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JPRS Report

East Europe

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10 JUNE 1987

EAST EUROPE

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BRIEFS

ATANASOV RECEIVES SOVIET MINISTER--In Sofia Atanasov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, has received Lukyanenko, USSR minister of chemical and petroleum machine-building. They discussed issues connected with the further expansion of cooperation between the two countries. Particular attention was devoted to cooperation in the field of machine-building and the creation of joint production associations and technology centers, and also to issues of giving assistance in the accelerated renovation of certain of Bulgaria's chemical enterprises. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 12 May 87 LD] /12232

DZHUROV MEETS SOVIET VETERANS--A group of Soviet Communists, fighters from the Red Army who took part in the Great Patriotic War, visited Bulgaria on a friendship air charter flight. Today the Soviet veterans had a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense and the Main Political Administration of the Bulgarian People's Army. They were cordially welcomed by Comrade Dobri Dzhurov. At the meeting stress was laid on the living force and the everlasting importance of Bulgarian-Soviet friendship. The veterans were awarded anniversary medals as a mark of gratitude for the victory over Hitler's fascism. Comrade Dobri Dzhurov handed the Soviet citizens memorial insignia. [Text] [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 13 May 87 AU] /12232

CUBAN CDR HEAD ATTENDS CONGRESS--Armando Acosta Cordero, national coordinator of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution [CDR], denounced U.S. imperialist policy today. Speaking in Sofia, Bulgaria, Acosta said that this policy was designed to fill the world with hot spots with unpredictable consequences. The Cuban leader said that proof of these intentions is the Central American situation, in which Washington's support for counterrevolutionary bands in Nicaragua produces more victims and material damage each day. Addressing the 10th Congress of the People's [as heard] Front taking place in Sofia, Acosta conveyed the greetings of the CDR and stated that the forum will give strong impetus to the Bulgarian people's efforts to achieve greater successes in the building of socialism. Acosta said that the world had changed a great deal in recent times, and imperialist ambitions today clashed with the policy of peace of socialist countries. [Text] [Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2047 GMT 14 May 87 FL] /12232

ORLOV ATTENDS CONGRESS--Sofia, 14 May (TASS)--The 10th Congress of the Fatherland Front of the People's Republic of Bulgaria opened today in the Bulgarian capital

at the People's Palace of Culture. More than 3,000 delegates, representing 4 million members of this, the country's most numerous socio-political organization, gave a warm welcome to Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, and other party and state leaders of Bulgaria. Taking part in the work of the forum are 49 foreign delegations, including a delegation from the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, headed by V.P. Orlov, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The congress was opened by Pencho Kubadinski, member of the Politburo of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the National Council of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0655 GMT 14 May 87 LD] /12232

SPANISH CP WORKING GROUP--Sofia, 18 May (BTA)--A working group of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party headed by Mr Jose Maria Coronas, member of the party's Secretariat, visited Bulgaria from 11 May to 18 May 1987 at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The delegation studied BCP's experience in the field of agriculture and the food industry. The working group was received by BCP CC Secretary Vasil Tsanov. ["Sharing BCP Experience"--BTA headline] [Text] [Sofia BTA in English 1648 GMT 18 May 87 AU] /12232

CUBAN JUSTICE MINISTER--Bulgarian Minister of Justice Svetla Raykova Daskalova has met in Sofia with her Cuban counterpart, Juan Escalona, who is on an official 3-day visit to that European country. The two exchanged information on the activities Cuba and Bulgaria carry out in the juridical field. [Text] [Havana International Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 18 May 87 PA] /12232

YORDANOV RECEIVES ZIMBABWE MINISTER--On 20 May Comrade Georgi Yordanov received David Karimanzira, Zimbabwe's minister of youth, sport, and culture. They discussed the possibilities of further expanding contacts in the intellectual sphere, science, youth activities, and sport. It was confirmed that cooperation in all areas and the cultural exchange between the two friendly countries are developing accordingly on an upward path. [Text] [Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgaria 1930 GMT 20 May 87 AU] /12232

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PRESS COMMENTARIES STRESS CONGRUENCE OF CHURCH, SOCIALIST VALUES

Jaruzelski Visit, Church-State Relations

Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 11 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Wladzimierz Wanat: "Between the State and Church -- Justifiable Signs for Optimism"]

[Text] In the last few weeks, we have witnessed several important facts and events that have clearly influenced the religious policy of our state and the relations between our government and the Roman Catholic Church and which have at the same time given us justifiable reason to be optimistic about their improvement. There has been obvious good will not only on the part of the state but also that of the church. The relationship between the two has developed in a correct manner and one beneficial to the ultimate interests of society. Negative aspects of church-state relations have been eliminated, dialogue has intensified and cooperation has increased. Much has been done to achieve mutual understanding, overcome doubts and eliminate prejudice.

One of these facts was the long conversation between the chairman of the Council of State, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and the Polish Primate, Cardinal Jozef Glemp, on 22 December of last year and, of course, General Jaruzelski's visit to the Vatican on 13 January of this year on which he held a long and frank talk with Pope John Paul II about Polish affairs and world peace. The Pope himself stated that the Vatican visit was an historical event. In both of these events which were important enough in themselves, it was discovered that the church and state had similar views about many issues of concern to our fatherland, the world and to peace. While discussing during their meeting the preparations for the Pope's coming visit to Poland in June 1987, W. Jaruzelski and Cardinal Glemp both agreed that "for the Pope's visit, there should now be created the proper conditions and above all a good climate for general church-state relations so that the visit will be of benefit to the faithful and to Poland herself". They both stated that "the visit will be still another opportunity for John Paul II to demonstrate his strong and respected commitment to peace".

This is one example of the adoption of a joint position by the highest representatives of the church and state. The same is true of General Jaruzelski's Vatican visit. As we know, the Pope himself felt that it was an historical occasion. At Fiumineno Airport in Rome a few days after that visit, the Polish Primate said that it was important "not only for Poland and Italy but also for East-West relations. I want for that visit to become a step forward for detente and make a contribution to understanding between nations with different political systems and ideologies". In an interview with SLOWO POWSZECHNE, the Primate announced that "General Jaruzelski's visit is and will remain very important. Above all, this visit has changed those imponderables constituted of certain psychological moods". In other words, the Vatican visit eliminated certain prejudices and doubts from church-state relations. The Cardinal also said that this was the first time a Polish head of state has visited the Pope in the Vatican. At a press conference in Rome on 14 January, General Jaruzelski himself spoke respectfully about the untiring activity of John Paul II in defense of peace and the great impression that his talk with the Pope made on him. "We agreed in full about the need for general European initiatives and efforts for detente and peace in Europe and in the world. We also expressed our shared belief that Italy and Poland can play an important role in this process". The general also announced that he had personally approved a written invitation for the Pope to visit Poland. Just after talking with the Pope, General Jaruzelski told a French journalist that he was very satisfied with the meeting and felt that John Paul II had agreed with him about the problems they discussed.

The Polish Council of State, Council of Ministers and the PZPR Central Committee Politburo all praised the Vatican visit. The Politburo "stressed the particular importance that dialogue and good relations between Poland and the Apostolic Capitol have in strengthening positive trends in international relations. This goal is also served by John Paul II's activity on behalf of peace and against the arms race and his efforts to aid bilateral disarmament and establish lasting principles of friendly cooperation between governments and nations. These goals form the basis for Polish foreign policy and the efforts of the entire socialist community. The Politburo described the role taken by dialogue between the Polish government and the Vatican and especially the attitude of John Paul II in creating good relations between the state and Catholic Church in Poland. It also emphasized the importance that the growth of these relations has in the process of national reconciliation and work for the good of our fatherland. The Politburo confirmed the unchanging nature of the religious policy of the socialist state with its will to constructively participate in the realization of the ultimate goals of the people and state and in the resolution of important problems in the life of our society".

The agreement between the highest officials of the state, party and church as to the significance of the Vatican visit seems obvious and only an unhealthily prejudiced person can deny that fact.

Here is still another example of the concurrence and agreement between the state and church — their shared assessment of their mutual relations. At his press conference in Rome, General Jaruzelski, in response to a question implying a poor state in these relations, said: "I personally know Cardinal Glemp quite well and as everyone knows, we met less than a month ago for a

very long talk and feel that church and state relations are developing correctly, which does mean that they are free of any problems but that we are trying to work together to resolve all issues for the good interests of Poland. The Vatican visit will be a strong impulse for further constructive development of these relations".

Let the malcontent and pessimist compare these words, not the only ones spoken by a representative of the highest government authority, with what Cardinal Glemp told a SLOWO POWSZECHNE correspondent in Rome about church-state relations: "We must see them not as a static figure but as a process in motion. They are growing in a dynamic manner. Indeed, there are many problems but step by step, we are trying to improve them. Together, we face problems that we will work to peacefully resolve". Does that not demonstrate a concurrence of attitudes, agreement and most importantly, good will?

The religious policy of our state is not transient or tactical in nature but stable. This comes from a sense of respect for the reality of religious persons and the Catholic Church with its thousand years of involvement in Polish history, from respect for peoples' right to personal beliefs and human dignity as well as the profound conviction that differences in opinions are unimportant in the face of the issues most important to the Polish people, peace and the development of Poland. There are very many of these important issues and their significance is immeasurable. Premier Z. Messner mentioned them recently in a Sejm report in which he said: "We want to cooperate with the church to fulfill supreme national interests such as a permanent and sovereign Polish state secure within its own borders, Poland's position within the world, economic growth, a peaceful life for our people, cultivation of national traditions and above all, a stronger peace. We have also proposed working cooperation in areas such as help for families with material difficulties, support for the elderly and infirm and the control of crime, alcoholism and drug addiction".

One would have to have an entirely hostile or hateful attitude to say that the church would be violating the principles of its faith to cooperate with the state on these matters.

Premier Messner also said that the state wants its relations with the church "based on dialogue and mutual respect for the achievement of internal policy goals that are not or cannot be disputed and that these relations should be based on full recognition of the socialist state and the full right of churches to fulfill their pastoral mission". Speaking of the existence of favorable conditions for constructive coexistence and cooperation between the state and church, the premier added that "they would in the interests of the Polish people and above all of religious Poles. The existence of philosophical and ideological differences and disputes do not have to lead to conflicts. The church's acceptance of the offer of lasting coexistence and cooperation would help to actively eliminate nonreligious activities from the churches in which they are taking place".

Unfortunately, nonreligious activities are taking place in church sanctuaries. Political farces, the use of the pulpit by various disappointed figures of the opposition and sometimes even by former marxists, bitterly provocative

sermons, calls to sing "God give us back our free fatherland...", hands raised with two fingers strangely parted — these are actions that hurt everyone, the church, state and public alike. Fortunately, even if they are loud, there are no longer many such initiators and religious imposters.

With such a good climate for better church-state relations and the encouraging statements of the leadership in both camps, more than one reader has asked why such things happen. One can answer that these actions are just a small part of the church's normal pastoral activities but they constitute discord which ruins preparations for Pope John Paul II's third pilgrimage to Poland. One can also say that they will be effectively suppressed. People are being irritated by political, primitive and antisocialist agitation in the churches just like they are annoyed by the unnecessary bureaucratic distortions in the state government which is currently being consistently eliminated or the brazen simplified atheist propaganda which is also no longer so prevalent.

In a 6 January sermon in a Warsaw cathedral, Cardinal Glemp assured his listeners that "we sincerely wish to help our fatherland of Poland" and in another place talked about the "need for collective wisdom". I quote that as an expression of the church's willingness to help solve difficult national problems. In the same homily which was not lacking in its own controversial themes, the Polish Primate categorically stated that "we are strongly against the cultivation in Polish churches of politics, regardless of whatever orientation it takes". Does such a statement not augur a cleansing of the atmosphere of relations between the church and state and honest preparation for the Pope's visit?

There are still two other facts that support my optimism. For the first time in recent history, a Polish Primate has been visit the Soviet Union. At this time, I cannot go there," he answered. "An episcopal delegation will go there and if they invite me again later, I will go". The Russians wanted Cardinal Glemp to participate in an international peace conference organized by the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Pimen.

The invitation of the Polish Primate to the USSR is an important event not only in the relations between the Catholic Church in Poland and the Russian church but also in the Vatican's entire eastern policy and Soviet attitudes toward the church. Let me cite another important fact which is Cardinal Glemp's granting an interview to the editor of the famous Soviet weekly, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. This is an unprecedented event in the history of the Soviet Union and an occasion which is truly historical. A Soviet journalist has asked for an interview with the Polish Primate, the leader of the Catholic Church in Poland. The highest official of this church agreed and therefore millions of readers in the Soviet Union and many other countries became familiar with Cardinal Glemp's views on protecting world peace and international cooperation.

The facts and events described here clearly support an optimistic view of the development of church-state relations in our country, the growth of cooperation, the improvement of our relations with the Apostolic Capitol, the creation of a good climate for the Pope's visit as a Pole returning to his fatherland. All of this destroys the last illusions of the obdurate, full of

hate for socialist Poland and has taken place according to the wishes of most of society.

Church Views on Poverty, Social Justice

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 17 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by Zdzislaw Morawski, permanent Rome correspondent: "The Vatican -- a New Look at the East — Realms of Cooperation"]

[Text] Rome, March. "He covered the hungry with good things and sent the rich away with empty hands". These words from the "magnificat" or the prayer of the Mother of God which are also one of the fundamental liturgical texts were read by Pope John Paul II in this year's Ash Wednesday message.

They give the sense of one of the basic moral canons of the entire faith and that is that poverty is good and a virtue that brings one closer to God and that wealth is an evil that blocks the way to salvation.

The church's understanding of poverty is certainly an unusually complex problem which has led to much discussion and even conflict. That has been true almost from the very beginnings of the church which has not always stood on the side of the impoverished and has often even sided with the rich and powerful.

However, that truth can obscure another one: the church's siding with the rich in past centuries has given it neither any benefit nor authority. The fate of Catholicism in France, once called the "first daughter of the church" but now inhabited by a population largely nonreligious, is particularly instructive. The church in France lost its position in the 19th century when it spoke out against the working masses and sided with the wealthy in a struggle that became one of the prime movers of history.

This struggle still continues over enormous areas of the world and under different conditions and remains not only a tremendous political and social problem but also a moral one. By problem, what I mean is one associated with a term used by the fathers of the French revolution and later by the worker's movement -- social justice. Today, this term is the basic canon of every decalogue of social ethics. The church adopted it a long time ago and has made it a part of its everyday social doctrine.

Justice seen not only as the proper behavior of the Biblical "just man" or individual but also as a necessary requirement of social coexistence is, as the famous Catholic theologian Hans Kueng wrote, "the sister of poverty in our world in which an excess of wealth among some is neighbored by hunger among others".

If we add that one of the continents most keenly affected by social injustice, Latin America, is also the continent inhabited by most of the world's Catholics, we can then see the importance that the problem has not only for modern Catholic ethics but also for the fate of that church in the 21st century.

At this point, we again see the political side of the problem. In the issue of social fairness which is today seen as a value of prime importance to the fate of the world, capitalism which until recently was very close allied to the church in terms of traditions and certain ideological problems (as described in a previous report), has turned out to be a system more sharply and clearly opposed to the church's social doctrine.

As recently as during the pontificates of the two preceding Popes, John XXIII and Paul VI, criticism of some social phenomena unavoidably associated with this system became a permanent part of church teachings. Some aspects of this criticism were intensified during the present pontificate. Exploitation, unemployment, poverty, the activity of international monopolies and firms and the economic exploitation of poor countries by rich ones were the subjects of encyclicals such as "Laborem exercens" or the earlier "Populorum progressio". These issues are also often addressed by the present Pope as well.

There are so many types of criticism that one can already say that the church has developed a well-defined and progressive doctrine which rejects everything in capitalism that is unfair and therefore, its very meaning with regard to material life.

This condemnation does not at all mean that the modern church is uncritical of socialism. The church's criticism of socialism above all concerns matters of doctrine connected with the individual's opposition to collectivization, the attitude toward personal rights and liberties and the church's role and place within society and the state.

These are serious doctrinal and philosophical problems that cannot be overcome. At the same time, with regard to the practice of life and to reality, it has not always been apparent where the problem lay.

It would be intellectually dishonest to cover up or ignore these differences. However, in the problem of social justice which is so important to billions of people, especially those living in poor countries, the church and world socialism often have the same position despite the fact that their ideological motivations are different.

There certainly has and will continue to be resistance to this cooperation from both sides. Socialism would have to have existed for decades before it could completely discard its assumptions that religion is a part of certain social orders such as feudalism and capitalism and will automatically disappear as socialism grows. Such simplifications were also applied to the role of the church which was once seen as an intellectual and organizational "agent of imperialism".

The time has passed for that type of thinking. The experiences of our country in the transformation of society on an international scale was and will remain the first concern.

On the other hand, considerable groups within the church continue to fear that Catholic cooperation with popular lay movements and marxist or semimarxist movements in Latin America will somehow "contaminate" Catholicism. These fears were most clearly expressed in the memorable document of the Vatican congregation on doctrine and faith which warned against the so-called dangers of "liberation theology".

However, this document led to so much protest within the Latin American church that it had to be corrected enough to partially alleviate its most controversial passages. Meanwhile, the extent of cooperation between lay revolutionary forces and popular Catholic movements is on this continent and beyond a fact that underscores the future of Catholicism and of social changes. The truths of life are stronger than any dogma, regardless of where they may originate.

In the understanding of theologians, the church has two faces. On one side, it is the emanation of salvation and deals with transcendental truths that are not subject to the laws of history. On the other hand, it is also an organization or a society of the faithful which functions within the material world and is subject to the laws of that world and its transformations. In this second, concrete and measurable realm of cooperation between the forces of the social leftists which are predominantly lay persons and the Catholic movements as well as the church itself and the Vatican, it has become a fact rather than the anomaly that dogmatists on both sides wish to see.

It is a fact of historical significance, an enormous metamorphosis and in the opinion of many intellectuals both Catholic and marxist, an augur of a "great meeting" of intellectual and social forces and mainstreams once hostile to each other. This has already become a reality in the struggle for peace.
Church Views on Poverty, Social Justice

Church-State Dialogue Enters New Phase

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 21-22 Mar 87 p 7

[Article by Zdzislaw Morawski: "Why It Is Historical -- A New Stage in the Dialogue"]

[Text] Rome in March. More than two months have already passed since the chairman of the Council of State, Wojciech Jaruzelski, visited beyond the Bronze Gate. Pope John Paul II defined this visit as an historical one. There were two factors that certainly made that an historical event. One was the fact that a Polish Pope and therefore the supreme leader of the church officially received a visit to the Vatican by a Polish head of state and that these two most famous representatives of our nation talked to one another as Poles but also as the heads of two different states. To put it briefly, the meeting was historical in terms of the position, role and authority of both persons.

"However," as George Bernard Shaw said many years ago, "history is made up of events and the time that gives them their meaning".

Two months is very little time on the historical scale but it has been enough to try to determine whether this meeting would be important for only a day or a week or whether it would have long-term effects and initiate processes of greater significance in the long run.

Using such a criterium, we will now try to look at this memorable visit in light of the facts.

Let us start with the basic Polish concern. In recent months, we have seen a more or less official confirmation of an important evaluation of the place and role of religion and of the church within the socialist state. I am talking about the public statement of government officials that the church's role is not a temporary but a permanent one. This conclusion was based on the historical experiences of the entire last four in our country. However, it has up to now never been so clearly stated as it has since that memorable visit.

In an interview for the Portuguese journal O DIARIO (20 February 1987), Wojciech Jaruzelski spoke about this subject as follows: "With all of our ideological differences, the visit showed how well we can understand one another to find solutions to the ultimate problems...The many philosophical differences should not pose an obstacle to better cooperation wherever it is possible to cooperate and there are many such possibilities".

In the same interview, Wojciech Jaruzelski talked about the "constructive coexistence of the socialist state and Catholic Church in Poland" and added that "even in this regard, we would like to help build a certain pattern or model".

As we see, this is not only a matter of our understanding of practical experiences in the coexistence of church and socialist state in People's Poland but also a new element in the concept of the state's relation to the church and its role in a socialist society.

If we make it our premise to accept the permanence of the church and religion (which was 20 years ago regarded as a leftover from moribund social systems), this brings us to certain conclusions. We must be able to answer several important questions such as what is and what can be a permanent place for the church in our system, what role does the church take in a socialist state and what issues are controversial?

It is not only the state but also the church and its followers that must find an answer to these questions.

Considering the numerous declarations of our Episcopate and especially the recent ones, these questions and their numerous consequences have been fully perceived. During his visit to Brussels, the Polish Primate, Cardinal Jozef Glemp, read a passage titled "The Church's Way in People's Poland". In conclusion, Cardinal Glemp formulated in the following manner one of the conclusions reached from the church's recent experiences: "Catholics too are looking at the Earth and above all seeing the need for moral principles to win if we are to achieve proper social coexistence. In this respect, faith must therefore come together with ideology to build something of value".

This is a very profound thought that much better than slogans conveys the belief that the framework within which the church functions in Poland is a permanent one and that regardless of all ideological differences, it is necessary to work together to build.

Would such a statement that indirectly accepts socialism as the real framework for every earthly deed have been possible before January and the memorable visit and talk between two famous Poles? Did the statements made then not constitute a breakthrough into a common point of view on many of the problems of our fatherland?

There is much evidence that this was indeed the case and furthermore, the C. feels that this is how things should be in the future.

He . . . another fragment of the passage read by the Polish Primate: "It is being said more and more openly that the church has a permanent existence under the socialist state. However, it is not enough to reinforce that with doctrinal quotations. The task of every Christian is to provide arguments through the open confession of his or her faith. The meaning of facts is often considered by dialectical thinking.

"However, what is more important is the awareness that the solidarity of the entire human family will overcome all barriers and divisions by starting with the things that join us" (All of the quotes from Cardinal Glemp's statements were translated from the French language in which the passage was originally read).

Do those of us that think dialectically feel the touch of the Primate's irony in reference to our dialectics? I do not think so. I do however think that we are all satisfied with the final conclusion of that statement.

Therefore, we must look for the things that bring us together! We must overcome barriers and not the ideological ones because that would be both senseless and harmful to the identity of every party to the historical dispute. It is the barriers of unjustified suspicion, dislike, passivity and resignation and prejudice that we must overcome because for whatever reason they have come into being, they hurt the human family in our country too.

Not long ago in my article "Pontificate for Peace" for this newspaper, I wrote about the role of John Paul II in his moral, social and diplomatic activity on behalf of the supreme value that is peace based on social justice and human dignity. In this year's document of the International Peace Day which was celebrated by the church on 1 January, the Pope emphasized, as one would assume on the basis of his experiences as a Pole, that peace in today's world is indivisible and not only in the geographical sense but also in the moral sense. Therefore, an awareness of this indivisibility of peace which Wojciech Jaruzelski described in a very similar manner at his Rome press conference is in today's endangered world an ultimate value which stands above all political and ideological divisions, social differences and above all things that can and do divide people in a pluralistic world and the pluralistic society of our country.

I have already spent several days writing this article. As I stop to hear the half-hours news broadcast in Italian by the Vatican radio, I hear about the communique from the latest conference of the Polish Episcopacy. "Poles," I hear on the Vatican broadcast, "can unite to build themselves a home. That is the sense of the Polish bishops' announcement following the Rome meeting of the Chief Episcopacy with the Pope".

When that meeting took place a few weeks ago, the Italian press reminded its readers that this was a double occasion for the Pope to convey to Polish cardinals and metropolitans the contents and meaning of his meeting with the chairman of the Council of State and for the Pope himself to receive from these Polish church figures their own assessment of the conditions that the visit created for his pilgrimage to his homeland.

Judging from the content of the bishops' conference communique which the readers must already know quite well and the commentary that it has produced here in Rome and the Vatican, these were assessments and evaluations of great importance not only to the church but also to our entire nation.

My Roman acquaintance who has for years observed the Polish church and its relations with the state, recently told me: "The Polish dialogue has reached a new stage. Whoever still doubted that in January can now rest assured. At one time, whenever people here thought about Poland, they said that there was a marginal dialogue based chiefly on confrontation. Today, they talk about a dominant dialogue with less and less confrontation and that is a change of historical significance".

Views on Peace, Arms Race Compared

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 24 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by Ryszard Drecki: "The vatican on the Peace Issue -- Growing Commitment"]

[Text] One of the characteristics of our times is the broadening of the forces in spite of the political, ideological and philosophical differences dividing them perceive dangers to world peace and come out in its defense. Most certainly, one of the most important examples of this is the interesting evolution of the Vatican's attitude toward the key issues of war and peace, the arms race and disarmament.

Speeches for preserving the peace are not really part of the Vatican traditions of the last few decades but a new development. Since the times of Pope John XXIII, we can add the Vatican to the list of forces for peace in the modern sense of the concept. In his encyclical "Pacem in terris", that famous Pope stated unequivocally that "the disputes that may arise between nations should be solved not by armed force but by negotiation".

An Active Line

Although his pontificate it was marked by a certain regression from the "radical pacifism" of his predecessor, Paul VI still issued scores of enunciations devoted to the cause of peace, established the World Peace Day celebrated on 1 January of each year and involved the Apostolic Capitol in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

In principle, the present pontificate has also taken an active line from the start. For example, under the auspices of the Papal Academy of Sciences, specialists from Brazil, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union worked out a declaration in December 1981 which pointed out the catastrophic medical effects of the use of nuclear and conventional weapons and in June 1982, John Paul II sent a sermon on disarmament to the 2nd Special Session of the United Nations Organization.

In this latter document we read: "To reject peace in our times means not only to cause the suffering and loss that war, even limited war, causes now more than ever but also to make it possible for entire regions to be destroyed or to cause a catastrophe of greater and even universal magnitude".

This evolution in the Vatican's attitude therefore does not consist of the emergence of a Vatican peace movement but the appearance within that institution of elements that have not been all that obvious or pronounced up to now. For example, to this we must include the specification of language and the better adaptation of certain methods of thinking to the realia of the international situation.

The Vatican statements on behalf of peace which previously had obvious religious motives approached the problem of protecting humanity against war almost exclusively in terms of ethics and peace was regarded as a function of

these values such as love or justice. That ethical approach was more related to individuals than to human societies. That meant that these statements were often too general, unconvincing to noncatholic societies and that they sometimes even missed the whole point of the problem.

This approach taken by the most recent statements and documents of the present Pope has not abated by any means and, to use the Catholic expression, its teachings on peace have made concrete references understandable to all.

The Call for Dialogue

A fairly typical example in this regard was the proclamation for Peace Day 1986. This included very general statements that "peace is a value that knows no divisions" and references to "participation in the building of a single peace based on social justice and the dignity and rights of every human being".

However, at the same time, John Paul II stated clearly that "the most dramatic example of insecurity in peace is the continuing specter of atomic weapons". This proclamation aroused a dialogue between the world powers that "is more necessary today than ever before". The proclamation also spoke about specific fields for dialogue offered by the "negotiations in Geneva aimed at reducing and limiting weapons" and "talks in the spirit of the multilateral process started by the Final Act of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation". In January of last year, shortly after this proclamation, John Paul II made a direct reference to the Geneva meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev and characterized it as "an interesting step toward dialogue".

These specific references in papal speeches must have more than ever before inclined church statements toward condemnation of the most significant danger to peace, the arms race. Speaking to a group of scientists in 7 November of last year, John Paul II very clearly referred to the Strategic Defense Initiative:

"I ask that you continue to strive for peace and understanding and make new efforts to prevent the use of space technology for military purposes".

A few days prior to that, the chairman of the Papal Academy of Sciences, Professor Carlos Chagas, said at the 50th anniversary meeting of the academy:

"As the Papal Academy of Sciences, we have still not started any thorough studies on "star wars". I can however say that we are definitely against such a form of warfare from both a scientific and a moral point of view".

The Vatican's lack of condemnation for the line of the United States Catholic Episcopacy which has become one of the centers of internal opposition to Reagan's arms race and his "star wars" can be seen as an indirect and even practical indicator of the Vatican's own present attitude toward the arms race.

Demonstration in Assissi

Vatican activities have also been marked recently by a transition from purely verbal statements to other more active forms.

An example of this was the meeting on 27 October of last year of the leaders and priests of various Christian and non-Christian faiths that was organized by John Paul II. This meeting, "a common prayer for peace", was strictly religious in form but there was no doubt that it was a very spectacular event of real political significance and a demonstration of readiness to defend peace. One could agree with Cardinal Glemp when in his interview with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA he acknowledged that the Assissi meeting was "of great importance to the consolidation of peace".

The Vatican's growing commitment to peace inclines one to speak of the present pontificate as a "peace pontificate" and one cause of that is the Polish pedigree of the present Pope. The famous Catholic thinker Jean Guitton said of John Paul II: "A Pole and therefore the representative of the nation most tormented by World War II naturally understands and feels more strongly than any others the tragedy of war, the value of peace and the evil that is war".

Without undermining the significance of the pedigree of a Polish Pope, it still seems that the reason the Vatican has become more active in the cause of peace should be above all sought in the dimension and quality of today's arms race. The dangers to humanity today is so great and obvious that every significant military power that has a feeling of responsibility for the fate of man wishes and is somehow compelled to redouble efforts to protect peace.

Field of Agreement

Meanwhile, from the Polish point of view, there is another interesting aspect of this phenomenon. The Vatican's stronger commitment to peace undoubtedly means that it is bringing itself closer to the "traditional" states and forces that have always been for peace and therefore closer to People's Poland which has always played a significant role among these nations. "We were in complete agreement," said Wojciech Jaruzelski after his last conversation with John Paul II, "about the need for general European initiatives and efforts on behalf of detente and peace in Europe and the world".

A shared awareness of the dangers to peace and the will to oppose them create a field in which the views of our state and those of the Vatican come very close and constitutes one of the areas in which both sides can open themselves to understanding, agreement and cooperation".

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CATHOLIC WEEKLY COMMENTS ON SPIRITUAL EFFECTS OF PAPAL VISITS

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 11, 15 Mar 87 pp 1,2

[Article by Marcin Krol: "Before the Third Pilgrimage"]

[Text] The feeling we experienced during the Holy Father's first pilgrimage to Poland in 1979, the meaning it had in public life, were described so often and with such an emotional charge that devaluation of memory and emotion threatened succeeding descriptions and recollections. It was similar, though somewhat different, during the second visit. And without the slightest doubt, in June of this year we will again experience great emotion, great spiritual intensity, great national unity. I need not dwell on what is certain, obvious and totally predictable. So I will try to look at the first two visits and the coming third one in particular a bit more coolly and from a point of view that is a bit different from the usual.

The first pilgrimage--and here I am talking all the while about spiritual and social matters, not about purely religious experiences--undoubtedly caused society's awakening from a longstanding torpor. The very feeling of community, a physical community of millions, as well as a national community, had cathartic and tangible consequences. But one should also remember about the personal experiences of individuals. We do not know much about this subject, but by recalling people close to me, recalling myself in those days, I can risk this interpretation.

We lived at that time in the reality of the social "propaganda of success" and the rapidly progressing collapse of the economy and moral values as well. In the first years of the Gierek era, society's appetite for material values was clearly whetted, which helped to some extent in the deterioration of the common image of the spiritual world. Corruption and shameless self-enrichment by a few, visible individuals admittedly aroused indignation but envy too. A chasm developed, not so much between "government" and "society" as between the model of rapid, cynical, relentless and often illegal getting along, e.g., acquiring things and goods, and moral and spiritual models. Moreover, this discrepancy often occurred in the souls of individuals who were already totally confused, who did not know what was more important--to get along or be faithful to values instilled since childhood. Opposition grew, to be sure, but its influence was limited to a few, relatively small centers and its struggle was also rather absurd against the background of absurd reality. Do not cheat,

do not lie, be fair--these are undoubtedly appropriate commands, but just repeating them, as we know, does not change much.

Then suddenly those few days spent listening to John Paul II, amid the crowds but in fact in solitude, led to an explanation or, in other cases, to a fortification of an already clear attitude but one continuously undermined by the surrounding world, toward what is truly important and what is secondary or not important at all. Those few days gave our life a note of dignity and reflection, allowed some to survive the shock, others to become more aware of their own life and extricate themselves from distraction and uncertainty. And I think that on a society-wide scale as well, this help in discovering a simple, sure road had colossal significance. It was only the self-discovery or inner fortification of people, individual, particular people, that could bring consequences important to all of society. Because real people are only individuals and only individuals have a conscience.

Today we rightly recall the Holy Father's first pilgrimage as the one that awakened the nation and had an unquestionable effect on the emergence of Solidarity, but we wrongly recall it less as the one that awakened us ourselves, that restored dignity to individual reflection and individual destinies. It is also worth looking at the second visit, which after all occurred in a radically different external climate, from the individual point of view.

From the first moments at the stadium in Warsaw, John Paul II talked about triumph. As a community, as a society and nation we could have interpreted those words in a moral sense. This fortification, consolation and reassurance of hearts was necessary, essential then. At the same time, triumph in the pope's sermons was triumph "in a future age," a hope for triumph in the plans of Providence, which helped us get away from the unhappy circumstances of the time and look at the world from the perspective of long endurance. So the national functions of the second visit were extremely obvious. But how did we perceive it as individual people?

We waited for the Holy Father with joy, but also with a little anxiety. We knew that he was also coming to console us, but a person who finds himself in a difficult situation does not always want consolation at any price. The first words spoken at Warsaw airport reassured us immediately and dispelled all doubt. At the same time, meeting with the Holy Father made it possible for us as individuals to escape not from torpor any longer but from our frenetic relations with the world. Previously, at the end of the 1970s, our relationship had been weakened by the Gierek years, while now it was marked by bitterness and a kind of utilitarian thinking: we deserved but we did not receive. It seems that this second intense reminder of the true hierarchy of values helped placed hopes and disappointments in the spiritual world, helped us depart from understandable but superficial and fruitless or rather destructive reactions and purely psychological resentments. It helped us be strengthened in convictions and attitudes already attained and to realize that bitter hope and pessimism relate only to what is here and now, not to the whole future.

So the third pilgrimage will be a journey to a changed country and to changed people above all. People aware of what they want from the world and from themselves, people once revitalized then disappointed, but aware that they must look for a place for themselves in the world as it really exists. We always expect fortification, consolation and a feeling of community. We always need a reminder of fundamental truths and moral commands, which we do not keep as we should. It is also always good to be together, to see the pope who speaks to us from a high place, while only the sun shines behind him.

We know all this, we are waiting for this with joy and without concern that it will not happen. But how can the Holy Father's third pilgrimage help us as individuals? For a while and from many sides we have been hearing calls formulated in a bit different language, a bit different tone. The international situation seems to be more favorable to changes in Poland and suggestions in a similar direction are also flowing from the Soviet Union. Although important, these changes do not have a direct impact on our life and, as a result of the psychological mechanisms mentioned, we even perceive a certain diminution of authentic forms of community life and more ineffective use than existing circumstances and limitations permit of the organizational forms accessible to us.

So as a result of this visit, we can anticipate and expect a strengthening of our feeling of individual freedom and a practical desire to use that freedom. We know that man is spiritually free under any circumstances, that he can be free if he himself can fight for that inner freedom. But we also know that one can make broad use of the inner freedom he already possesses. I think that the change that occurred over the past seven years among particular individuals is based mainly on our having achieved a feeling of the potential possibility of inner freedom. We have learned that we are people who have our own identity; we have also learned that as individuals we have our own identity. We are diverse and because of this we also imagine diverse ways and forms of making use of our freedom. Nevertheless, we have learned to want to use that freedom.

To make use of one's own individual freedom does not necessarily mean working in the public sphere. On the contrary, as the best examples from the history of spirituality show, one may remove oneself from public life in order to intensify the inner, spiritual experience of the world. As is apparent, in contemporary Poland there are relatively many examples of such an attitude and communities, neo-catechumenical movements and various other forms of secular life within the church make strengthening of this position possible.

The mystical position, or even attitudes similar to it, have always been an exceptionally strong and important but at the same time marginal trend in the church. The church works in the existing world and does not encourage escape from this world by any means. The harder it is to work in the existing, real world, the stronger the inclination to remove oneself to the truly or apparently "pure" regions of spirituality. Everyone does as he thinks best with his own freedom. That is precisely what freedom is based on and so we may not question this kind of decision, this religious "internal immigration." Yet the attitude of the Holy Father, involved with incomparable energy in the diverse problems of the contemporary, temporal world, should turn our attention to certain opportunities and possibilities.

Regardless of numerous limitations we have a significant margin of social freedom, an area where we can fulfill our inner freedom. We are no longer threatened by torpor and consolation is not what we need most. A stimulus to work under changed conditions is essential. Keeping the past in mind, we must find means for life in the future, life in this country and under circumstances such as those in which we are to live. In attempting to act publicly under these conditions, in my opinion, we must reach for new models and methods. Because those that we know from the not so distant and distant past have brought us many instructive experiences, but they do not fit our present situation very well.

Indeed the social benefit from John Paul II's visit (I am not talking about its purely religious aspects here) should be based on the fortification and growth of individualism in our country. At first glance this seems to be contradictory to the communal nature of the church and the feeling of community we experience so strongly when listening to the pope's words amid the crowds of millions. Nevertheless, it is this strength of community that also makes particular individuals strong. One can achieve inner freedom in public and social, educational and economic activity more freely if our feeling of belonging to a community is stronger. Furthermore, the stronger the community, the less necessary is its defense, the more courageously we can undertake the risk of action, because all action is always associated with risk, namely the risk of failure.

Undoubtedly the time of nations as communities organizing the life of individuals has not yet passed; however, this communal vision of reality and treatment of the community (family, religious, national) as the exclusive framework for human life produces neglect and disregard of the concept of the "liberal minimum" already prevalent in all of Western culture. In this culture the individual has two spheres of reference, one of a communal nature, the other of a liberal nature. Relations between these two spheres do not always come together without conflict. Yet after all, life is not based on avoiding conflicts but rather on resolving them according to existing written and unwritten rules. The "liberal minimum" is not only the minimum of human rights but also individual responsibility for actions undertaken and therefore authority for individual action and for individuals to come together in bodies serving to resolve specific, concrete, current problems. Yet such bodies are no longer communities but rather purposeful groups in which we participate prompted by our own interest, which can often be equated with the public interest or serve it indirectly, such as when economic activity produces an increase in the number of goods on the market.

Economic activity, in our difficult situation, is the first, most prominent example, but my remarks concern educational or cultural activity to an equal extent. So, strong because of our belonging to a strong community, we can even more easily undertake individual initiatives, no longer as members of a community but as free people with a strong feeling of inner freedom. The development of civil society depends on the development of just such initiatives.

I know the Holy Father is not coming to Poland to stimulate the development of civil society, but I also believe that how we understand the social aspects of

his visit and the conclusions we draw from it depend on us. As I mentioned, we can be certain in advance that our religious and national community will undergo further fortification but, if I may say so, if we were to stop at these feelings we would be taking a passive position on the pilgrimage of John Paul II. But if its effect is to give impetus to our action as independent individuals, a reminder to us of law and revitalization of the desire for pro-social action, then we will make active use of those six festive days in Poland.

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PZPR VOIVODSHIP PLENUMS REPORTED**Economic Evaluation in Olsztyn**

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Mar 87 p 2

[**"Field Session on Economic Results"—PAP report; under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"**]

[Excerpt] Olsztyn. Assessment of economic results in the first year of implementation of the 5-Year Plan and the tasks for 1987 in the light of the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress and the Third Central Committee Plenum were the topics of a field session of the Voivodship PZPR Committee in Plock. The deliberations were preceded by a seminar at which members of the Plock party echelon discussed within working groups the draft 1986-1990 voivodship socioeconomic plan.

The current year and the years following it should, it was stated, bring above all an acceleration of qualitative changes ensuing in more efficient management and improved utilization of available resources. Roman Ruminski, first secretary of the PZPR committee at the Mazowsze Refinery and Petrochemical Works, declared, "An important road in that direction should be the application and promotion worker initiatives and resourcefulness as well as of various forms of conservation and improvements in internal cost-effectiveness accounting."

The tasks of party echelons and organizations in these projects were defined precisely in the adopted resolution.

Przemysl Features Youth Issues

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Ryszard Zatorski: "**With Youth and Caring For It**" under the rubric "**Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees**"]

[Text] Przemysl. The course of the last Voivodship PZPR Committee plenum was unusual. It was preceded by analysis of the fulfillment of the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress and the plenary session of May 1984 of the Voivodship

PZPR Committee on youth affairs. What has already been accomplished, and what has to be changed?

It was precisely during meetings with leading secondary-school students, as emphasized by Zenon Czech, first secretary of the Voivodship PZPR Committee, who chaired the deliberations, that the initiative of establishing school youth councils under people's councils, chiefly in cities, was conceived. These councils were not only to be endowed with advisory powers, as was established during the discussions, but also with the power of disposing of a specific amount of monies for distribution, in accordance with its suggestions, to meet the needs of youth in the community.

I listened to the discussion on the life start and career start of youth — ardent, very sincere, and spontaneous discussion. One of the specific features of Przemysl Voivodship is that its population is mostly rural, and at the same time consists more than 60 percent of young people. As stated, their educational background is higher than that of their parents, but when they take over neglected farms, they need assistance not only from the state administration but also from the youth organization.

The proposals presented during discussion by taskforces provided a basis for complementing the program of action of the voivodship party organization on behalf of youth and with youth, because young people account for one-fourth of its membership. Among other things, the need to promote the advancement of young people and entrust to them responsible leading offices was pointed out.

It was strongly emphasized that our organization does not regard youth problems as something artificially isolated from general social problems. Measures are being taken out of concern for youth, but also with the idea that they should be executed together with youth.

Wroclaw Reinforces POP Role

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Czeslaw Kubasik: "Deeds, Not Slogans" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Excerpt] Wroclaw. "In our party work we shall abandon slogans such as 'Streamline the Performance of Retail Trade.' To act instead of sloganeering means to specify tasks to be accomplished, their deadlines, and the persons responsible for accomplishing them," declared First Secretary of the Wroclaw Voivodship PZPR Committee Zdzislaw Ralicki at its 25 March 1987 plenary session devoted to discussing party tasks for 1987.

First Secretary of the Kobierzyce Gmina PZPR Committee Czeslaw Cichy told the TRYBUNA LUDU reporter: "Our most important task is to strengthen 30 POP's [basic party organizations], including 11 active in the countryside. Above all, within the rural POP's we intend to assign specific tasks to each party member in developing agricultural production and making it more marketable and profitable. Party members must provide an example of cost-effective work and social activism."

Electrician Stanislaw Wilczynski of the HUTMEN Nonferrrous Metals Processing Works told us that his work and that of his fellow workers is being disturbed by the lack of consistency and credibility in the handling of many issues. "We want to and can produce more, but coproduction is uncoordinated, resulting in production disturbances."

He added, "In our community we have many devoted non-party member fellow workers. We [party members] must be credible and provide the necessary cogent arguments when explaining many problems of concern to people. We should enhance the responsibility of all for the performance of their tasks and be consistent in evaluating each individual's labor input. In my opinion, this is the way to strengthen the party's authority and broaden party membership with valuable representatives of the working class."

Moral Health Issue Draws Varied Groups

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Tadeusz Kajan: "Educate by Personal Example" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] Zielona Gora. The party's activism in promoting moral health and combatting social pathology was a topic of the plenary session of the Zielona Gora Voivodship PZPR Committee on 25 March 1987.

During preparations for this session, Committee members and local aktiv took part in consultative meetings attended by non-party member activists and representatives of certain communities, especially the legal, medical, and educational communities. Others invited to attend these meetings were representatives of the allied political parties, the trade-union movement, youth organizations, and societies active in the domains of education, family problems, and work culture. The deliberations were attended by Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Zbigniew Pudysz.

First Secretary of the Zielona Gora Voivodship PZPR Committee Zbigniew Nieminski declared in his opening address, "It is the national and humanist duty of our party to awaken social sensitivity and spur community activism in the direction of a resolute struggle against distortions and deformations, against anything that harms the ethically accepted system of values and cripples morally the individual and the community."

Many Zielona Gora party activists, namely, Helena Kaszubowa, Henryk Baturo, Aleksander Borysewicz, Kazimierz Jaskula, and Stanislaw Kobzda, then took the floor to discuss aspects of the operation of institutions, organizations, counseling clinics, and associations whose proper activity should promote consolidating moral health in the life of the society.

Particular tasks are specified in the resolution adopted toward the end of the session.

Export Production Stressed

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Czeslaw Kubasik: "Plenary Deliberations of the Voivodship Committee" subtitled "Eliminating Barriers to Production" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Excerpt] Jelenia Gora. Ways of increasing output and exports, improving quality of production, and streamlining the performance of enterprises were discussed at the plenary session of the Jelenia Gora Voivodship PZPR Committee and linked to the resolutions of the Third PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

The Chairman of the Voivodship Committee Commission Zdzislaw Szmajdzinski said, "No one needs be convinced about [the expediency of] exports, but the potential for them is not being tapped at plants and factories owing to the existence of many barriers to trade with foreign customers. There are shortages of raw materials, packagings, and even ordinary cardboard boxes."

Success Depends on Exports

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by Tadeusz Wiacek: "Every Plant Has Export Opportunities" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] Kielce. The resolutions of the Third PZPR Central Committee Plenum concerning, in particular, the intensification of exports as a factor spurring the economy of Kielce, were the subject of discussion of the voivodship party organization.

The deliberations were chaired by First Secretary of the Kielce Voivodship PZPR Committee Jaroslaw Motyka and attended by, among others, Chairman of the National Bank of Poland Professor Wladyslaw Palka and Rector of the Academy of Social Sciences and Sejm Deputy from Kielce Professor Jarema Maciszewski.

It was said that production for export requires not only better raw and other materials but also more up-to-date machinery and equipment and highly skilled and properly trained workers. To be sure, exporters benefit from tax discounts, systematic awards and bonuses, and higher depreciation rates, and they have priority in receiving supplies of scarce raw and other materials as well as other preferences, but not all feel capable and ambitious of elevating the level of their work and the quality of their products to match the high requirements of foreign customers.

Joint Session with ZSL in Torun

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Marek Badtke: "The List of Needs is Huge" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] Torun. The possibilities for the development of agriculture and the agricultural and food industry are — judging from the comments of discussants at the joint plenary session of the Torun Voivodship executive committees of the PZPR and the ZSL [United Peasant Party] — mainly contingent on meeting all the expectations of the Torun countryside.

The list of needs is indeed tremendous. In addition to such topics as the shortages of coal, fertilizers, and chemical crop protectants, as well as the fatal [as published] quality of machinery, the discussion also extended to color TV sets.

The adopted resolution stresses the need to take political and organizational measures assuring a complete fulfillment of the tasks ensuing from the 1986-1990 Socioeconomic Plan.

Participating in the deliberations were the Director of the Agricultural and Food Industry Department under the PZPR Central Committee Kazimierz Grzesiak and the Director of the Agricultural and Economic Department of the ZSL Supreme Committee Tadeusz Ruchniewicz.

Bialystok on Small Plant Role

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 30 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Alicja Zagorska: "The Future Also Belongs to Small Plants" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] Bialystok. Shortening the migration of produce and processing them at small plants is an advantageous solution to both producers and consumers.

The possibilities for developing the food industry in Bialystok Voivodship, expanding its raw material base, and utilizing agricultural products more efficiently were discussed at the 28 March 1987 plenary session of the Bialystock Voivodship PZPR Committee.

This voivodship, which is a major potato producer, lacks the opportunities for a complete utilization of its potato crop and has problems with potato marketing. The establishment of small potato-drying plants, for example, was postulated by farmers at the session. Jerzy Zymel, director of the Sokolka State Farm, mentioned that a small starch plant processing 20,000-30,000 tons of potatoes [annually?] will be established at their initiative. Production waste (mash) will be utilized in the State Farm's hog-fattening pens.

The development of agricultural processing plants should be promoted to a greater extent by the mechanisms of the economic reform.

Expansion of poultry plants was postulated by Edmund Krynski of Turosnia Koscielna, a representative of poultrymen. Using their own feeds, the poultrymen are expanding output, but they lack processing facilities.

The plenary deliberations were chaired by Wladzimierz Kolodziejczuk, first secretary of the Bialystok Voivodship PZPR Committee, and attended by Maciej

Lubczynski, director of the Socio-Occupational Department under the PZPR Central Committee, and Jan Zegartowski, deputy director of the Agriculture Department under the PZPR Central Committee.

Ostroleka Begins 'Cleanliness' Campaign

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 30 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Witold Sawicki: "Cleanliness is the Cheapest Investment" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] In a civilized and cultured society cleanliness, esthetics, and orderliness should not be discussed; these features should characterize citizens, their workplaces, their domiciles, and their surroundings. This precisely is the status we desire to attain our voivodship, as was said on 28 March 1987 at a plenary session of the Ostroleka Voivodship PZPR Committee which dealt with the region's sanitary state and public undertakings serving to promote it.

Henryk Olech, labor-brigade leader at the Ostroleka Cellulose Plant, appealed, "Let's propagate the slogan, 'From Cleanliness to Good Husbandry.' Let's not be ashamed to use brooms, shovels, and brushes. They don't cost much, and there'll be less apathy and fewer complaints."

It was said, on referring to the Third PZPR Central Committee Plenum, that the introduction of the second stage of the economic reform will be possible only in the presence of a good sanitary state, in clean factory rooms, at clean workplaces. Cleanliness is the cheapest investment in conservation and more pleasant working conditions.

Chief Sanitary Inspector for Poland Professor Jerzy Bonczak, who took part in the deliberations, emphasized the pioneering nature of the Ostroleka plenary session. The Ostroleka Voivodship PZPR Committee is the first in the country to launch a cleanliness drive as a general social goal. Minister J. Bonczak praised the related initiatives being undertaken throughout Poland -- including the drive "From Cleanliness to Good Husbandry" launched by this newspaper.

In its adopted resolution the plenary session turned to all citizens, socio-occupational organizations, work establishments, and state agencies for active participation in implementing the slogan, "Make April the Beginning of a Constant Drive for General Orderliness, Civic Deeds, and Release of Initiatives to Promote Cleanliness."

The deliberations, chaired by First Secretary of the Ostroleka Voivodship PZPR Committee Jerzy Glowacki, were attended by Deputy Director of the Socio-Occupational Department of the PZPR Central Committee Stanislaw Skladowski.

Regulations Hinder Reform

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 30 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Edward Filipczyk: "The Need for Qualitative Changes" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] Opole. The plenary session chaired by First Secretary of the Opole Voivodship PZPR Committee Eugeniusz Mroz was preceded by consulting several dozen of the region's social and economic activists about the status of application of the reform, as well as by conducting a poll among nearly 400 respondents. Two-thirds of the respondents declared that the reforming of our economy is being impeded by an excessive number of regulations as well as by their constant revisions.

This was also mentioned by many participants in the critical and at times controversial discussion, who provided specific examples. Blunt comments were made about the bureaucratization of our economy, its excessive fiscalism, the support provided by parent agencies to bankrupt enterprises, and the lack of consistency.

Attention was drawn to the need to minimize existing perils and promote innovativeness and resourcefulness, and also to the indispensability of more radical changes in lieu of tiny steps, changes serving to lead out the economy onto the straight path and stabilize it.

The adopted resolution specifies the main economics-oriented activities of party echelons and organizations following the Third PZPR Central Committee Plenum. The plenary session was attended by Deputy Director of the Economic Department under the PZPR Central Committee Wladzimierz Hausner.

Economic Figures Studied in Siedlce

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 30 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Jozef Sadowski: "Surmounting the Barriers" under the rubric "Plenary Sessions of Voivodship PZPR Committees"]

[Text] Siedlce. Assessing the economic performance in 1986 and determining the tasks of party work were the subjects of the plenary session of 28 March 1987 of the Siedlce Voivodship PZPR Committee, chaired by First Secretary Andrzej Ornat and attended by Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Planning Commission under the Council of Ministers Manfred Gorywoda.

A picture of the region's economy was presented in the addresses delivered by voivodship committee secretaries Henryk Augustyniak and Kazimierz Drozdziuk, as well as by Siedlce Voivode Colonel Janusz Kowalski. It is favorable, and it is worth noting that sales of industrial output in the voivodship are higher than for the country as a whole. The performance of agriculture too has been good.

But unfavorable trends also occurred in the region's economy. The plan for socialized housing construction was not fulfilled, and neither were the material plan for infrastructural investments and the financial plan for social investments. In agriculture, the consumption of fertilizer lime decreased. The proportion of products of poor quality has increased.

Dariusz Wojciak of Minsk Mazowiecki declared, "Poor quality should not be anonymous. Its perpetrators should be identified by name."

Taking the floor, M. Gorywoda stressed the need to catch up with the winter backlog, because this will decide the economic results for the current year. Other highly important issues are: exports, counteracting the inflationary phenomena, rational and high-quality production, and complete utilization of market mechanisms. The deputy minister also declared, "The meaning of the reform consists in, among other things, assigning resources where they can be utilized most efficiently. It is an urgent matter to attain more flexible organizational structures and eliminate the barrier of formal regulations impeding progress and modernity."

The plenary session adopted a resolution specifying the tasks of the voivodship party organization in accelerating qualitative changes in the region's economy.

1386
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PZPR ROLE IN EXECUTING CONTROVERSIAL REFORMS NOTED

Poznan WPROST in Polish No 16, 19 Apr 87 pp 7-8

[Article by Marek Krol: "A Time of Necessary Reforms"]

[Text] I do not like to sit with my tooth hurting in a dental armchair and listen to the stomatologist's lectures on prevention. Such a situation happened to me once. When the eloquent dentist began to describe to me the formation of a tooth abscess and its effects on the entire organism, I could not restrain myself and, with a whispered outcry, I begged him, "For God's sake, pull it out and spare me the verbal torture." Of course, this act of desperation was accompanied until the very last moment, that is, until the tongs were applied to the aching molar, by the hope that extraction might be avoided.

This not very ingenious metaphor mirrors better, in my opinion, the condition of the society, that state of certain tensions and expectations, than any scientific study. Of course, that social conflict of expectations and fears is neither specific nor characteristic to the Polish society. On the other hand, a distinctive sign of the times is the intensity of the voices clamoring for changes, that is, for extracting the tooth of impotence. Everywhere there is hue and cry that this cannot continue any longer, that it is high time to alter the methods used so far. An outside observer might have the impression that something very strange is happening in Poland. On the one hand, the society is increasingly clamorous for a change; it simply is a-boil with critical opinions. On the other hand, were that observer to analyze social life, he would be surprised by a kind of somnolence, stagnation, lack of initiative in resolving even the simplest problems. And it might seem that this picture of the society lacks both better and worse aspects, that it lacks sharp social divisions and conflicts, that is is a picture of a Polish "blandness."

Can then those social pressures for carrying out fundamental changes in the situation be seriously considered, since in reality no one wants these changes? Might not those hurrah-revolutionary outcries happen to be a means of venting tensions and frustrations? Were this true, we would be a unique society to which criticism and breast-beating are ends in themselves.

I have nothing against criticism. On the contrary I believe in its necessity and that the occasionally turbulent wave of often demagogic criticism is the price we are paying for years of its curtailment. Except that I am apprehensive that the specter of Hyde Park [soapbox orations] is hanging over us, as a result of lack of response to critical comments.

Whence then ensues the dissonance between the sometimes elemental criticism and the incommensurately somnolent response to it? This may be a subversive answer, but I perceive its source to lie in the colloquial claim that our decrees, programs, and assumptions are very good but their enforcement is poor. In other words, it is as if I were to say that I have an idea for an expedition to Mars but somehow that idea cannot be translated into reality. A plan or concept whose assumptions are disproved by its execution is not worth a farthing. Yet we prefer to continue our Chochol dance [mad whirl], praising the word which for reasons unknown does not become deed. Or perhaps all those distinctive concepts, programs, and visions are escapism, a way of avoiding the necessity of performing radical surgery on our socioeconomic organism?

In view of this, might not the acceleration of the economic reform, whose prime mover from the outset has been the party, signify new social divisions, conflicts of interest, or even certain tensions? Might not the party, being aware of its responsibility for the destiny of the entire nation, fear losing the approbation of a segment of the society? After all, the mechanisms of the economic reform are a threat to the interests of certain worker groups. The example of the Feniks Plant in Lodz, where it was decided to reduce the number of employees, is merely the first sign of a more rigorous approach ensuing from the economic reform. The management of Feniks faced the choice of either keeping intact its entire workforce and paying an average wage of 16,000 zlotys [monthly], which would mean that its best experts would quit in favor of outside jobs and thus condemn the plant to stagnation, or fight this clinical death and reduce its workforce. The funds thus saved could be assigned for bonus pay for the best and most productive employees. The latter alternative was chosen and, instead of egalitarian poverty, the mean monthly wage at Feniks at present has approached the ceiling of 40,000 zlotys. Unfortunately, discharging 400 employees is no joke. It is easy to postulate this in writing, in the press, or to lecture from the podium in favor of such measures. But when more than 400 "unemployed" turned to the PZPR plant committee at Feniks for help, and when letters asking how could it happen that workers are being thrown out into the gutter in a socialist state began to arrive at the PZPR Central Committee, in such a situation it is truly difficult to find a conflict-free solution. True, no one has actually fired these workers. But in this country the very idea of changing a worker's workplace is regarded by him as a threat of unemployment. The right to one's current workplace is viewed by most people as something sacred, and they think that its violation means that workers are treated as mere tools.

While reading articles on the role of basic party organizations in the country's sociopolitical and economic life I often ponder the dilemma of the party organization at Feniks. And yet, it is to be expected that similar cases will multiply in the future. According to a Poznan worker quoted in an article in GAZETA POZNANSKA, the economic reform means a sellout of worker's interests. How then should the party resolve such difficult situations, with

the interest of workers being placed on one pan of a pair of scales and the interest of the entire society, that is, of workers, too, on the other? How can a plant party organization convince a party member threatened by dismissal from the plant that this is necessary because the reform requires it? And what should be done about administrative overemployment, which we all are aware of but unfortunately most often outside our own workplaces? I read a letter from a non-party member worker in TRYBUNA LUDU and my hair stood up. The writer of the letter stated that at the Film R&D Center at which he is employed there are five directors and 35 supervisors whereas the entire workforce consists of 280 persons. Of course, the streamlining of administrative personnel was commenced by... discharging some charwomen.

When I read critical articles on the operation of various institutions, plants, and factories, I wonder what are their basic party organizations doing, and why is it that often they are the last to signalize problems on their turf. I do not think that this situation is due to low activism of party members. I do not think either that attributing this all to the human element will serve as a ready-made answer to everything. Even the best and most active individuals sooner or later submit to mechanisms enforcing particular modes of behavior. Thus, it is time to take a look at these mechanisms and consider whether we might not be blaming the crisis in attitudes too much, whether we exist in a distinctive crisis of party-work technology? Could it be that the plant party organizations, which should be strongly implanted in the plant communities and at the same time represent the interests of the entire society, are being menaced by a situation similar to that encountered by those playing chess with Tamerlane? When the player lost, Tamerlane had his head chopped off for poor playing, and when he won, he lost his head for being impudent.

The coming Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum will of a certainty be viewed by most people as a typical intraparty plenum. Yet, precisely this plenum, which will be devoted to the role of basic party organizations, may be in the very near future of tremendous importance to not only the functioning of basic party elements but the entire society. If the success of the second stage of the reform hinges on the ability to solve sociopolitical and political problems at the level of plants and factories, then the role of the basic plant party organizations in this process will be special, though diametrically different from that operating model of the party known to us from the past.

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ECONOMISTS, DIRECTORS DIFFER ON WORKER SELF-MANAGEMENT

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Mar 87 p 3

[Interview with Dr Juliusz Gardawski of the SGPIs [Main School of Planning and Statistics] by Alicja Matynia-Bonik: "A Strong Self-Government Is Not a Threat to the Director"]

[Text] [Question] Many enterprise directors in this country as well as industrial economists and department directors at various institutions are graduates of the SGPIs. They influence directly economic management and the evolution of its model. Once every 5 years SGPIs alumni hold a reunion. Is it merely an occasion for exchanging reminiscences of student days, or does it also serve to exchange professional experiences among what are after all Polish managers [American term used in the original]?

[Answer] Of course, the reunion also has the objective of exchanging experience, sharing opinions about current problems of the operation of the economy. For example, during the last SGPIs alumni reunion, a team of sociologists and economists headed by Professor Leszek Gilejka of the Institute of Working Class Surveys, Academy of Social Sciences, polled the reunion participants on worker self-government and the economic situation at enterprises. It is worth noting that 40 percent of the participants were enterprise directors, another 40 percent were managerial personnel, and only 20 percent were government officials. Thus, for the most part they were competent individuals by education and profession -- economists whose views warrant a critical verification of opinions on worker self-government.

[Question] Is there a particular slant to the views of economists, SGPIs graduates, on this subject?

[Answer] Their assessment of worker self-government is markedly influenced by their support of the Polish concept of the economic reform. Suggestions for adapting Hungarian solutions or, the more so, the Yugoslav model, have not met with many supporters. At the same time, though, our graduates are critical about the extent of advancement of the reform, particularly as regards enterprise autonomy. In their opinion, the enterprises may indeed be more autonomous than they had been prior to the reform, but the degree of that autonomy is still too small for their efficient performance. The following broad judgment may be hazarded: about two-thirds of the economists are inclined

to support the operating model of the economy adopted in the decrees on the state enterprise and worker self-government, while one-third favor solutions defined by the term "the managerial model," that is, a considerable autonomy of the enterprises, but without a strong workforce self-government.

[Question] A view espoused by, especially, central administration [government] personnel is that worker self-governments should principally or even exclusively be concerned with increasing labor productivity, improving production quality, promoting the conservation of materials and energy, and modernizing technologies. It is sometimes believed that the accomplishments of self-governments in these domains are the sole criterion of their performance; more even, that these accomplishments alone warrant the existence of worker self-government. How do the economists participating in the reunion view this?

[Answer] Their view is different. Above all, they believe that measures to streamline enterprise performance are within the purview of specialized economic bodies. As for worker self-government, it may facilitate the application of relatively unpopular decisions and improve the atmosphere at plants and factories. Many economists point out that such self-government affords a major opportunity for eliminating the barrier of mistrust between the workforce and the management and facilitates mobilizing workers for fulfilling tasks. Nonetheless, as far as decisionmaking within the enterprise is concerned, they view self-government as an auxiliary rather than an equal partner of management, a body making its own counterproposals, drafting its own modernization plans, and engaging in an interplay with the management.

This instrumental role of self-government bodies does not, however, exhaust the functions ascribed to them. According to a majority of the economists polled, self-government also has to fulfill an exceptionally important mission as an organization assuring enterprise autonomy and serving to apply the reform. The related opinions may be tersely stated as follows: about one-half believe that self-government is crucial to enterprise autonomy, while two-thirds relate the possibilities for reforming the economy to the existence of a strong self-government. Fewer than one-third of the economists polled were of the opposite opinion and rejected any relationship between enterprise autonomy and the reform, on the one hand, and the existence of a strong worker self-government on the other.

Overall, more than 47 percent claim that it is impossible to apply the reform and maintain enterprise autonomy in the absence of a strong worker self-government, with more than 22 percent of the respondents sounding very categorical about it, claiming that these goals cannot be accomplished without participation by worker self-governments. The converse view is held by more than 19 percent of the economists, though only 4 percent state it categorically, claiming that there exists no relationship whatsoever between strong self-government and enterprise autonomy and the reforming of the economy. Thus, strong worker self-government is in the opinion of a majority a factor protecting the enterprise against strivings to deprive it of its autonomy.

[Question] This is yet another confirmation of the indispensability of worker self-government to the reformed system of enterprise management. But the most

debatable topic, which is most often widely discussed, is mutual cooperation, interdependence, and even conflicts of interest between the management and worker self-government. How do experienced economists, graduates of the SGPIs, view this issue?

[Answer] The findings of our poll indicate that this is not a very controversial issue. The undermining a director's position by worker self-government is a real issue to only about 20 percent of the economists, and moreover only 5 percent consider this to be a serious problem. An overwhelming majority regard this issue as only a seeming one. A strong self-government compels, of course, the management to change its traditional style of work, but this results in weakening the director's role only when his professional competence is already low in the first place. For in the new atmosphere decisions have to be prepared more thoroughly and credible cost-effective accounting has to be drafted. In other words, self-government may restrict economic dishonesty and hinder the adoption of hasty, ill-conceived, or ad hoc decisions imposed on the enterprise from the outside. A considerable majority of the economists believe that a strong self-government enhances the role and standing of the director.

[Question] This opinion is linked to the issue of responsibility -- namely, to whom should the plant director be accountable? To the parent agency or to the worker self-government bodies?

[Answer] I have already mentioned that in the opinion of a majority of the economists managing an enterprise should be handled by its managerial personnel. At the same time, two-thirds of the respondents believe that the plant director should be responsible for his decisions not to the parent agency but to the workforce self-government. On its part, the workforce, through the mediation of its self-government, should at specified intervals of time monitor and evaluate the director's performance.

[Question] Workforce self-government would then exist in a particular relationship -- it would not handle operative management, but it would periodically monitor the manner and results of that management, and it would not weaken the director's standing, but it would indirectly subordinate him to itself through the evaluation procedure.

[Answer] In the majority opinion, a greater threat to the director's standing is his subordination to superior agencies rather than to the self-government bodies of the plant's own workforce. Of course, I am not conveying the opinion of all the economists polled. It should be borne in mind that there also exists a group of persons who are skeptically disposed toward worker self-government. One-third of the economists polled totally reject the thesis of the director's accountability to self-government bodies. But it is worth mentioning that in that group, too, only a small proportion of economists claim that self-government weakens the director's standing.

[Question] You said that a negligible group of economists believe that self-government in the enterprise is dispensable. The others, that is, the majority support its existence. But how do they view its accomplishments so far?

[Answer] Most often they say, more or less, that "Self-government is beneficial but no excessive expectations should be tied to it." This is a moderate view. The second most numerous group claims that self-governments cannot as yet be evaluated because they have not been afforded a chance for operating normally. The remainder, about one-fifth, believe that even now self-government has produced many positive effects and its activities should definitely be supported.

Hence, self-government is regarded as a useful element of the structure of an enterprise, even by those who do not link to it the issue of enterprise autonomy and do not postulate that it monitor the activities of the management.

[Question] Currently forms of labor-brigade self-government are being increasingly mentioned, and it also is known that workers expect self-governments to spread "in depth" within plants and factories.

[Answer] Our poll also contained a question as to the organizational, enterprise, economy, and state levels at which self-governments should operate. The economists believe that self-governments should primarily operate at the level of plant and enterprise management and are rather unnecessary at the level of labor brigades and plant departments. This position of the economists is surely traceable to their view of the functions of self-government bodies. Only about 4 percent consider it expedient to establish a central institution coordinating the activities of self-governments on a national scale. Two groups of about 15 percent each, more or less, favor flexible forms of cooperation among discrete enterprise self-governments, and they also favor the idea of a self-government chamber within the Sejm. The remainder postulated confining self-government to the enterprise level.

Such a resolution of the issue is consonant with the economists' expectations concerning the reform. If the reform is to continue spurring changes in the initially accepted direction, the enterprise will increasingly become the place at which economically important decisions are taken. Hence, it is at the enterprise level that self-government is to function as an institution assuring the autonomy of production organizations, promoting the integration of the workforce with the enterprise, and periodically monitoring the management.

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NEW LAW OUTLINES MILITARY SERVICE EXEMPTIONS

Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA in Polish 23 Mar 87 pp 1,3

[Article by (bis): "Less Bureaucracy, More Information" subtitled "Vital Statistics Records—A New Approach; Once More About the Rules for Deferring Military Service"]

[Excerpts] [Text] (Own information) As of 1 March the new Law on Vital Statistics Records has become effective. The decree meets longtime postulates and wishes for a more flexible approach to the validation and recordkeeping of births, naming, marriages, and deaths. The related provisions have (finally!) been adapted to the new administrative division of this country introduced years ago. At the same time, the decree augments the importance and responsibility of the office of director of the Vital Statistics Office (for example, in his absence, marriages may be performed only by the town mayor or gmina chief, while Polish citizens abroad may contract marriages at the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] consulate.

The new decree and the principal aforementioned revisions of the law governing vital statistics were reported upon at a press conference by the director of the Socio-Administrative Department of the Bialystok Voivodship Government Kazimierz Konopka, who subsequently, jointly with the representative of the Voivodship Military Staff Major Aleksy Lisicki, offered a reminder about the regulations governing the deferral of basic military service and early military discharges of persons performing that service.

This subject will certainly be of interest to young gentlemen born in 1968, because they will be subject to conscription between 13 April and 23 June this year, i.e., they will have to appear before Regional Conscription Commissions with the object of determining their fitness for military service. It should be emphasized here that at the regional commission every draftee is thoroughly briefed about the terms of his conscription or deferral of service, about his rights and duties. But for complete clarity and early information, let us point out that the conditions for deferral are regulated by the Ordinance of 7 September 1979 of the Council of Ministers (DZ. U., Item 31, No 5, 1986).

The regional conscription commission in the district of domicile of the draftee may defer military service in the event that the draftee:

-- personally nurses a family member or members with whom he resides (i.e., if the parents, grandparents, wife, or children are incapacitated and no one else in the family can take over their care);

- personally manages a farm (with an area of at least 2 hectares) which is his sole source of support;

-- is the sole wage-earner in the family (but in this case the conscription or deferral is decided upon by the Military Compensation Office (WKU). In the event of conscription, the draftee's family receives a specific monetary allowance).

The head of the WKU may also defer military service for students (this applies to persons attending all full-time schools as well as evening- and correspondence-school students and, by way of an exception, to students in secondary evening and correspondence schools. He may also grant deferrals up to age 23 in case of certain occupations exercised, depending on the number of jobs in discrete industrial subsectors. This concerns, among others, miners, power industry personnel, metal industry workers, etc., that is, persons in occupations of special importance to the national economy.

The requirements for an early military discharge are the same as for deferral of military service. This usually concerns changes in the situation of the serviceman's immediate family. In this event, the first instance to which the serviceman should appeal is the gmina chief or town mayor in the area of the serviceman's civilian domicile.

Mention should also be made of surrogate forms of military service, for which conscripts of poor health are eligible.

Lastly, let us offer the reminder that basic military service applies to males up to 24 years of age and by way of an exception (for farmers, students, and those unjustifiably avoiding military service) up to 28 years of age.

1386
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COMMENTARY ON REGIONAL INTERESTS IN SATELLITE TV

Rzeszow NOWINY in Polish 20 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by Wieslaw Zabierowski: "Satellites to Order"]

[Text] "I am a student. Last year, while in Holland, I took a 3-month course in international economic studies and trade. Receiving satellite TV programs would facilitate my access to information on this subject (I have a working command of all West European languages), and it would be of great assistance to me in my professional activities which, upon completing my studies, I intend to undertake at the Institute of International Indebtedness and Development being established in Krakow."

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This letter was written by a young man to justify his request for permission to install a special parabolic antenna adapted to receiving satellite TV programs. It should be at once stated that this is an exceptional case, because in the other cases -- and there were seven such other applications in Rzeszow -- the applicants were interested purely in entertainment. Those wanting to open wide their window to the world were, of course, much more numerous still. Some 15 persons visited the District Inspectorate of State Radio Inspection (PIR) in order to obtain information on the formalities to be completed for a permit to receive TV signals from outer space as well as on the necessary equipment and its cost. They even included a farmer from the Bieszczady hinterland. When informed that he would have to pay approximately US\$1,500 for the installation of a parabolic antenna, he sighed with relief and said, "Thank God. I thought it would be more."

In this way, following the rather successful graft of computers and videocassette recorders onto this country, we have entered upon the era of satellite television. Whatever else might be said about it, one thing is certain: our preparations for it have been quite thorough, which does not mean though that they were good. The first pertinent law appeared on 20 February 1986. It was the ordinance of the minister of communications "Concerning Detailed Principles for Issuing Permits for the Ownership and Use of Radio and Television Receivers Other Than the Common Kind." Incidentally, it is a mystery: what are those "receivers other than the common kind," and why are not things being called by their proper names? But let it pass.

What matters more is the purport of that ordinance. It declares that permits for receiving satellite TV programs are issued by PIR inspectors to persons over 18 years of age and that only holders of such permits and nobody else may use the receiver. As known, this last provision was immediately and thoroughly ridiculed by the mass media and by every soberly thinking person. For it looked like the minister was, on the one hand, seemingly permitting the viewing of television and, on the other, doing everything to shield with his own breast the TV screen from being viewed.

Following that ordinance there was a long silence. At the central level there began all kinds of jurisdictional disputes which are not worth mentioning now, considering that on 5 March 1987 the PIR main inspector declared at a press conference in Warsaw that persons owning antennas for the reception of satellite TV will be permitted to use them upon filling out appropriate application forms. For the time being the permits will be issued only until 31 March 1988.

However, the inhabitants of southern Poland may sleep in peace and avoid excitement. As I was told by the District Inspector Engineer Tadeusz Krawczyk, the Rzeszow PIR as yet lacks appropriate facilities and is unaware of any possibilities for the reception in our voivodship of television programs broadcast by the telecommunication satellites already inserted in geostationary orbits. It is simply that we are outside their reach. As for the future of satellite TV, so far as private viewers are concerned, it is linked to the so-called radiodiffusion satellites scheduled to be launched. In optimal conditions, this will serve to reduce to about 60 cm the diameter of the receiving antenna, whereas the antennas for telecommunication satellites have a diameter of nearly 2.5 meters.

The unsuccessful launching of the French Ariane V 18 rocket in May of last year has resulted in postponing the insertion into geostationary orbits of the "TV-Sat" satellite in geostationary orbits covering the territory of the FRG, and the "TDF-1" satellite for France, originally scheduled for the fall of 1986. It is expected that the programs broadcast by the first of these satellites will also be received in Poland. CEMA countries intend to launch their own radiodiffusion satellite in the early 1990's.

So that our region would not remain a white spot on the country's map of the reach of satellite TV, it can be said that a certain foreigner has become interested in Rzeszow and intends to conduct appropriate measurements in the very near future in order to tell whether we have a chance to rub elbows with the great world of "show biznes." Seemingly, all this looks very simple and that also is how most of the potential recipients of signals from outer space are reasoning. It is sufficient to have a TV set with a suitable operating system and a parabolic antenna, and also to raise one's face to the sky and scan it for the satellite. But several other equally important or perhaps most important problems still remain to be solved.

First, such specialized equipment is not being manufactured anywhere in this country. As for importing it, this requires the aforementioned permit. As I was told at the Customs Office in Rzeszow, so far no one has availed himself of this possibility. On the other hand, a Szczecin artisan who constructs

superior-quality antennas exported to Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, has gained broad publicity. Thus, the antenna can be bought, though of course not for zlotys.

Second, it is highly doubtful whether Western television stations will want to send us their programs as Christmas presents. More likely is the assumption that they want to be paid for their broadcasts. Even now, some of these broadcasts cross the borders of this country, but they do so in a coded form. Whoever wants to view them is welcome -- but first he has to purchase a kind of subscription. This is not surprising; that is business, pure and simple. Were we to fantasize a little -- though the fantasy might become a reality in a far from distant future -- the solution of this technical question could be considered. But that is the least problem. We had similar troubles with the copyrights to videocassette film viewing and we somehow settled the problem.

We will also cope with the TV satellites, especially considering that at present in three voivodships only two persons have been granted permits to install parabolic antennas. It might be said that in such a situation the problem does not exist. It may not yet exist, but it will arise in the not distant future.

Many people feel dubious about the current system of satellite TV monitoring by the state. Chiefly because, as in the case of videocassettes, there is in practice no way of verifying who is viewing Warsaw's "Government Monitor" newscast on his TV screen and who a revue of starlets from West Berlin. And besides, just what kind of criteria is being used for permitting some persons to benefit from the boon of satellite TV and forbidding it to others?

It appears that these matters are not as important as they are said to be, because linguistic and financial barriers operate as a kind of natural selection in the choice of television programs. As for what will happen later, we shall see.

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BRIEFS

MUSLIMS ERECT MOSQUE--In the Katowice WIECZOR, Editor Włodzimierz Amerski states that three years ago in Gdańsk, a ceremony was held to imbed the charter of foundation for the construction of a mosque. For the first time in 192 years, Polish Muslims are building their own mosque from the foundations. The charter of foundation was imbedded under the mosque's construction by one of its chief founders, an Arab industrialist from Austria, Alu Abdu Turki. In accordance with Muslim doctrine, the only decoration on the walls within the mosque will be Arabic verse. The mosque was designed by Marian Wszelaki and the investment costs for its construction will be more than 25 million zlotys. This sum will be provided by gifts from foreign individuals and firms as well as Polish Muslims and is to be collected by the Muslim Religious Association and the Gdańsk Muslim community. In Poland, about 2500 Muslims are members of the association and are active in 6 communities in Białystok Province (where the largest community includes 700 individuals), Kruszniany (the smallest community with 50 persons), Bohoniki, Gdańsk, Szczecin and Warsaw. Poland has two functioning mosques in Bohoniki and Kruszniany. The third one under construction in Gdańsk will serve about 270 followers. This year, construction will probably be started on two other mosques in Warsaw and Białystok. [Text] [Krakow ECHO KRAKOWA in Polish 10 Mar 87 p 3] 12261

PZPR PUBLICISTS GROUP MEETS--On 26 March 1987 was held the inaugural session of the All-Poland Team of Publicists at the Culture Department under the PZPR Central Committee. Participating in its deliberations, PZPR Central Committee Secretary Andrzej Wasilewski drew attention to the need for the mass media to deal more broadly with the major problems of culture ensuing from the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress and the sessions of the Politburo devoted to, among other things, broadly conceived problems of book publishing, filmmaking, and the aesthetic education of children and youth. He paid special attention to aspects of universal culture and ways of financing and utilizing cultural boons by various socio-occupational communities. Following broad discussion, the team adopted guidelines for action until the end of this year. Sławomir Tabkowski, Central Committee member and editor-in-chief of GAZETA KRAKOWSKA, was elected the team chairman. [Text] [PAP] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Mar 87 p 2] 1386

PZPR ECONOMISTS GROUP MEETS--On 26 March 1987 was held a session of the Party Team of Economists at the Culture, Education and Technical Progress Department under the PZPR Central Committee. The new term of office of the team was inaugurated and its tasks and directions of work were discussed, as were certain problems of the economist community in Poland. The deliberations were chaired by Professor Dr Andrzej Kierczynski. [Text] [PAP] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Mar 87 p 2] 1386

PZPR IDEOLOGY CHIEF IN GDR—Berlin (PAP)—The ideological work of the PZPR following its 10th Congress was the subject of a lecture presented at the Polish Information and Culture Center in Berlin by Director of the Ideology Department under the PZPR Central Committee Wladyslaw Loranc to the central party aktiv of the SEPD, research-institute personnel, and representatives of the mass media of the capital of the GDR. Similar problems were the subject of a conversation between W. Loranc and the aktiv of the SEPD District Committee in Rostock. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 28-29 March 1987 p 8] 1386

CSO:2600/567

'INEQUALITY,' 'OPPRESSION' HAVE BEEN 'ELIMINATED,' EDITORIAL AFFIRMS

Cluj-Napoca TRIBUNA in Romanian No 11, 12 Mar 87 p 1

[Article by Liviu Zapirtan: "National Unity and Dignity"]

[Text] On the occasion of a visit to Romania a foreign writer, stating he was familiar with the life of many peoples on all continents, acknowledged the powerful impression made on him by Romanian realities, those achievements on numerous levels which express what he termed our national dignity. "It is comforting," wrote this author, "to see a people such as the Romanians living courageously and honorably and to see Romania living, possibly for the first time in its history, for Romania," something that every honorable and courageous man will appreciate. I call these thoughts at a time when the ethnic Magyar and German workers' councils have been doing their work. On this occasion Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of our party and state, has clearly reaffirmed the fundamental elements of our party and state conception of the role of the ethnic group in the contemporary world, the resources of historical progress which it mobilizes, and the original, creative way in which the ethnic problem has been solved in Romania, in a profoundly humanistic and revolutionary manner. As the party secretary general has pointed out on a number of other occasions, "one of the great accomplishments of our socialist revolution is equitable solution of the ethnic problem, elimination of inequality and oppression forever, full assurance of equality of rights without distinction as to ethnicity, and continuous strengthening of the unity of the entire people," in a dialectical vision based on marxist-leninist principles, which require that account be taken in the ethnic problem of the complexity of the determinations of this form of human community, of the interwoven elements of continuity and discontinuity, and interpenetration of the values of the ethnos with general human values and of the national with the international.

Under the conditions of an increasingly complex world such as those characterizing the contemporary era, in which relationships between countries and peoples are placed in a new equation, in which the desires and aspirations of ethnic groups and peoples who once ignored each other coincide, in which the positions of those nostalgic for hegemonism, the boosters of older or newer forms of imperialism or neocolonialism clash with each other, the general tendency is to assert the ethnic identity, so that the assessment made by the writer quoted above is based on the political thought and practice of the vast majority of nations throughout the world. But this observation must

be more precisely defined. The simple assertion by political authorities of the desire to realize national values does not also mean material expression of intentions, does not lead automatically to practical application of the precepts of equality, justice, and dignity in national life. Solution of the problems of the ethnic group requires all-embracing vision in which allowance is made for both the objective and the subjective aspects, in which there is differentiated understanding of the interrelationships of the economic, sociopolitical, and cultural aspects, and in which traditions are combined with what is authentically new. In this context, one finding of the Romanian political experiment in solving the ethnic problem is that socialism, because of the nature of the revolutionaries who establish it in society, also ensures flourishing of ethnic life, definitive solution of the ethnic problem, and creation of a truly flourishing socialist homeland. Following a period of waning interest in the ethnic phenomenon, the 9th party Congress introduced a new and non-dogmatic spirit in dealing with the specifically ethnic question, in studying their historic roots. This is a spirit of stressing the freely affirmed elements of ethnic identity, in opposition to any nationalist, chauvinist, regionalist, or universalist distortion or exaggeration often present in political practice as well as in contemporary ideological disputes.

The socialist revolution and socialist construction have emphasized the idea that the ethnic problem is linked to the social one, that only when class exploitation and domination have been eliminated are conditions created for equal participation by all members of society in the economic, political, ideological, and cultural life of society. Equality of status of every worker in relation to his fellow citizen, based on the relationships generated by socialist ownership, is the basis of a political status such that all avenues of expression in the democratic management of society are open. Thus, in Romania the economic and the political, by affirming the dignity of labor and of the person who performs it, establish an interpersonal position of social equality between Romanians and the ethnic minorities, generating a common interest in prosperity of the country.

Romanian socialism also creates the framework for restructuring of spirituality, convictions, and sentiments, even though the subjective side of human life is not marked by movement rigorously in harmony with the objective side. The patriotic sentiments which inspire us all, regardless of ethnicity, express the socialist unity of the people, the fact that the fundamental interests of building socialism determine affirmation of the unity of the entire people around the party. Unity, the major accomplishment of the years of socialism, is a guarantee of affirmation of the dignity of our common homeland. To this end, organizational structures suited to the ethnic minorities have been created. These structures tend to further the efforts toward fully integrated economic and social development of the political system of the country. Education, science, and culture also play full-fledged roles in ensuring assimilation of major national and universal cultural values and in training all the cadres needed for progress of economic, social, and cultural life. However, all this does not lead automatically at the level of the individual consciousness to understanding of the specific structural essence of socialist unity of the people and to display of patriotic sentiment in deeds and not simply in words, as an interior dimension of human personality. Hence prosperity of the ethnic group also presupposes educating the members of society in the spirit of ethnic values, of love for the

positive accomplishments of the ethnic group in its historical progress, in the spirit of the dignity of having a flourishing socialist homeland. The Cluj philosopher D. D. Rosca has pointed out that actually living the idea of ethnic dignity, of the individual's desire to increase the dignity of the ethnus because it is itself a "reservoir of creative power," must of necessity be a part of molding as well-balanced a human personality as possible. The conscious relationship, based on firm convictions, between the individual and his ethnic community, is today to very many political scientists the sign of a maturing of political life, a source of a political dynamism based on democratic structures. The perspective afforded by the international affirmation of the ethnus so expressively described by the philosopher G. Santayana: "A man's feet must stand on the soil of his country, but his eyes should pass the world in review" can be approached on this basis. This is a condensed description of the complexity of the relationships between the national and the international in which both the ethnus and the individual are involved: their concrete life, with all its wealth of determinations, is essentially linked to the cradle of the homeland. But it does not mean autarky and does not imply isolation and individualist pride, but rather permanent opening to the broad horizon of the life of humanity, constantly weighing its own contribution to the general development of society and constantly judging the accomplishments of other countries and peoples.

As the general secretary of the party has pointed out, difficulties and contradictions may still arise as we follow our course of socialism and communism, but ensuring the smooth progress of socialist construction is exclusively the concern of the Romanian people, the Romanian Communist Party, and Romania, a sovereign and independent national state. No alleged argument, regardless of origin, whether philosophical, sociological, political-economic, or military, can be invoked to limit in any way full-fledged manifestation of the attributes which ethnic life has acquired under socialism, just as the documents of our party rightly state that it would be an occasion for real satisfaction if the ethnic problem were to be solved in principle in other parts of the world, for all time, as it has been solved in Romania.

This finding confirms what was written at the outset here, but not for the purpose of transforming the sentiment of ethnic dignity into a feeling of overweening pride and ostentation, but rather to establish another, supplementary, sentiment for it, of definite humanist inspiration, intimately bound up with our ethnic characteristics and highly receptive to all the positive accomplishments of humanity, a sentiment of respect for the ethnic life of other peoples.

As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu has pointed out, it simply means the right to be fully in charge in one's own country and to concern oneself with the problems of development of the country without interference of any kind.

6115
CSO: 2700/179

CRITICISMS OF HUNGARIAN TRANSYLVANIAN HISTORY BOOK**Holocaust 'Downplayed'**

Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA in Romanian No 14, 2 Apr 87 pp 11-14

[Article by Dr. Oliver Lustig: "Distortions and Falsifications That Insult and Desecrate the Memory of the Victims of the Horthyist Terror"]

[Text] Having read to the end the 2,000 pages of the History of Transylvania recently brought out in Budapest, I am forced to note, with bitterness and indignation, that, despite the status of the forum--the Hungarian Academy of Sciences--that sponsored it, the book deviates, with a consistency worthy of a loftier cause, from both scientific probity and historical ethics.

As a son of Transylvania and a Romanian citizen of Jewish nationality fated at a certain point in my life to empty the cup of humiliations and suffering generated by hatred and animosity, I felt entitled to hope that a book published today in a socialist country, a book that set out to recall in detail--three massive volumes--the history of Transylvania, would be, or at least try to be a warm and sincere plea for cooperation between our countries and peoples, energetically and unequivocally condemning all the ideas, theses, and orientations that at certain times in history disseminated a hatred, diversion, oppression, and contempt that culminated in the obscene Horthyist terror which caused the physical extermination of tens of thousands of Romanians and Jews in the north-west part of Romania. I believe--an no one could deflect me from this conviction--that a book of history must militate--precisely because of the lessons of history--for a better understanding, for closeness, and for mutual respect for the past of our peoples.

Having opened the first volume of the History of Transylvania with those thoughts in mind, by the time I finished the third volume I was in the grips of utter disappointment and my heart was filled with pain and indignation. Yes, pain and indignation, because the pages of those three volumes were packed with not only errors and tendentious views, not only vague and incorrect data, but in particular distortions and falsifications that went as far as to sully the brightest moments in the history of the Romanian people, insult the dignity of the nationalities who have been living together for centuries in the ancient Romanian region of Transylvania, and reviving and relaunching extremely harmful chauvinistic and revisionist theses that I

thought had been long since buried. Instead of bringing our peoples and the nationalities of our neighboring countries closer together, the three volumes of the History of Transylvania elicit--through gross falsehoods and unacceptable deliberate omissions, through snide remarks and overt slander--astonishment and indignation, generate animosity and dissent, poison the atmosphere, and undermine, through overt attacks, a gain attained in the course of a troubled history: cooperation and understanding.

Not only does that work in general present a distorted image of the history of Transylvania, but each one of its chapters falsifies the stages and periods it handles.

In this article I will not refer to facts that have long since been condemned by history: massacres, unparalleled terror, repression, forced labor camps, and expulsions perpetrated by the Horthyts during the 1940-44 period against the majority Romanian population in the north-west part of Romania, which had been occupied in the wake of the fascist diktat of Vienna in August 1940. Out of the many issues regarding the Horthyts terror, issues distorted, falsified, or simply omitted, I will dwell, for the purpose of demonstration, on only one instance: the deportation and extermination of the Jewish population in the north-west part of Romania invaded by Horthyts Hungary.

Incredible, but true: out of 2,000 pages, or more precisely out of about 90,000 lines, the authors of the book devote only four and 1/2 lines to the Horthyts extermination of the Jews in northern Transylvania. Thus, they managed to dispatch in one sentence the deportation and physical destruction of a population that had lived in that area for centuries. For the sake of precision let us be specific and cite the entire sentence: "After the German occupation in 1944, the Hungarian authorities shipped--despite the brave protests of progressive intellectuals and church leaders such as Bishop Marton Aron--a considerable part of the Jewish population of northern Transylvania, about 90,000-100,000 people, to the concentration camps in Germany, thereby sentencing them to death."

Aside from the fact that to reduce to just that the physical elimination of the Transylvanian Jews constitutes an outright desecrating minimalization of one of the biggest mass murders in the history of humanity, the above sentence distorts, falsifies, and misleads the world through both unforgivable omissions and through each one of its assertions and words.

Let us take them in order.

The authors begin reciting the holocaust of the Transylvanian Jews by unhesitatingly putting it down, "After the German occupation..." The reader cannot but ask himself: And until then, until the German occupation of March 1944, nothing happened to the Jews of northern Transylvania? I believe it is insulting and profanatory for both the memory of the victims and the suffering of the survivors to persistently circulate, in other works, too, the idea that "not a hair was touched on the heads of the Jews"--as some like to put it--in Hungary and in its occupied territories before 19 March 1944. That is an impiety that I feel dutybound to reject in the name of the painfully long string of victims from the towns and villages of northern Transylvania

killed by the bullets of Horthyst officers and troops, beaten to death with gun butts or whips, brained against the wall by the gendarmes and policemen of the Hungarian terror regime, or chased en masse toward the big massacre of Kamenec-Podolsk.

Of course, having penetrated north-west Romania under the arbitrary Vienna Diktat, the entire repressive apparatus and the mechanism of Horthyst oppression turned their weapons against the Romanian population, committing thousands of individual and collective crimes, devastating and maltreating, spreading fear and dread in towns and villages, and unleashing a terror of unprecedented savagery.

But even then, since the first days after the border was crossed, the victims included, aside from Romanians, increasing numbers of Jews. Six Jews were among the dead in the big massacre of September 1940 in Traznea. Jews from Cerisa and Marga (Salaj County), Viseu and Tasnad, etc., died together with the Romanians by Horthyst bullets or bayonets. In Sucutard, near Gherla, two young Romanian peasants--Iosif Moldovan and Ion Cotin--were killed at the suggestion of the count of the commune. On the same day, Lt. Papucs ordered the assassination of two young Jewish women--Rosa and Ester Rozenberg. Noting that crime in his book, Israel's Michael Bar-On said: "The bodies were exhumed after the war. The Hungarians, who like to trumpet their chivalry, had buried the victims in an infamous manner: they had put the girls at the bottom of the pit and the two men on top of them."

Did none of the authors of the book know that for the first mass murder in the long string of those that marked the implementation of the "final solution" by the Nazis, namely for the terrible massacre of Kamenec-Podolsk in 1941, out of 20,000 victims approximately 16,000 had been provided by the Horthyst authorities from among the Jews of northern Transylvania and subcarpathian Ukraine? Hard to believe, because the work of Gide'on Hausner, the general prosecutor in the famous trial of war criminal Eichmann, published in translation in Budapest under the title Verdict in Jerusalem, states: "In the summer of 1941, shortly after Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Hungarian authorities collected all the so-called 'eastern Jews,' that is to say all those that did not have Hungarian citizenship (former Polish, Romanian, and Czech Jews) and draggad them to the recently occupied areas in eastern Poland. There, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Jeckeln pledged that 'by 1 September all these kikes will be liquidated to the last man'" (Those deported from Hungary, northern Transylvania, and local Jews). "And he kept his word. Einsatzgruppe C under his command butchered them all at Kamenec-Podolsk and in the neighboring towns. The number of victims exceeded 10,000. Only a few managed to miraculously escape, reached Budapest, and told the tale."

How can one overlook the sufferings of the over 50,000 Jewish men in the prime of life--15,000 of them from northern Transylvania--whom the Horthyst authorities organized in forced labor and penal groups and sent to the Ukraine with the premeditated intention of having them liquidated? As it emerges from a memorandum by the former defense minister of Horthyst Hungary, Colonel General Nagybaconi Nagy Vilmos, out of every seven Jews sent to the Ukraine, six died of hunger, cold, beaten to death, shot, or burnt alive at Dorosici.

The sentence reads on: "...in 1944, despite the brave protests of progressive intellectuals and church leaders such as Bishop Marton Aron..." Here specific reference should have been made to at least one document, one public memorandum signed by some prominent Hungarian intellectual or group of intellectuals. We, those in the ghettos, were waiting for just such a protest with bated breath. But not even then, not even during the deportations, was such a protest ever heard. Yes, Marton Aron, the only one that the authors mention by name, did protest courageously, except that he was not the head of the Hungarian Church, as the authors let it be understood, but a bishop with the seat in Alba-Iulia, that is to say, in Romania; from there he crossed the temporary border and, on 18 May 1944, he delivered his protest in the St. Michael Cathedral in Cluj, for which, by the end of the same month, he became "persona non grata" in the Horthyst-occupied territory and was shipped back.

It is true that toward the middle of June the Reform Church did try to organize a joint protest by the Hungarian churches. However, the attempt failed because of the position of Hungarian Primate Seredi Jusztinian, the head of the majority church. Years later, the primate's supporters claimed that, like a military strategist, he was waiting to attack "at the right time, with the right strength, and in the right place." Except that at the time, when people were being shipped to death at a rate of 12,000 a day, "waiting and procrastinating" was neither a strategy nor a tactic, but simply a form of abandoning the victims.

Thus, despite the brave protests (for which no testimonies are given), the authors further tell us, the Hungarian authorities "...shipped a considerable number of the Jewish population of northern Transylvania, some 90,000-100,000 people to the concentration camps, thereby sentencing them to death."

For me, as a survivor of that nightmare, is unfathomable how the authors could presume to falsify the facts to such an extent, and to evade with such lack of scruples a reality as serious as that. I pass over the expression "shipped" (The Nazis directly sent or oversaw the sending to death, gas chambers, and burning of about six millions Jews. However, all the Hitlerite documents of the time speak merely of "shipping to the East," "evacuating," "resettling," or "applying a special treatment" to the Jews. Never of murdering, asphyxiating, or exterminating them. Following that dismal example, documents issued by the Horthyst authorities use the same euphemistic language of a rare cynicism, carefully avoiding even the word "deportation." I think that the time has come to call a spade a spade!), although I cannot hide the fact that any attempt to polish up a reality of a cruelty and savagery unparalleled in the history of mankind affects me as a knife to the heart, but I cannot and do not have the right to remain silent when the truth is not respected even in the case of facts and figures that are only too well known. How can one say that only "a considerable number" of the Jewry of northern Transylvania was deported, when it is widely known that the Horthyst gendarmerie and police searched every house in every village and town--with a thoroughness and meticulous care that surprised even the Hitlerites--and, using data provided by the "population records" services and "special lists" compiled well ahead of time, they gathered "man by man" all the Jews of northern Transylvania in ghettos, then, packing them 80-90 into cattle cars, shipped them to death in

trains of 50 cars each. Those excepted--a few heavy war invalids, etc.--make up such a tiny figure that it does not alter the situation.

Equally unfounded is the statement that they were shipped to "concentration camps in Germany." Indeed, the Nazi Reich was at the time crisscrossed by thousands of concentration camps, in which prisoners of all European nationalities were subjected to exhausting labor and an impossible treatment. However, the Jews of northern Transylvania were shipped, without exception, to the extermination camp of Birkenau-Auschwitz, where 70-75 percent or even 80 percent of each transport was taken from the station directly to the gas chambers. Only the 20-30 percent who were left alive were later sent to concentration camps in Germany.

Although Birkenau-Auschwitz had an efficient death machinery and a few years of experience in operating it without accident, a whole series of special measures were taken in anticipation for the arrival, at an unprecedented rate, of the deportees from Hungary and from the occupied territories. SS Lieutenant Colonel Rudolf Hoess, former commander of the camp, who in the meantime had been appointed inspector general at the camps headquarters, was once again dispatched to Auschwitz.

The railway cars were repaired, the furnaces were relined, and the smoke stacks were reinforced with steel bands; kilometers of ditches were dug in the immediate vicinity of the crematoria, and pyres were prepared for burning the bodies on the days and nights when the capacity of the four crematoria was exceeded.

Even the primitive gas chambers that had been used before the construction of the modern ones were readied for use.

A new railway track was built between Auschwitz and Birkenau, and the landing point was brought 200 meters closer to the crematoria. The number of Haeftling [prisoners] in the two Sonderkommandos (special detachments) who worked at the gas chambers was increased from 224 to 860, and the kommando that sorted out the loot from the trains was increased to almost 2,000. Despite all these measures, Rudolf Hoess was forced to go to Budapest several times to coordinate the exceedingly high rate of Horthyst deportations with the gassing and burning capacities at Birkenau.

As for the figure of 90,000-100,000 that the authors cite, it can only be explained as a deliberate attempt to minimize the magnitude of the crime perpetrated by the Horthysts and, implicitly, to attenuate the responsibility of the perpetrators.

Even a remotely correct calculation would have been easy to make. The 1941 census taken by the Horthysts showed 151,125 Jews living in northern Transylvania. However, it is known that, because of the anti-Jewish laws, persons who considered themselves gentiles but who had Jewish parents or even grandparents, were also persecuted, put in ghettos, and deported. That increases their number by about 10 percent. What is certain is that, according to data provided by specialized literature, the number of northern Transylvanian Jews marked for extermination was over 166,000, out of whom over

150,000 were deported by the Horthyst authorities to Birkenau-Auschwitz, while some 15,000 were sent to death in the Ukraine. I cannot understand how the authors came to estimate the number of victims at maximum 100,000. Even if they had been content to consult only the incomplete data recorded by the Hungarian Military Command of Kosice, where the deportation trains passed on their way to Birkenau-Auschwitz, they would have seen records for 27 trains, including the day of transit, the number of deportees in the locked cars, and the ghetto from which they originated.

Adding up the figures found there would have given a total of 131,641, to which they would have had to add the 15,000 sent to the Ukraine.

Moreover, it would have been fitting and compulsory to mention, if not to comment upon, the shattering reality that 84.5 percent of those deported--shipped, as the authors euphemistically put it--were exterminated.

In point of fact, that is not the only serious fact evaded. Unfortunately, the omissions are so many and so unforgivable that in some respects they are more reprobable than the distortions themselves.

I reread the respective paragraph again and again; I could not bring myself to read on. I could not believe, I could not conceive that a book that claims to be a work of history, sponsored by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and whose editorial team included one of the prominent members of the Budapest government, can simply note the extermination of an entire population without attempting to qualify that heinous crime in any way, or to make even the vaguest reference to the causes that generated it, or to say a single word of censure about its perpetrators.

Before anything else one must and should have clearly and unequivocally stated that the "final solution," i.e., the "Horthyst-style definitive solution of the Jewish problem" was the direct outcome of the fascist, chauvinist, racist, and antisemitic policy promoted by Horthy's regime. In fact, the rulers in that regime liked to boast--and not without ground--that in the post World War I period Hungary was the first European state to legislate antisemitic measures. Indeed, as early as 1920 Hungary adopted a law on admission to secondary education; the avowed purpose of the law was to "judiciously limit the number of students." In reality, the number of students belonging to the coinhabiting nationalities was being limited to a certain percentage.

Another anti-Jewish law, one bearing an innocent name, appeared in 1938: "More Efficiently Ensuring a Social and Economic Balance;" the purpose of that law was to curtail the Jews' access to economic and social life in Hungary.

A mere 1/2 of a year later, the Hungarian parliament passed another anti-Jewish law, which ruled that aside from those of the Mosaic faith, all Hungarian citizens who had one parent or two grandparents of the Mosaic faith at the time or prior to the enactment of the law, were to be considered Jewish, too. The concept of Jew was then expanded under the 1941 law on "racial preservation."

On the basis of that reality, Vitez Endre Laszlo, appointed by Horthy as secretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior, in a statement broadcast on the radio and picked up by the entire Hungarian press, vehemently denounced "the concept that the Jewish problem had allegedly resurfaced [i.e., after 19 March 1944] because of the international political situation." He stressed that "The entire Hungarian society, a defender of racial purity, has for almost 25 years pressed for a solution to the Jewish problem. Hungarian antisemitism is not a matter of fashion, a copy or an imitation of new tendencies and current ideas. Not for 1-2 years, but for decades, so to speak, the Hungarians, the first in Europe, have felt on their own skin the catastrophic threat posed by the increasing growth of the Jewish influence. During the course of decades long struggle the conviction has been crystalized that only a radical solution can yield the definitive and satisfactory results desired by both sides.

"Our unwavering conviction," the first aide to the Horthyst interior minister continued, "can be summarized as follows: For our Hungarian nation, the Jewry is a morally, spiritually, and physically undesirable element. Aware of this finding, we must seek a solution that can totally remove and eliminate the Jews from Hungarian life."

Recognizing this historical reality, in May 1946 the People's Tribunal of Cluj which tried the Horthyst criminals guilty of the extermination of the Jews in north-west Romania, emphasized in the indictment act that "Horthyst Hungary harbored the oldest form of European fascism, having been the first to legislate anti-Jewish laws already in 1920, when it introduced the 'numerus clausus' regulation in Hungarian universities. The same type of oppression involved the persecution of workers and progressive elements and political assassinations, being in contact with the Hitlerite regime of Germany from the very first moment of its coming to power. In consequence of the establishment of such a fascist regime, Horthyst Hungary adopted a number of anti-Jewish laws and implemented inhuman measures such as the deportation of Jews to Kamenec-Podolsk in the summer of 1941, the expulsions ordered by the military commands in northern Transylvania, the pogrom of Ujvidek, and other similar acts."

I feel dutybound to dwell on this reality because not talking about it, like the authors of the so-called History of Transylvania, creates confusion and misleads the young generations. This is not a matter of mere omission. To present the holocaust of the Jews of Hungary and of the territories occupied by it as an accidental occurrence, and to suggest even indirectly that it was exclusively the result of the entrance of the Nazi troops into Hungary is a serious political and historical error, a reprehensible attempt to minimize--if not even to absolve--the responsibility of the Hungarian state of that time. Such a position on the part of historians can only disinform public opinion and the young generations, who have the moral obligation to watch and to actively ensure that such disasters should never be repeated anywhere in the world.

Confessing their innermost thoughts in the memorial volume "Gherla, Iclod, and the Surroundings," the survivors of the Gherla ghetto quite correctly stated: "We must write, if not for ourselves, the witnesses of those horrors, who have

seen with our own eyes the bloodshed unleashed by monsters with human faces and have felt the savagery of gendarmes with rooster feathers in their caps... then for our descendants, who in one or two generations time will not be able to believe that such a thing could have happened. We must write so that the world should know in 10,000 years time that once there existed countries which, even with the end in sight, even when the battlefield reached their borders, even in those critical moments, could think of nothing but liquidating the Jews."

I think it is significant that Ianko Bela, chairman of the People's Tribunal of Budapest which functioned in the first post World War II years, talking of the harmfulness and danger of chauvinist and racist-Horthyst propaganda and of the disastrous effects of inciting base passions, felt bound to stress: "Despite the presence of German troops and of Hitler's violent demands, this bloody action [the deportation] could not have been carried out so completely if the gentile population had put up a greater resistance, as was the case in other countries. In my opinion, this shameful and inhuman action was possible not only because of the Sztojay government, but also because the Hungarian people were mislead and their hatred was exacerbated by decades-long antisemitic propaganda and, last but not least, by fanning the antisocial instincts of scoundrels hungry for a prey..."

I think that the authors of the History of Transylvania, too, were dutybound to emphasize the harmfulness of the Horthyst ideology, precisely in order to highlight the truth that the blame for what happened does not attach to the people as a whole, but primarily to the Horthyst regime and its representatives and ideologists who, at various hierarchical levels, propagated and exacerbated animosity, racial hatred, and terror.

Going back to the reprehensible omissions I mentioned, I also believe that it should have been said and it must be said that the implementation of the "final solution," in other words, the "Horthyst-style definitive solution of the Jewish problem" was carried out in Hungary and in the territories under its occupation with such an unmatched zeal and cruelty that in many respects it outstripped everything that happened in other European countries, including Nazi Germany.

"No, the Hungarians did not sell the Jews to the Germans," exclaimed Zoltan Singer in his book Volt Egyszer Egy Dezs... [Once There Was a Dej], "they simply paid the Germans to take them away. [Eichmann confessed that 'the Hungarian government paid 5,000 Marks for the deportation of each Jewish family'] We can state with a clear conscience that no nation in Europe behaved more savagely, more inhumanely to the Jews, than the Hungarians."

In the book A Jeruzsalmi Per [Trial in Jerusalem] Dezso Schoen wrote that he had a conversation with several people from Liska 06, who for almost 1 whole year had studied nothing but the Holocaust in preparation for Eichmann's trial, at the end of which he came to the conclusion that: "The Hungarians had been the most merciless. So much savagery and inhumanity toward the Jews was not encountered among any other nation in Europe... This is a painful admission to make, especially when one does so in the Hungarian language."

According to the reconstruction of Samu Stern, at the time chairman of the Central Jewish Council of Budapest, the situation had become so unbearable that "By the middle of April we appealed to Eichmann for help against Endre Laszlo. We described to him the horrors of the ghettos in the provinces, and asked him, in the name of the minimum human feelings, to help us. Naturally, the reply was a cold refusal. That is when Eichmann made his famous remark: 'Endre will die Juden mit Paprika fressen.'" [Endre want to devour the Jews with paprika]

At a meeting with Fulop Freudiger, chairman of the Jewish community of Budapest, Eichmann's aide Wisliceny noted: "The Hungarians seem to be the true descendants of the Huns; we would never have managed such a performance without them." Eichmann's deputy Krumey expressed himself in the same vein: "The Hungarian gendarmes do their job with genuine Asiatic brutality."

Levai, one of the Hungarian experts on the Holocaust, summarized the reality as follows: "Because of their small number, the Nazis were practically incapable of even supervising the deportations, let alone carrying them out. If it was possible to mark the Jews with the Star of David and to gather them in ghettos and concentration camps, that was only because the gendarmerie--.pa well informed on the situation and having about 20,000 men at its disposal--could be certain of the help of the local police everywhere."

Amazed by the Horthysts' zeal, Hitler's envoy to Budapest Vessermayer reported to Ribbentrop at the very beginning of the action, on 31 March 1944, that "In view of the circumstances prevailing here [Hungary], progress can be estimated to be unusually rapid." Only a few days later he again stressed, in a cable, that regarding the anti-Jewish measures, "the Hungarian government is proceeding very actively and with particular dispatch."

In point of fact, it is significant to note that the Nazis in Berlin, examining the anti-Jewish laws in Hungary, remarked that "certain provisions are even harsher than the German ones."

The zeal of the Budapest government in implementing the "final solution" reached such proportions that it not only surprised and amazed their bigger brothers--the Nazis in Berlin--but more than once it forced them to temper things and to intervene--what an irony!--in order to "defend" the Jews against certain excesses that could have misfired and caused them damage at the international level.

Illustrative in this respect are the minutes of the 3 May 1944 meeting of the Council of Ministers in Budapest which debated the management of the property of enemy-citizens (Jewish and non-Jewish) and of foreign Jews: Mr. prime minister stated, among other things, that it is in the common interest of the two nations (German and Hungarian) that the property of the enemy-citizens (who were primarily the Jews) and of foreign Jews should be duly administrated on principled bases.

"One of the counselors of the German embassy in Budapest has been three times to the Foreign Ministry and has strongly called attention to the fact that it is in the common [Nazi-Horthyst] interest not to allow police excesses, which

may elicit international countermeasures not only against Hungarian citizens, but also against German citizens... In particular, he called the attention of the Hungarian government to the suitable treatment that should be applied to citizens viewed as enemies and to their property; a summary of the German regulations in this area was presented, and the wish was expressed that the Hungarian side should not exceed them."

Nothing can incriminate more overwhelmingly the Horthyts' zeal than the haste with which they filled the ghettos and the infernal speed with which they shipped people to the crematoria.

On the basis of verbal guidance and without waiting for written orders, the Horthyts' mayors went to work with fanatic zeal. With an inexplicable haste they packed tens of thousands of Jews in impossibly small enclosures, without bothering to provide even the most elementary sanitary measures, then, clamoring about the danger of epidemics and infection of the surroundings, they began to press their superiors, including the Germans, to speed up the removal of "these undesirable and dangerous crowds," and "the liquidation of these hotbeds of infection." This is how the mayor of Ungvar ended his memorandum to the Ministry of the Interior: "I respectfully ask you to issue an urgent order that the Jews gathered in Ungvar and put in camps should be shipped off as soon as possible."

In the statement he made in 1946 from the Bratislava prison, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dieter Wisliceny said: "At the beginning of April I was transferred to Munkacs to supervise the organization of the ghettos. The gendarmerie commander of Sighetul Marmatiei came to me and told me that he could not carry out [...] the placement in ghettos in Sighetul Marmatiei because of the lack of appropriate buildings and sanitary installations. He said that either he ceased that action, or the 'excess people' [Jews] be sent to western Hungary or even to Germany..."

"As soon as I arrived in Budapest I immediately went to Eichmann and told him that Baky was soon to call him up and ask him to decide. In the afternoon, around 2-3 o'clock, we met in Baky's office [...] Secretary of State Baky told Eichmann about the situation in Maramures, then added:

"'I ask you then, dear Adolf, should we abandon the idea of the ghettos, or are you prepared to take over our Jews?'

"'Mein lieber Laci [My dear Laci], with the authority I have from my superiors I can tell you right away, now, that we are prepared to take over all the Jews.'

"The entire discussion (which sealed the fate of the Jews of north-western Romania) did not take even 15 minutes."

Naturally, the Nazis themselves wanted fast action. As Eichmann said at the Jerusalem trial, his aim was "The rapid evacuation of all the Jews and their deportation to Auschwitz, for which purpose Hungary had to be searched from east to west. Speed was of the essence in order to preclude a repetition of the humiliating [for the Nazis] occurrence of the Warsaw ghetto rebellion."

Despite their preoccupation with speeding up the deportations, the Nazi authorities had initially planned daily transports of 3,000 Jews to Auschwitz in 50-cars trains. Consequently, Veesenmayer reported to Berlin: "[...] Negotiations have begun about shipping them [the Jews] and, as of 15 May, we have planned to ship 3,000 Jews daily [...] End station: Auschwitz."

Overtaxing the Nazis about the implementation of the "final solution" amid the tense conditions of the war, when every railway car counted, the Horthysts pledged to ensure--since it was a matter of the Jews!--not one train, but four 50-car trains. That is why not 3,000, but 12,000 (and sometimes 14,000) Jews were shipped daily from northern Transylvania to Auschwitz.

I could not understand either at the time or in the 40 years that have elapsed since then: why so much haste? How was it possible that an entire country, a country at war, could subordinate everything, its forces and resources, not to the needs of the front, not to the economy, not to feeding the people, but to collecting, embarking, and shipping to death hundreds of thousands of innocent people? There were not enough engines to transport food, there were not enough railway cars for the wounded, the trains were getting stuck, and passenger and freight transportation was increasingly deteriorating. Yet the death trains had "free passage" day and night; no shipment from any ghetto was ever delayed because of a shortage of cars. Thanks to the Horthy zeal, the arrivals from north-west Romania to the death ramp at Birkenau did not deviate from the schedule even once. Wherefrom so much hatred of humans? Why did we, the Jews of north-west Romania, enter the gas chambers in the largest proportion among the people deported from all the European countries?

I cannot fathom why the authors of the History of Transylvania did not mention any of that. They did not even feel the need to mention Horthy's name in that context, a name that in the course of 25 years had become synonymous with terror, and who repeatedly made publicly known--in words and deeds--his hatred for the Jews.

It is true that Horthy, realizing the unprecedented seriousness of the monstrous crime that was being perpetrated against the Jews, prepared an alibi which he thought was unbreakable. The meeting of the Council of Ministers of 29 March 1944 which released the avalanche of anti-Jewish laws designed to provide--the peak of cynicism!--a "legal framework" for the extermination of the Jews of Hungary and its occupied territories, began, according to the minutes, with the "communication" of one of Horthy's "decisions:" "According to Mr. Prime Minister's statement, His Excellency the Regent gives the government under his leadership a free hand in connection with all the Jewish [anti-Jewish] ordinances, and does not wish to exercise any influence in that respect."

Speaking about what the Horthysts were doing in Hungary, Churchill wrote to Eden at that time: "The persecution of the Jews in Hungary is perhaps the greatest and most abject crime in the entire human history."

Horthy's direct participation in planning and carrying out that crime is undeniable. The fact that he declined any prerogative in the solution of the

Jewish problem denotes only cowardice. Because he "stepped aside" only "de jure;" "de facto" he ensured that the horrible crime is carried out mercilessly. Consequently, he hastened to appoint secretaries of state at the Ministry of the Interior in charge of "solving the Jewish problem;" they were Baky and Endre, his trusted men, whom he had known since Szeghedin, and who were known throughout the country as the most savage and vehement antisemites.

In point of fact, Baky quoted before the Popular Tribunal of Budapest the words Horthy spoke when he appointed him secretary of state for the interior: "You are one of my old officers from Szeghedin, I know you are devoted to me, I trust you completely, and that is why I am appointing you secretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior at this difficult time. Today we need the best among the Hungarians... I hate the Galician Jews and the communists. Out with them! Out! Out!"

Besides, what right does a state leader have to simply forsake the fate of 1 million of his citizens? How could he impassively look on the humiliation, torture, and mass liquidation of 1 million citizens of the country he was governing and think of himself as innocent on the absurd grounds that he did not want to "exercise any influence?..."

How and who could absolve a dictator (which Horthy was) from crimes committed at the order of the government appointed by him? And the governments that Horthy appointed, beginning with that chaired by Sztójay Dóme, initiated, sponsored, and covered up unimaginable crimes, defying the protests of the entire world.

After the liberation, the Popular Tribunal of Budapest unequivocally pointed out the inhuman attitude, feverish haste, harshness and abuses, and the frightening criminal zeal that characterized the incarceration in ghettos and the deportations. In the trial of Baky and Endre (secretaries of state), and Iaross (minister of the interior), in verdict No BX 4419 of 7 January 1946, referring to the collection and shipment of the Jews to death, the tribunal stated: "There cannot be any doubt that the incarceration in ghettos and the deportation abroad of 434,351 persons living in various parts of the country in only 2 months was possible solely because of the active collaboration of the Hungarian authorities, who were familiar with the local situation... At the time, several German public figures (Eichmann, Wesliceny) said that the situation in Hungary was special, because Endre and Baky dictated a more rapid tempo to Jewish affairs than even the Germans. And, according to Veesenmayer's statement, Adolf Eichmann, Berlin's expert in Hungary for the solution of the Jewish problem, had informed him that in essence, the deportation relied on the Hungarian gendarmerie and administration, because he had only a small command at his disposal."

After the war, as we said, some sources sought to attenuate the Horthysts' zeal; they went as far as to attempt to diminish their responsibility by pushing their defense close to absolution and putting the blame on the Nazis. Unfortunately, the authors of the work under discussion are no exception. The testimonies and documents of the time--testimonies by former Budapest and Berlin rulers, too, and documents issued and stamped in those capitals--make unappealable accusations. Even if no document had been left and no witness had

been found from among the deportees to incriminate them, the truth still could not have been concealed, because, in their cruelty and mercilessness, at the very last moment, in the last throes of death, they committed a revolting crime, a crime impossible to cover up or deny--the horrifying crime of Sarmas.

It was in September 1944. The sufferings of the people of north-west Romania were coming to an end. The victorious advance of the Romanian and Soviet troops was bringing freedom and ease for the pain. However, here and there along the temporarily imposed border, the Nazi and Horthyst troops for a few days succeeded in penetrating into southern Transylvania, across the unjust boundary laid down by the heinous diktat of Vienna. There, all the Jews, without exception, had been left alive. Subunits of the Horthyst army penetrated the commune of Sarmas, a few dozen kilometers from Cluj. The Horthyst "knights" noted with surprise that the small commune had 126 Jews. And all alive! They did not hesitate even a moment. Without being requested or ordered by the German side, without even consulting Budapest, the Horthyst army knights, on their own initiative and impelled by instincts rooted in them for almost 25 years of fascist-Horthyst rule, fell upon the 126 men, women, children, and old people and committed one of the most shocking crimes of the Holocaust, which was to become known to the world as "the horrible crime of Sarmas."

At Birkenau-Auschwitz, Landsberg, and Kaufering, in all the camps to which the fate prescribed by the Horthysts had brought me, I had seen thousands upon thousands of bodies. I had been an eye witness to the death of many comrades who died of starvation, cold, disease, asphyxiated, shot, or hanged; drowned, frozen, or hurled off scaffolding. Yet, I confess that I had never been as horrified as when I saw photographs of the victims of Sarmas. I want to cite only one passage from the report made at the exhumation performed by the Romanian authorities on 21 February 1945.

"...Very many bodies--particularly from the second pit, which contained mostly women and children--presented marks of the most savage violence: skulls were broken and even smashed by strong blows with dull or sharp objects (gun butts, pick axes, shovels, etc.); many bodies had been stabbed or even torn apart by cold weapons; others had the bones of the upper or lower limbs broken.

"The bodies had been thrown in helter-skelter, one on top of the other; nevertheless, some bodies were found enlaced: a husband embracing his wife, a father clasping his child to his breast..."

It is outright strange that the authors of the History of Transylvania, while not writing more than 4 and 1/2 lines about the holocaust of the Jews of the Horthyst occupied north-west Romania, found it appropriate to write somewhat more--six lines--about the fate of the Jews in Romania. Those lines were well used by the authors to increase confusion and carry on the distortions and falsifications.

In order to better understand the dangerous game of falsifying history that the authors of this historical improvisation play, we must bring an earlier quotation which shows the perception that they want to accredit. According to the authors, after the fascist diktat of Vienna, there began the so-called

"policy of reciprocity toward the nationalities; expulsions were answered with expulsions, internment with internment, and school closing with school closing, thus creating total uncertainty for the fate of the Romanians in the north and the Hungarians in the south."

In other words, the authors try to suggest to the reader the existence of a parallel between the situations prevailing in northern and southern Transylvania. Such an attempt is more than revolting. When and where, in what commune in southern Transylvania, were 155 innocent people butchered--pregnant women and mothers with babies at the breast, men in the prime of life and old people, indiscriminately--as it happened case in northern Transylvania in the night of 13 to 14 September 1940 in the commune Ip? When and where, in what commune of southern Transylvania was there ever a massacre such as the one perpetrated by the Horthysts on 9 September 1940 in the commune Traznea, in which 81 people died? When, where, in what communes in southern Transylvania were there ever horrifying crimes committed such as those carried out by the Horthysts at Moisel, Sarmas, or Leordina?

The authors tried to launch the idea of a parallelism in the attitude toward Jews, too. They formulate it in a lapidary manner, as something that is allegedly natural: "The fascist policies on both sides [i.e., both in northern and southern Transylvania] went hand in hand with antisemitism." Then comes the sentence that we cited at the beginning of the article, in which the authors describe in four and 1/2 lines all that their hearts and conscience allowed them to write about the extermination of the Jews of occupied northern Transylvania. The most elementary logic would have required that they further describe all that happened in southern Transylvania, with a view to supporting the idea of similarity "on both sides." However, the authors remorselessly sacrifice logic and, to the reader's amazement, make not the least reference to the situation prevailing in southern Transylvania, jumping instead, without any connective link, to the situation of the Jews throughout Romania. Of course, the authors had to make that jump because they did not have the guts to lay down the historical truth: no Jewish life was threatened in southern Transylvania under Antonescu's rule. While the Jews of Cluj and Dej, Oradea and Satu-Mare, and all the towns and villages of northern Transylvania were collected and all of them, down to the last old man and the last baby, were driven, under the prodding of Horthyst bayonets, to the crematoria and gas chambers of Birkenau-Auschwitz, the Jews of Turda and Alba-Iulia, Arad and Timisoara did not even wear the yellow star!

Moreover, those towns, like towns throughout Romania, offered a safe haven to all the Jews from northern Transylvania--and even from Hungary--who managed to escape from ghettos and to flee to Romania.

The specialized literature is well aware of and often cites the cable sent from Budapest to Berlin in which Veesenmayer reported: "...It has been learned from the circles of the Romanian general consulate in Cluj that Hungarian Jews who fled to Romania are treated there as political refugees, and that the Romanian government is facilitating their emigration to Palestine."

The authors claim that "According to estimates, approximately 387,000 Jews were killed in Romania, particularly east of the Carpathians, during World war II."

What is now under discussion is the History of Transylvania, the falsifications and distortions that it contains, not the fate of the Jews under Antonescu's regime. Nevertheless, since the authors themselves advanced that view, we must clarify a few things.

This is not the first time that with one flourish of the pen, Hungarian writers transfer the entire number of Jews from north-west Romania who fell victims to the Horthyist implementation of the "final solution" to Antonescu's account. This is how the misrepresentation is achieved. The figures of the official population census of 1930 showed 728,115 Jews living in Romania. In view of the natural demographic growth, it is estimated that by the beginning of 1940 Romania had a Jewish population of approximately 760,000. After the liberation from Nazi domination, over 350,000 Jews still lived in Romania. Hence, their number had decreased, indeed, by about 400,000. Except that that figure obviously included the over 166,000 Jews deported by the Horthyist authorities, of whom 84.5 percent had perished. And then there are the approximately 280,000 Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina. Without in any way minimizing Antonescu's responsibility for the death in Transnistria of 70,000-80,000 Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina, who had been moved there in the chaos of the world war, we must state that in the part of Romania under the authority of the Romanian government, within the boundaries established in the summer of 1940, despite heavy and repeated pressures from Berlin, the "final solution" was not implemented.

University Professor Yisra'el Gutman of Israel, in a paper entitled "The Situation of the Romanian Jews Against the Background of Nazi Occupied or Dominated Europe," shows that the Nazi plans to deport the Romanian Jews to the extermination camps of Poland met with "energetic opposition from the Romanian people and authorities, including the government and the dictator Ion Antonescu... Their refusal to hand over the Jews hardened in time, and that resistance was responsible for saving the majority of the Romanian Jews from the 'final solution' thought up by the Nazis. It seems to me that this was not merely the consequence of opportunism and changes on the front, but, to a good and partly decisive extent, the outcome of the differences of positions and concepts that existed between Nazi Germany and Romania under Antonescu concerning the Jews."

According to original documents at the Yad Vashem archives in Jerusalem, on 15 September 1942 Hauptsturmfuehrer Gustav Richter, who had arrived in Bucharest as an expert in "Jewish problems," signed a German plan to deport the Romanian Jews. Impatient, BUKARESTER TAGEBLATT, brought out by the German embassy in Bucharest, announced that still in 1942 the Jews of southern Transylvania and Banat would be evacuated, while in the following year all the Jews from the old kingdom would be deported, so that not one Jew would be left in Romania. Confident of its information, the newspaper predicted that "Romania will once again serve as an example for other countries." Once the deportation plan became public, a wave of protests by the most diverse political, economic, cultural, and religious circles in Romania began to make their pressure felt.

A protest by Romanians from southern Transylvania and Banat--intellectuals, tradesmen, industrialists, and shop keepers--sent to the Ministry of the Interior in Bucharest, stated: "Whatever our concept about the Jews, we are Christians and humans, and we, who have suffered so long under Hungarian domination, and who know what our people suffer today under that same domination, shudder at the thought that citizens of a state could, for no fault of their own, be stripped of all their possessions and chased away from the country in which they were born and where the bones of their parents, grandparents, and greatgrandparents are buried." The deportation plan could not be implemented. It failed.

In a study entitled "The Antonescu Regime and the Rescue of the Jews of Southern Transylvania," Dr. Jean Ancel of Israel states that "The problem of the deportation of the Jews of [southern] Transylvania can be viewed as a first serious clash between the plans of the Nazi government and the determination of a small nation. If we regard Stalingrad as a decisive event in the history of World War II, an event that marked the beginning of the end for the Nazi domination in Europe, then the refusal of the Romanian government to hand over its Jews can be viewed as one of the great acts of resistance in Europe, at a time when Germany was at the peak of its power..."

Of course, the Jews of Romania were not spared a long string of antisemitic measures, afflictions, and persecutions either. Among the victims of the legionnaire rebellion of January 1941 were 130 Jews. Another few thousands perished in the Iasi pogrom. An exact figure could not be established because of a lack of documents. Studies estimate it at over 3,200 victims. Referring to the rebellion and to the Iasi pogrom, Professor Dr. Yisra'el Gutman of Yad Vashem said: "It is to be assumed that the Nazis initiated and prompted those tragic events, but one cannot overlook the fact that certain antisemitic elements from among the locals had a hand in them."

I have said it elsewhere and I feel compelled to repeat: as a survivor of the holocaust of northern Transylvania I find it extremely difficult to compare figures that express crushed lives, or to judge the seriousness of the crimes by the number of the victims, when the taking of a single life for ethnical reasons is an act deserving capital condemnation. However, I believe that it is unjust and inadmissible to put on the same plane--as the authors of the History of Transylvania do--the fate of the Jews of northern Transylvania--84.5 percent of whom were exterminated--with that of the Jews in the south, where, as is known, all were left alive. It is unjust and inadmissible to put on the same plane the fate of the Jews in North West Hungary--about whom the American historian Randolph Braham said that "they were destroyed at an unprecedented rate through the most relentless deportation and the most cruel program of massacration ever encountered during the war"--with that of the Jews in Romania, which, according to the same historian, constituted "an oasis and a haven for the Jewish refugees from Hungary."

Interior State Secretary Laszlo Endre himself, in a summarizing report to the Council of Ministers of Budapest at its 21 June 1944 meeting, stated: "In order to escape the incarceration in ghettos, the Jews have begun to flee across the border, abroad, particularly to Romania. Among all our neighbors,

'Rehabilitation' of Austro-Hungarian Dualism

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[Article by Dr. Nicolae Edroiu, Dr. Constantin Cazanisteau, Dr. Ladislau Gyemant, and Dr. Ion Patroiu: "Nostalg for a Dismal Empire: The Austro-Hungarian Empire"]

[Text] One of the aspects of the Romanian people's history tendentiously presented in The History of Transylvania, a work recently brought out in Budapest, regards--has been mentioned in this magazine--the consequences of the establishment in 1867 of the dual Austro-Hungarian regime.

During the 1867-1918 period Transylvania was deprived of its autonomous status and administratively incorporated into Hungary. That period marked an unprecedented exacerbation of the system of national discrimination and oppression of the Transylvanian Romanians, who were subjected to a brutal policy of denationalization and Magyarization. The struggle for national emancipation and unity of the Transylvanian Romanians intensified during this time and, thanks to the united efforts of the Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians, on 1 December 1918 it culminated in the unification of Transylvania and Romania, thus completing the process of establishment of the Romanian national united state.

From the very beginning one is surprised by the definition of the Austro-Hungarian dualism provided by the authors of the work: "The 1867 compromise imposed from above brought the 1848 revolution to a conservative end both outwardly, concerning the relations with Austria, and inwardly, concerning the relations with the broad masses, and transformed the Hapsburgic empire into a 'bicephalous' constitutional monarchy. In order to assess this intentionally incomplete and imprecise "definition" we must briefly recall the circumstances of the achievement of the 1867 "compromise" that created the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy.

The major revolutionary tremors of 1848-49 had shaken the already rickety foundation of the multinational Austrian empire; the repeated attempts of the Vienna Court to find a political formula ensuring the survival of the empire failed one after the other. Neither absolutism nor the liberal regime yielded any results. Austria's defeat in the war with Prussia (1866) sharpened the crisis of the Austrian empire. The Court of Vienna tried yet another political formula: an alliance between the Austrian and Hungarian ruling classes--the landowners and the bourgeoisie--which became known as the "compromise" or "accord" of 17 February 1867, following which the Austrian Empire changed its name to Austria-Hungary; the two sides of the dual monarchy were separated by the river Leithe (the western part was comprised of Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Gorizia, Dalmatia, Bukovina, etc., whereas the eastern part included Hungary, Transylvania, Banat, Croatia, Slavonia, Vojvodina, etc.). Francis Joseph became emperor of Austria and king of Hungary; each of the two sides had its own government, while Vienna was the seat of the ministries of finance, war, and foreign affairs for the entire dual monarchy. Joint

expenditures were covered 70 percent by Austria and 30 percent by Hungary. The "compromise" of 1867 incontestably established a conservative structure in Austria-Hungary, even though the constitution promulgated on 21 December 1867 introduced certain bourgeois freedoms. The Austro-Hungarian dualism was an attempt to salvage that "prison of nations" which was the Hapsburg empire.

In the case of Transylvania, the new regime marked the abolition of its ancient political-administrative autonomy and its incorporation into Hungary, under law XLIII voted by the Hungarian diet, which ignored the opposition of the majority population of the province, the Romanians. As we will further demonstrate, the purpose of the incorporation of Transylvania into Hungary was to consolidate in this province the power of the Magyar landowners and bourgeoisie, who formed a tiny minority, with the direct support of the landowners and bourgeoisie of Hungary, which now included Transylvania. The 1867 accord was an attempt to contain the increasingly vigorous assertion of the Romanian people and the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

The only thing that the authors of *The History of Transylvania* retained from this historical reality is the "conservative ending of the 1848 revolution!" A peculiar juxtaposition of terms--as if there could be such a thing as conservative revolutionarism or vice versa--designed to disguise the reactionary nature of the Austro-Hungarian dualism and to make more presentable the hideous face of a national oppressor. The only link that the authors can find between the 1848 revolution and the "Austro-Hungarian dualism" is that: "The compromise [of 1867] brought an end to the 3 centuries old status of Transylvania as a separate territory," and that "One of the basic principles of the compromise [...] was precisely to fully reinstate the union [of Transylvania and Hungary] accepted in 1848." The achievement of this objective of the ruling classes of Austria and Hungary--the abolition of Transylvania's autonomous status--caused the authors to "forget" all the darker aspects of the dual monarchy, and to "forget" that the 1848 union was not accepted by the Transylvanian Romanians. Blinded by this consequence of the dual monarchy--Transylvania's forced incorporation into Hungary--the authors did not see, or did not want to see, what people knew at the time and what so many historians subsequently stated. According to an equally suitable and descriptive definition of that time, the Austro-Hungarian dualism was the *unio duarum nationum contra plures* (the union of two nations against the many). It was unequivocally condemned by all those who objectively analyzed its nature and contents. Thus, as early as in 1883, Romanian socialists viewed Austria-Hungary as "a decomposing state that cannot last long, despite all its pretenses, which are nothing but the convulsions of a dying body, the last flickerings of a light about to go out," while 5 years later Friedrich Engels, highlighting the relationship between czarism and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, wrote: "If the despotism of Petersburg were to fall tomorrow, day after tomorrow there would be no Austria-Hungary left in Europe."

Referring to the 1867 compromise and the manner in which it came into existence, historian Robert Kahn opined that it was "one of the most deplorable chapters in the history of the monarchy's nationalities policy."

Undisputedly, for the Hungarian side the main incentive of the compromise--one that the authors do not recall even in passing--was that it gave it a "free

hand" against the nationalities that were incorporated in the monarchy east of the Leithe. In his History of Austria-Hungary, French historian Louis Leger quite correctly stated that "The Hungarian noblemen, with their customary selfishness, had only thought of their own interests;... they took advantage of their victory to levy a heavy domination on the Romanians, Serbians, and Slovaks."

The same idea is clearly expressed by the well-known Hungarian historian Hanak Peter in his book Hungary in the Monarchy, namely that: "The most characteristic trait of the dualism was the special system of national oppression, the division of the domination of nationalities between the Austro-German and Hungarian ruling classes."

In The History of Transylvania, instead of a profound analysis of the negative consequences of the dualism for the Romanians--as in fact for the other oppressed nationalities of the dual monarchy--the authors reproach the Romanians for not having realized "the price of the historic gift" offered by the new political-administrative formula: the abolition of Transylvania's autonomy. The cynicism shown by the authors brings them closer to the propagators--in fact, the old propagators--of the policy of national divisiveness and oppression. Their reasoning, which is as spurious as it is harmful, is the following: "Until recently, Transylvania's autonomy seemed ensured for the foreseeable future, and if the Romanians entertained somber presentiments, they hoped that they would gradually gain the political preponderance in the Great Principality [of Transylvania]. The [Austro-Hungarian] union, however, deprived them of the stronghold they were claiming and precisely because of the blow they had suffered, they were not in a position to appreciate, for the time being, the price of the historic gift offered to them in exchange: constitutionalism and the unification of the Transylvanian Romanians with the Romanians of Hungary and their incorporation in one camp."

In reality, this "historic gift" was a "poisoned gift," because the new regime enabled the ruling circles of Budapest to unleash a virulent campaign of Magyarization of the Transylvanian Romanians--and of the other oppressed nationalities--subjecting them to systematic humiliation, persecution, and oppression that elicited protests from the international community.

The authors of the History of Transylvania hypocritically claim that the dual monarchy permitted the "unification of the Transylvanian Romanians with the Romanians of Hungary," but they "forget" to mention that in point of fact, both were subjected to the same regime of national discrimination and oppression, and that in the case of Transylvania, the dualist formula was designed to turn the Romanians--who, even the authors of Budapest admit, were the majority of the Transylvanian population (except that in that work the majority character of the Romanians is presented, in complete violation of the historical reality, as a relatively recent phenomenon, i.e., dating to the second half of the 18th century)--into a minority of the "united" Hungarian kingdom; they also forget to mention that, concerning the unity of the Romanians, the latter were guided by the idea clearly and succinctly expressed by the participants in the Blaj Assembly of 1848: "We want to be united with the Country," that is to say by the idea of unification with their brothers

across the Carpathians. What the authors of the History of Transylvania represent as a "salutary" effect of the Austro-Hungarian dualism--the unification of the Romanians "in one camp" within the boundaries of the Hungarian kingdom--had exceedingly serious consequences in that it facilitated their denationalization. This is precisely what the influential British historian R.W. Seton-Watson, among others, emphasized: "As long as Transylvania remained an entity, the Romanians living there, although deprived of their rights, made up the absolute majority of the population and could be reasonably certain of asserting themselves in the future. The incorporation into Hungary, although it united them with their brothers in the abutting counties, reduced them to a powerless minority comprising only 15 percent of the overall territories of the Holly Crown [the symbol of the medieval Hungarian royalty]. The life of a smaller entity was to melt into the broader history of Hungary, and there existed no chance of redress, as another privileged nation, the Saxons, were to soon find out on their own skin."

As for the other component of the "historic gift" offered to the Romanians, constitutionalism, that was inserted by the authors, evidently without any basis, in an attempt to justify the completely false idea that for the 5-decades duration of the dual monarchy, Transylvania--and thus the Romanians, too--allegedly benefited from a constitutional government. Thus, with a few strokes of the pen, the authors qualify as constitutional all the laws of forced Magyarization, all the measures of oppression and persecution of the nationalities, and all the actions designed to curb and prohibit their cultural manifestations, to curtail and impede their economic development, and to persecute, arrest, and detain their representatives under the pretext that what they were saying or writing "harmed" the interests of the "national united Hungarian state." However, the mere fact that under a given regime the laws are voted by parliament does not suffice to declare that regime as constitutional, and even liberal, as the authors claim. When a historian makes a pronouncement about a regime he may not ignore the contents of the laws promulgated and the manner in which they were implemented.

As is well known, the entire policy toward the nationalities was based on the notorious "Law for granting equal rights to the nationalities" (Law XLIV of 1868), which from the very start was not accepted by any of the nationalities, because precisely that law, broadly trumpeted as designed to "ensure equal rights for the nationalities," sanctioned and enacted the concept of an extreme chauvinistic nationalism concerning "the united political Hungarian nation," a concept that resulted in the fiercest policy of national oppression, forced Magyarization, and relentless repression of anything that was not Magyar and of everything that was suspected of opposing Hungarian hegemony in one way or another.

In point of fact, the very name of the law had been calculated to deceive and mislead, because the law did not propose to "grant equal rights to the nationalities," but, as Zenovie Pacilisanu wrote in his book The Minorities Policy of the Hungarian Governments, to "treat them equally unjustly, or better said, to equally eliminate them." While the law was being debated, Romanian deputy Iosif Hodosiu stated in the Budapest parliament that it "violated national freedom and equality of rights by creating an official nation, or a so-called state nation, the Hungarian nation, and disregarding

the other nations as if they did not exist either historically, or legally, or juridically, or de facto, although yesterday, our deputy Dobranszky Adolf clearly showed that they existed both historically and legally. That they really exist, you can see for yourselves: look around you, through the country, gentlemen! From a linguistic and national viewpoint, Hungary was never a specifically Hungarian state."

Even the authors of the History of Transylvania had to refrain from describing the law as a real measure of "granting equal rights to the nationalities," and with their customary habit of expressing themselves as euphemistically and elliptically as possible, they state: "... in order to reassure the non-Magyar population, a separate law was hammered out 'on the subject of equal rights for the nationalities,' which had a great political and ideological importance both at the time and later." Naturally, the authors did not have the courage to state that the main purpose of the law was to decree the hegemony of the Hungarian nation, by virtue of which violations of all the rights of the nationalities were initiated and justified, and all the oppressive measures were unleashed. They do not hesitate to state that "The law of nationalities (Law No XLIV of 1868) is, despite its limitations, a fundamentally liberal act. It ensured the broad use of non-Magyar languages. Each citizen could file documents in his mother tongue to the respective commune or county authorities or to the government, and the reply had to be in his mother tongue, too. Similarly, the communes were free to use the language selected for administrative purposes. The various religious denominations, clerical officials, and their institutions could use their mother tongue without restriction. Thus, the communes, religious bodies, and individuals were free to select the language in which their schools taught; on the other hand, the law partially assigned to the state the care of the medium level education in the languages of the nationalities... It cannot be said that the law did not ensure collective rights for the nationalities, although it was based primarily on individual and cultural freedom..."

We cannot, try as we may, fathom how the authors could come forth with such shocking statements. Not content with saying that the respective law contained or envisaged certain rights, they strongly claim that it ensured them. Moreover, they begin with "ensuring the broad use of non-Magyar languages."

Is is possible that they have forgotten that, in the very second paragraph of the introduction, the law specifies that the use of the languages of the nationalities is permissible only within the limits admitted by "the unity of the state, for the practical purposes of government and administration, and for promptly dispensing justice"? Referring to the provisions of that paragraph, the well-known Austrian philosopher L. Gumplovicz, far from considering them "liberal," wrote that they "force us to recognize that equality of rights restricted by so many clauses is nothing but an empty phrase, devoid of meaning, and that in reality, the law can be more aptly described as a 'law of oppression'." Have the authors forgotten that one of the main directions of Magyarization and of establishing the chimerical national state was, from the first day to the moment of collapse of dualist Hungary, to limit to the point of exclusion the use of non-Magyar languages in all the areas that concerned the state, particularly in the administration and

justice, down to changing geographical names by law and people's names through the most diverse economic, moral, and administrative pressures?

Is it possible that they have not looked through the list of names of persons, places, and localities changed into Hungarian compiled in 1893 by the Hungarian Academy? Or the pamphlet edited by the chairman of the Cultural Association for the Magyarization of Names, Telkes Sandor, and distributed at the beginning of 1898 by the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior under the title "How to Magyarize Our Name?" Can they be unaware of the fact that the many laws concerning education, culminating in Apponyi's dreadful laws, vehemently censured by European public opinion, had no other purpose than to make the children of the nationalities break off with their mother tongue as soon as they went to kindergarten and to force them adopt the Hungarian language, sacrificing for that purpose the learning of any other cultural and scientific subjects by continuously reducing the number of schools teaching in their mother tongues and forcing them to devote the majority of the schoolday hour to teaching Hungarian?

It is true that article 17 of the law obligated the state to have schools teach in the language of the nationalities in the areas in which the respective nationalities lived. However, none of the Hungarian governments that came to power in those 50 years observed that point of the law. During the period of the dual monarchy, not one of the state schools in Transylvania--either primary, secondary, or of any other level or category--taught in Romanian.

The Romanians' access to the state, administration, and justice apparatus was brutally restricted.

Referring to the intolerable workings of justice in Transylvania, the London magazine CONTEMPORARY REVIEW of December 1914 wrote that practically "all the high-ranking functionaries and judges appointed in Romanian counties are Hungarians. The lawyers are Hungarians... and jurors are selected out of the Hungarian population. Consequently, the poor Romanians are judged in a foreign language, by a foreign judge, defended by a foreign attorney, and the verdict is returned in a foreign language by foreign jurors... Consequently, the Romanian citizen in his own country cannot freely talk to functionaries appointed for the purpose of protecting his interests, whose salaries he himself is paying."

A similar situation prevailed regarding "ensuring by law" the cultural rights of the Romanians. The authors emphatically state that "One of the most important provisions [of the law concerning the nationalities] envisages that, for the purpose of establishing associations or societies serving the development of language, art, and science..." citizens may "associate" and may "collect funds which, under state control, can be used according to their legitimate national interests." Once again, out of respect for the truth, we see ourselves forced to recall several facts that the authors want forgotten. Through a number of measures and decrees the authorities increasingly prohibited social and cultural meetings, finally outlawing them as dangerous, because they pursued the preservation and development of the Romanian national consciousness. Telling examples along this line were the attempt to close down

ASTRA, viewed as "the most dangerous element from the viewpoint of the Hungarian state policy;" the confiscation of books and various publications in the Romanian language and dealing with the history of the Romanians; watching the people who received such publications, etc. Well informed about this situation, the Belgian minister to Vienna, Borchgrave, wrote in a report addressed to his foreign minister on 19 November 1892: "No less injustice is done to the Romanians in the matter of culture and public education. Ministers Trefort and Csaky have done all that was in their power to halt the progress of Romanian culture, either through laws or through decisions..."

The same line was followed by the policy of Magyarization and of restricting and eliminating Romanian culture, a policy pursued with manic zeal by the Associations of Magyar Culture in Transylvania (EMKE), initiated and guided by the state.

The newspaper LUPTA protested, with complete justice, on behalf of all the Romanians, against this series of base acts, stating that "The state, through laws supported by power, and the Magyar Association, through laws unchallenged by the state, have started a war against our culture, demanding from us unconditional submission... in the name of culture they want to destroy all our culture in order to more easily rob us of our nationality."

The press was oppressed with particular harshness and brutality, and the Hungarian authorities unleashed a relentless persecution of the journalists. Through a series of regulations, the government in Budapest invested prosecutors with discretionary prerogatives to monitor the Romanian press with a view to promptly and harshly repressing the expression of any idea, opinion, or assessment that could be suspected of hurting the foundation of the Hungarian "uninational" state. A proof of that are the many trials conducted for "press offenses," and the years of emprisonment to which dozens of Romanian publicists were sentenced.

Alone between 1884 and 1894, 161 people were implicated in press trials, of whom 107 were sentenced to 59 years in prisons and fines of 11,840 forints, while between April 1906 and August 1908, 226 political activists and Romanian journalists appeared before justice instances and were sentenced to over 124 years of prison and fines of almost 200,000 gold crowns.

Even the briefest depiction of the cruel fate of the Romanian in Transylvania during the period of the dual monarchy cannot omit a reference to the arrogant and contemptuous behavior of the entire state apparatus, and the chicaneries and brutalities, which more than once ended in crime, of the gendarmes who terrorized the Romanian villages. With justified feelings of bitterness and indignation, Romanian deputy Teodor Mihali said in the Parliament meeting of 20 November 1911: "Persecutions are committed daily by the administrative authorities... there have been many clashes between the peaceful population and the gendarmerie. One marvels, how is it possible that the gendarmerie should simply bother peaceful citizens... who wear articles belonging to the national costume, which they have always worn as an ancient custom, and which they are entitled to wear; clashes have frequently erupted on this ground with the most disastrous consequences."

Particularly significant for the abuses, brutality, and pressures which accompanied the entire political life of Hungary in the period of the dual monarchy is the manner in which parliamentary elections were held. As the historian George Goldberg showed in one of his books, "Elections were supervised in such a way as to ensure the results desired. The 1910 elections, for example, were supervised by 194 infantry battalions and 114 cavalry squadrons." Referring to the same parliamentary elections, the reputable historian R.W. Seton-Watson stressed in his well-known work, *Corruption and Reform in Hungary*, printed in London in 1911: "Troops were engaged in 380 of the 413 electoral constituencies existing in Hungary; in reaction to the criticism levelled at this type of procedure, the Hungarian government on 15 June (1910) published an official declaration stating that the press interpretations of the number of troops used were grossly exaggerated, and that 'only' 194 infantry battalions and 114 cavalry squadrons had been used." "In other words," the British historian remarked, "the government admitted to a number that is virtually the equivalent of a partial mobilization of the joint army. When 173,000 troops are required to maintain order on election day, we can safely assume that something unusual must be happening."

In these conditions, small wonder that the 1910 elections, according to the same historian, "made 12 victims, including the five Romanian peasants killed by gendarmes in the village of Margineni." Thus, after the elections of 1910, historian George Goldberg pointed out, the Magyar nobility "went as far as to declare itself the majority in Hungary, on the basis of figures that were so phantastic that the minister of education congratulated the chief statistician for cooking them up."

The authors of the *History of Transylvania* gloss over all that with reprobable ease. They do not dwell on those facts because they are in flagrant contradiction with their preestablished molds; during the period of the dual monarchy the laws were liberal, and the government constitutional! However, they do provide for themselves a margin of safety. They admit that at certain times, under the government of certain prime ministers, things went rather far.

Thus, they "admit" that with the "disappearance of the great 1848 liberals, the orientation that became dominant negated the distinct individuality of the nationalities and, invoking the interests of the entire countries, it opted for the slippery path of limiting freedoms." As we can see, the authors stubbornly try to "absolve" the dual monarchy even when they agree to point out some of its failings. Thus, in the first period the government was marked by the "great liberals," and only later their followers "opted" for--not forced Magyarization, not the brutal oppression of the nationalities, not their denationalization, but--"the slippery path of limiting freedoms." The only one about whom the authors state initially that he went too far along that "slippery path" was Baron Banffy Dezso. In connection with his appointment in 1895 as prime minister the authors note: "Banffy came to the conclusion that, without affecting the policy of accord with Vienna, with the dynasty, and in perfect agreement with Austria, all the forces must be concentrated against the nationalities, destroying their organizations. Their cultural and religious institutions must be put under state control in order to intensify and hasten the Magyarization." He is the only head of government

about whom it is stated that he "brought a new element into Hungarian political and social life by frankly expressing the need for a chauvinist policy toward the nationalities, for the purpose [once again, an attempt to justify a small excuse] of compensating the national public opinion for the submission to Vienna."

After pointing out that "Banffy's national policy gave up Magyarization through laws and circumspect repression that avoided violence, and institutionalized and bureaucratized the national problem," the authors conclude with a phrase calculated to minimize, if not cancel out, everything that they had "admitted" in order to lend some credibility to their treatment of the nationalities policy. They conclude: "In reality, Banffy's national policy of force produced more smoke than fire. The sniffing detectives, police vexations, and administrative measures did not deal strong blows to the nationalities' movements."

Having quarrelled with scientific discipline, the authors totally lose their objectivity, not only becoming subjective, but using denigrations that come perilously close to invective when directly referring to the situation of the Romanians in Transylvania, their national struggle, and their political activists. Obsessed by a desire to present the Romanians as having been, throughout their life in Transylvania--which the authors "deign" to concede them only since the end of the 12th century!--at a low level of development in comparison with the other cohabiting nationalities in Transylvania, the authors write: "The integration of the Saxons in the dual monarchy--as a realized possibility--is an indication of the possibilities and limitations of policies tending toward compromise in the area of national policy. When the ruling political class of a nationality accepted (and helped make it accepted by its own society) the dual monarchy and the need to bolster the Hungarian state, and resigned itself to certain manifestations, particularly external manifestations of Magyarization, then the governments supported their religious and cultural institutions, left their people in medium and low-ranking key positions, and allowed them to organize their towns and localities in their way and to represent a distinct color in the state. Such a compromise policy could be pursued only by a nationality that had a large network of institutions, a ruling class, and sound and stable positions. The less developed nationalities, even if far larger numerically than the Saxons, had to travel a longer and more tortuous path before their leaders could become interlocutors of the government."

The allusion is too transparent to pose any difficulty for understanding the viewpoint of the authors of the History of Transylvania. For them, the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy is not--as could be expected from competent and objective researchers, not to mention from historians claiming to examine historical phenomena from the positions of historical materialism--the target of a deservedly harsh condemnation. No! They believe that the "developed" nationalities, with a long historical tradition and an extensive network of institutions, such a nationality that did not feel affected by "the manifestations, particularly external manifestations of Magyarization," such a nationality did not view its interests as harmed by the dualist formula. Only the "less developed nationalities, even if larger than the Saxons," only they had difficulties integrating in the structures of the dual monarchy. Here the

authors' hypocrisy reaches peaks worthy of the greatest contempt! First they try to blur the national discrimination and oppression that made the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into a "prison of nations;" they viewed the problems of the nationalities as generated by their level of development! From this false angle, the Romanians, although numerous, were allegedly at a backward level of development. In contrast to the Saxons, the authors claim, they could not, in the absence of a "broad network of institutions," a "ruling class," and "sound and stable positions," enjoy of the support of the authorities for their religious and cultural institutions. As many statements, so many falsehoods! The authors "forget" that for centuries the Romanians--who were both native and the majority of Transylvania--were subjected, especially as of the second half of the 14th century, to a policy of discrimination and national oppression; that the political formula of *unio trium nationum*, i.e., of the alliance between the Magyar nobility, the Szekel patricians, and the Saxon notables had excluded them from the political life of Transylvania, dooming them, the oldest and most numerous inhabitants of Transylvania, to the status of a "tolerated" people in their ancestral land. It is clear to anyone who studies the history without prior bias that in such conditions the Transylvanian Romanians could not have had the extensive "network" of institutions that the other "nations" enjoyed. However, despite the political regime of Transylvania, the Romanians developed, on the basis of their national consciousness, a genuine ideology, founded on the aspirations of emancipation and national unity.

This basic problem is ignored by the authors of the History of Transylvania. Had they proceeded--as they claim to have done--from the historical truth, they could not have missed the objective process of the formation of the Romanian nation and, consequently, the objective need for the establishment of a united national Romanian state. It is solely from this perspective that one must examine the situation prevailing in Transylvania after the establishment of the dual monarchy. The attempt of the ruling circles of Budapest to impose the existence of an indivisible Hungarian nation, which was to assimilate through Magyarization all the other nationalities, of a united national state, which was to incorporate within its boundaries those non-Hungarian nationalities, that attempt was of a profoundly reactionary character. Preserving the "statal entities of historical Hungary" was an attempt--doomed to fail--to halt the irresistible process of assertion of the nationalities and of their right to live in national states. The "cohesive Hungarian state" and the "cohesive Hungarian nation" as conceived by the Budapest ruling circles were "cohesive" only through the legislative oppression of the dual monarchy, which was aimed at homogenizing territories inhabited by Romanians, Slovaks, Serbians, etc. by Magyarizing them. Only when those populations were separated and united within national states (Romania, Czechoslovakia, etc.), only thus and then could the Hungarian national state be realized, too, as it emerged after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at the end of World War I.

Instead of such an analysis, the authors of the History of Transylvania thought that they could cover up their failed--and anachronistic--attempt to rehabilitate the Austro-Hungarian dualism with a quotation from Ady Endre, on whom, the authors write, "The sight of the dismembering of historical Hungary had a paralyzing effect." This is the quotation: "And nevertheless, when I

think of Transylvania I must become sentimental. Transylvania has a soul of its own, and a brutal and threatening alteration of the map would tear away two twins, a Hungarian and a Romanian, from two breasts." Ady Endre was a cultural figure worthy of respect, but that passage requires a commentary that the authors of the History of Transylvania omitted to make. The "fears for the future" experienced, according to the authors, by anyone living in Transylvania on the eve of World War I, and that Ady Endre allegedly voiced, were not as general as the authors try to make out. "Fears for the future," for a future in which Transylvania would unite with Romania, were felt only by those who opposed the irresistible march forward of history: a minority of privileged people scared by the prospect of losing their privileges. Transylvania's unification with Romania was not a "brutal and threatening alteration of the map," but the redress of a great injustice done to the Romanian people and the reconstitution of the map of old Dacia, in other words, of 2,000 year old boundaries; it was not a matter of tearing away twins from the breast, but of a cohabiting Hungarian nationality living in a cohesive Romanian state, as it was formed in 1918, and for that nationality, in the conditions of the socialist society, the national policy of the RCP ensured optimal living and development conditions. Ady Endre, the generous activist of brotherhood among nations, is too close to the heart of anyone who identifies with that ideal to be lowered to the status of an "argument" for the nationalistic and revisionist theses of the authors of the History of Transylvania. Let us remind the authors, and primarily the coordinator of that work--and of culture in the People's Republic of Hungary--of the quotation that should have been cited and that faithfully expresses the thoughts of the great poet on the chauvinistic education promoted during the time of the dual monarchy: "We have learned from the pious Professor Palfy that cursing Germans, Serbians, Romanians, and Slovaks is an act of patriotism. Could that be true? If it is true, I want to solemnly declare that I am not a patriot. I respect every nation, language, religion, belief, and right extra et intra Hungariam."

Through the method of quotations and insidious formulas the authors of the History of Transylvania try to dispute the inevitable nature and legitimacy of the formation of the national cohesive Romanian state, of which Transylvania was and remains an integral part, despite all the old and more recent attempts--including that of the historians led by Kopeczi Bela--to present it as a distinct ethical and cultural entity of central-eastern Europe," or as having "a soul of its own." It is easy to perceive the desire of the authors of the History of Transylvania to revise the negative assessments of the dual monarchy and to present that nefarious and reactionary political structure as a favorable regime, even though certain "limitations" were laid down concerning the assertion of the nationalities.

The same tendentious perception is seen concerning the national struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians. The authors are intent on minimizing and denigrating that struggle and on presenting the Romanians as being torn apart by petty party infighting and as being often used as mere tools by this or that political group or figure. A conclusive example is offered in this respect by the narration of the memorandists' trial. As is well known, the writing and presentation of the great memorandum (1892) constituted one of the most important protest actions against the string of injustices to which the

Transylvanian Romanians were subjected, and which were vigorously denounced in that document, beginning with Transylvania's forced unification with Hungary and down to the Magyarization measures. In order to detract from the importance of that action, the authors wrote that "a considerable number of the leading figures of the Romanian society of Transylvania did not support the memorandists, and even abroad some voices described their petition as 'antechamber begging.'" In reality, even if differences of opinion did exist within the ranks of the Romanian leaders between those who recommended boycotting the new dualist regime (the "passivists") and those who were in favor of asserting the Romanian nationality within the new political-institutional framework (the "activists"), there existed also a unanimous feeling of dissatisfaction "based," as the British general consul to Budapest, A. Nicholson noted in 1891, "on more serious and specific complaints than among the Serbian and Croatian nationalities, which are given expression and form by a well organized opposition system." As for the "antechamber begging," that formula was culled from a French newspaper and appeared in the following context: "One can expect nothing from the Hapsburgs... Justice is won by open struggle, as befits descendants of ancient Rome. Pity should be reserved for antechamber beggars."

The memorandum strugglers were not "antechamber beggars," but, in the conditions of their time, they were fighters for the national emancipation of the Transylvanian Romanians, and the statement read at the trial in their name by I. Ratiu, chairman of the Romanian National Party, from which the authors reproduced one quotation, is an inspiring document because it vigorously asserted the conviction that the justice of the Romanians' case will be recognized by an impartial court of law: that of the cultured world.

That process demonstrated that the rights of the Transylvanian Romanians could not be won through petitions, but through an open, fierce struggle to fulfill the national ideal.

How is that process presented in the History of Transylvania written in Budapest? "The debates were not devoid of comical aspects, too," or "Bored, the Magyar audience began to give the sessions a miss, and many jurors claimed illnesses in order to escape." Admitting, however, that nevertheless "the sentences had been very harsh," the authors claimed that they satisfied "not only Hungarian nationalism, but also the wishes of the Romanian National Committee," which was pleased with "the manufacture of martyrs" to which the "nationalist camp" had recourse. The trial itself is presented as a genuine blessing for the Romanians' emancipation movement: "The Romanian leaders were rescued from the difficult situation created by the failure of the memorandum action by the nationalism of public opinion and the government." Thus, the repressive measures of the authorities and the chauvinistic manifestations of certain public opinion strata had, according to the authors, "positive" effects, too.

Attempts to minimize the Romanians' struggle for their legitimate aspirations and to discredit their outstanding activists appear on every other page of the book under discussion: after the trial of the memorandum activists, "internal dissent created a reflux within the Romanian national movement;" about the activities of Stefan Ciclo Pop, Vasile Goldis, Iuliu Maniu, and Al. Vaida-Voevod the book states: "Their speeches, which contained positive demands, too, did not elevate them above the general parliament level; moreover, Vaida-Voevod did not shrink back from cheap parliamentary intrigues;" in connection with the appearance of the newspaper ROMANUL, edited by Vasile Goldis, the authors state that "from then on the moral level of Romanian journalism in Transylvania hit rock bottom." Invective is slyly added to trivialization: "Through the victory of passivism Romanian policy did not become, as its adversaries claimed, like the gypsy who, imagining himself sick, laid down to await death." We leave it up to the readers to assess the form of expression of people who lay claim to scientific approach!

No one negates the existence of various currents and trends within the national movement of the Transylvanian Romanians; such phenomena existed in all the movements of national emancipation and, dialectically speaking, in examining them one must take into account the place and time factors. What was important and specific to the Romanian people's struggle for liberation and unity was their categorical refusal to accept the negation of their national identity, which was the purpose of the Magyarization policy. As George Barit noted as early as in 1871, "The Romanians have been imputed and are imputed one 'crime' from which they refuse to cease and desist. That crime is being

born 'Romanian' and wanting to be and remain Romanian, with their national language and individuality in their own land, a land fattened by much blood and watered with much sweat and as many tears."

The attitude of the Romanian state and of the political parties and public opinion in Romania toward the Transylvanian problem is presented by the authors in an equally tendentious manner. The main objective of the authors was, in this respect, to give the impression that the emancipation struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians had become the object of narrow political manipulations.

We have noted a few of the many examples that attest to the perseverance--often carried to the absurd--with which the authors of the History of Transylvania distorted and falsified reality, by advancing totally unfounded views, frankly walking around the facts and phenomena that do not fit in with their theories, and minimizing the disastrous effects of the laws, actions, and measures directed against all the non-Magyar nationalities. We must add that they took the same attitude toward the concepts and theses that underpinned the entire policy of oppression and denationalization promoted by Budapest throughout the period of the dual monarchy. We will dwell on only one example that we view as particularly important.

We are referring to the significance and profound implications of the concept of a "cohesive political Hungarian nation." There was no law or administrative measure even marginally important taken in the Hungary of those years, and no governmental action or parliamentary debate that did not invoke, mention, refer to, or center on that concept. The promotion and implementation of that concept was viewed as the cornerstone of the policy of all the governments that succeeded one another in Budapest in the course of those 51 years. In his study "The Development of Nationalism and the Evolution of the Nationalities Problem" in the last decades of the dual monarchy, published in 1961 in SZAZADOK, historian Horvath Zoltan correctly stated that "Dualist Hungary was based on two defining institutions: the great feudal property (secular and clerical)... and the violent defense of the idea of a 'cohesive national Hungarian state,' which meant defending the hegemony of the Hungarian nationality over the other nationalities."

The authors of the History of Transylvania, however, hold an entirely different opinion. They do not go as far as to validate the above concept, but in view of its importance for understanding Hungarian policy during the period of the dual monarchy, they try to define it as follows: "The national ideology, built upon historical right, the unity of the country, and the principle of bourgeois equality of rights, gave birth to the concept of a 'political Hungarian nation,' which included all the nationalities, with their characteristics and their cultural-linguistic autonomy, and recognized them to the extent that it did not threaten the historically engendered hegemony of the Hungarians."

One cannot help being stunned and revolted by such statements, which are not only historically unfounded, but down right defiant. Where and since when did the authors from Budapest discover such an "historical right" that suffices to legitimize a "national ideology" overtly directed against other nationalities and to justify their oppression and denationalization? How can one say in 1986

that the nationalist-chauvinistic ideology of the dual monarchy was "based" on the "country's unity?" Is it possible that even now, in our time, it is still not obvious to everyone that far from being cohesive, Hungary of the dual monarchy incorporated almost all around--to the north, east, and south--provinces that did not belong to it, inhabited by people who never gave up their aspirations for national freedom and unity? Since when and by virtue of what logic does the "principle of bourgeois equality" permit that a preeminently multinational state such as Hungary of the dual monarchy period should decree one nation as the 'cohesive political nation" and "de jure" obliterate all the others, not recognizing any of the latter's rights as collective entities? What equality principle, bourgeois or otherwise, and what right, historical or not, can we be talking about here when a country inhabited by 13.5 million people declares and institutes by law the existence of only one nation, the Hungarian nation, which made up only a minority of the population--5.6 million--while the other nationalities, which were the majority--7.9 million--were declared nonexistent as collective entities, being "de jure" included in the Hungarian minority?

At one with the governing circles of the time, the authors serenely state that the famous concept of a "cohesive political nation" "included all the nationalities, with their characteristics and their cultural-linguistic autonomy..." However, it is unanimously known and admitted that in fact, precisely that concept excluded the nationalities from any political right; by virtue of that concept their existence was simply negated, and their collective manifestation and assertion as entities and as nationalities was not admitted in any area and in any form. In point of fact, here the authors nonchalantly drop a statement that they do not even deem worthy of comment, so natural it appears to them. They say that the abovementioned concept "included all the nationalities" and so forth, "to the extent that it did not threaten the historically engendered hegemony of the Hungarians." Had we not read and reread that sentence with our own eyes we would not have believed that today, in the 9th decade of the 20th century, historians can write, not even with a trembling hand, that one nation may oppress other nations and nationalities by virtue of a historically engendered hegemony. We know that the dreadful arsenal of Nazi ideology attempted to justify the enslavement of some nations by other nations by virtue of the so-called racial superiority. But we know of no doctrine devoted to justifying and to creating historical grounds for the hegemony of one nation over other nations and nationalities.

We all know that in practice, the concept of a "cohesive political nation" was invoked to ensure the hegemony of the Hungarian nation, oppress the other nationalities, and promote a harsh policy of denationalization. But, all that occurred not by virtue of any historical right, but because of the enormous oppressive mechanism that the dualist state set in motion and continuously developed.

In Hungary of the dual monarchy period any state representative was allowed to commit any act of brutality, abuse, or crime if it was directed against other nationalities and served the dogma of the "uninational Hungarian state." The newspaper MAGYAR HIRLAP of 16 February 1892 had good reasons to write that "In Hungary all political crimes, all parliamentary failures, and all governmental negligence are forgiven and forgotten on the condition that the government

have a resolute and unwavering attitude on one question: the policy of Magyar hegemony."

One cannot say that the authors from Budapest do not also have a few "clearly critical" lines about the dual monarchy. We cite them: "The dualist system was a trap; it gave the Hungarian ruling classes a feeling of security while concealing the dangers lurking for them and for historical Hungary. The dualism masked the truth that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was not a safe and definitive haven." Consequently, in the view of the authors, the great fault of the dual monarchy did not lay in the reprehensible collusion between the Austrian landowners and upper bourgeoisie, and the Hungarian counts designed to enslave millions upon millions of people of other nationalities and to pitilessly bleed the forcibly incorporated, annexed, and invaded provinces; not in the most terrible bureaucratic and gendarmerie apparatus created to nip in the bud and mercilessly repress any attempt of the oppressed nationalities to assert themselves, but in the fact that it did not offer "a safe and definitive haven" capable of enduring, and why not, for all eternities for the unrestricted reign of the arrogant Hungarian exploiting classes over the Romanians of Transylvania, the Slovaks and Serbians, and all those who were not Hungarian and who made up the majority of the population of Hungary during the period of the dual monarchy.

Because of that flaw of the dual monarchy--concealing the dangers threatening historical Hungary--the authors inform us that "... aside from people with a clearer insight, or rather, healthy instincts, everyone else stopped thinking that the monarchy might one day collapse, something that would necessarily have meant the collapse of the historical Hungarian state. The Transylvanians, more sensitive to danger, set aside their fears about losing Transylvania."

Here, too, as in numerous other instances, the authors evade the truth. There had been fears, in fact, very serious fears in Budapest that "Transylvania can be lost." An increasing number of Hungarian politicians, economists, and publicists began to openly say that Transylvania did not have a Magyar character and that, without altering the realities prevailing there, it may not be possible to keep it for long in the grips of the "Holly Crown." As of the 1900's the fears began to turn into panic. In the parliament and the press, in pamphlets and leaflets, studies and books people clamored, pointed out, and "demonstrated" that unless drastic measures were taken in all the areas--economic, administrative, cultural, and social--and unless the state and the entire society pooled their energies to change the existing relationships, particularly from the viewpoint of demography and property, decreasing the share of the Romanians and tipping the balance in favor of the Hungarians, Transylvania would be irretrievably "lost," and that would cause the unraveling and collapse of all Hungary. "Currently the struggle in Transylvania is incredibly lopsided. The brutal force and state power are incontestably in Hungarian hands. However, today one can no longer rely on that alone," exclaimed panic-stricken Sofalvi in his work "On Strengthening the Hungarians in Transylvania."

A paper presented at the Hungarian Economic Society stated: "Traveling through the Magyar islands [localities with a larger number of Magyars] that float up above the Romanian ocean that is flooding Transylvania, and examining the

stability of the foundation of those islands," the author finds that "in most places it is so water-logged that it will not by itself be capable of resisting for long the increasingly swollen waves [...]"

The measures and actions envisaged and taken to bolster the Magyars in general and to deromanize Transylvania acquired such proportions that even the authors of the History of Transylvania could not overlook them. They write: "By the end of the century the handling of the nationality problem burst out of the bounds of police duties, became a specialty, and joined the ranks of the major daily problems facing each successive government. Greater resources were invested in dealing with it, but its practical solution was for many years to come not viewed as urgently necessary in order to combat the onset of the crisis of the dual monarchy. During this time, however, a new and important tendency from the viewpoint of the Transylvanian Hungarians appeared, namely the intention to indirectly strengthen the Magyar ethnic element... Plans were devised to improve its credit in Transylvania and to expand the cooperative movement, and steps were taken toward introducing a policy of social-national colonization."

However many times you may read this passage, the formulation is so obscure and intentionally vague that it is difficult to decypher what the authors actually wanted to say: did the policy toward the nationalities worsen or improve? One thing is clearly stated: "the intention to indirectly strengthen the Magyar ethnic element." A clear, but completely false statement. That was no attempt to "indirectly strengthen," but a vast complex of direct measures and actions designed to increase at any cost and through any means the demographic and economic weight of the Magyars in Transylvania, to accentuate the brutality of the denationalization of the Romanians, intensify the rate of Magyarization, and tighten police control of all Romanian institutions and manifestations.

A consistent promoter of Magyarization, Beksics Gusztav, after airing his views in dozens of articles, devoted a whole book to demonstrating that the state alone could not save Transylvania and Slovakia; the entire society had to devote all its forces to that purpose. "The society must not believe in that vain illusion," the author warned, "that the government and the law will be able to save the ideal of a Hungarian state between the peaks of Transylvania and Slovakia without its contribution."

Beksics openly demanded that the state should unreservedly finance the policy of denationalization and Magyarization, and should subordinate its economic policy to that objective, too: "Because in Hungary only the state has been built, while the national state has not yet been completely achieved, an economic policy organically combined with the national policy must provide not only for the state expenditures, but also for creating the national state."

Beksics openly appealed to the great Hungarian landowners "in the national interest, but also in their own interests, to divide up some of their lands on the Alföld and Ünnantúl and to purchase forests in Slovakia and Transylvania." The author further praised Minister Darányi who had decided to use state funds to buy forests in Transylvania, both from communes and from private owners, to restore them, and then to give them on concession or sell them to the

Hungarian counts. In this manner, Beksics concluded, the national criterion would triumph: "That criterion according to which the majority of the Slovakian and Transylvanian forests will in time come into the hands of the great Hungarian landowners, and the select Hungarian society will move from the dusty and muddy provinces on the Alföld to the picturesque areas of Slovakia and Transylvania.

"In England, the second or third generation sons of great families go into the City or leave for India or the colonies. The second or third generation sons of our landowners can populate Slovakia and Transylvania without having to move to the other end of the earth."

Surprisingly and even unexplicably, the authors, while talking about the history of Transylvania during the dual monarchy, totally and deliberately ignore the multiple economic, cultural, social, and other links between that ancient Romanian region and Romania. A foreign reader perusing the authors of Budapest might be led to think that east and south of Transylvania there was nothing but a geographical and demographical void. Anyone familiar with the history of the Romanian people knows that the historical, economic, cultural, and demographic development of Transylvania cannot be understood outside the close ties and mutual relations that had always existed between the Romanians living on the two sides of the Carpathians. It is true that during the period of the dual monarchy those ties had been greatly impeded. But in themselves the negative effects of that policy go to prove that the ties between Transylvania and Romania were so strong that artificially curtailing them had to have harmful effects. From documents of the time the authors could have seen for themselves that there was practically no report from any Chamber of Commerce and Industry to Budapest or from regional authorities to the Ministry of the Interior that did not contain references to ties to Romania and did not emphasize, sometimes in a down right dramatic tone, the painful repercussions of having them blocked.

The community of land and language and the many economic, political, demographic, and cultural relations generated a perfectly cohesive structure of the Romanian society in the extensive area of old Dacia even before the Great Unification of 1918.

The entire Romanian people aspired to achieve a cohesive national state, and the Romanian socialists faithfully expressed this aspiration by writing in 1883: "We want Dacia as it used to be [...] If right has any power on this earth, then Transylvania and the other provinces of old Dacia, where the Romanians are in the majority, must unite and will sooner or later unite within the Romanian state." This feeling was asserted increasingly vigorously and while differences of opinions sometimes emerged as to the priority and opportuneness of actions aimed at accomplishing national unity, they did not affect--as the authors of the History of Transylvania would have us believe--the aspiration of the entire Romanian nation to live within the boundaries of a national cohesive state.

That goal featured in the objective historical process of the formation of national states, a process that doomed the Austro-Hungarian monarchy to disappearance. No one and nothing could rescue from bankruptcy that hybrid

anachronistic and reactionary political body. As Bogumil Vosnjak noted in 1916: "No other country in Europe is as backward from the viewpoint of civic rights and duties. The officials of that old empire know nothing of the ideals of a modern state or the tasks of a genuine state-society. It is all rot and decadence, and totally useless for a vigorous life." And the author further asked himself: "What then is this Austria-Hungary? Nothing but an anachronism, a cruel anachronism that does not spare life; an anachronism filled with suffering, death, and blood. Perhaps Austria-Hungary is a government. But if it is nothing but a government, then the government called Austria-Hungary can collapse and eight nations can rise out of the prison walls. Who will be sorry about it? A few thousand representatives of the Hungarian and German ruling classes, a few old Austrian families, a parasite court, a few archdukes and their valets and mistresses, a retinue of secret counselors and courtiers, and a few thousand public functionaries and sergeants."

The collapse of the dual monarchy had become inevitable from the moment it came into conflict with the objective-historical requirements of the statal existence of the central-eastern and south-eastern European nations. World War I (1914-1918) did nothing but precipitate the unraveling of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, that is to say, it hastened a process that was coming close to its natural denouement. In this respect, too, the Romanian socialists understood the march of history: "The Romanians," they wrote as early as in 1883, "are not the Austria's heirs, nor do they want to be; they are creditors, and therefore they will not wait for its death to collect their dues, but will come forward as soon as the circumstances allow them to victoriously claim their right."

The collapse of the dual monarchy was the outcome of a profound crisis, in the process and unraveling of which the struggle of the oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary played an essential role. The Romanians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbians, Croats, etc., dealt--through their struggle for emancipation and unity--a mortal blow to the oppressing dual monarchy, and expressed their right to self-determination at representative, democratically elected meetings. The unification of Transylvania with Romania, voted at the Great National Assembly of Alba-Iulia on 1 December 1918 and subsequently recognized by the world at large, was part and parcel of that historically necessary process of eliminating the obstacle of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from the way of forming or completing the formation of national states in central-eastern and south-eastern Europe.

Instead of a profound analysis of the objective historical factors that inexorably brought the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy to bankruptcy, the authors of the History of Transylvania strove to create the image of a political structure "purified" of its great sins, and viable--according to their logic--if certain of its "limitations" had been corrected. However, history returned a verdict that no one and nothing can revise.

The authors of the History of Transylvania cannot not know that one does not need to openly state that one has territorial claims; it suffices to recall without criticism those times when annexation, invasion, enslavement, and denationalization were current practices in order to poison the atmosphere and undermine understanding and peaceful coexistence, bringing back to life the

heinous nationalist-chauvinistic and revisionist ideas and theses that still harbor a danger which we cannot and do not have the right to underestimate.

That is why we want to firmly assert: any attempt to make that policy palatable creates serious confusion and it feeds and revives theses belonging to a particularly dangerous arsenal. Bringing up the period of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy without objective analysis and without clearly censuring all its nationalist-chauvinistic ideas disconcerts the readers, creates confusions, and inflames those people who still hope that by flooding the atmosphere with the poison of such ideas they can bring back practices, methods, and situations that have been buried and will remain buried for ever.

12782

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USSR LAW ON LABOR ACTIVITY DEFENDED

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 6, 1987 p 9

[Article by Vladimir Kondratenko]

[Text] The letter from Jan Uhlir of Kolin read in part: "Our collective has been discussing at some length whether the Soviet Union has taken a step backward or not now that its executive offices have passed a law on individual labor activities..."

The principles of this law are in full accord with the principles of socialist management. They in no way represent a return to some form of private entrepreneurial activity. Under socialism there are three forms of ownership: state ownership, in which the property belongs to all the people; cooperative ownership, and individual ownership. Each form has its own political, and socioeconomic justification, and a precise role in the social replacement process. The leading role belongs to state ownership. The main source of increases in national income and the satisfaction of the growing requirements of the Soviet people remains public production based on state ownership of the means of production.

What is the difference between individual labor activity and private entrepreneurship? Individual activity is based on the personal labor of a citizen, and is taxed and regulated by public agencies. Private entrepreneurship is based on the exploitation of a citizen in an employer-employee relationship, the misuse of a monopoly of services, or in dishonest trade.

The law in question makes this distinction clear and clearly defines the socialist principles of individual labor activity. It forbids the hiring of labor outside of family members. The USSR constitution states that the state will regulate individual labor activity to assure that it is used for the benefit of society.

The work performed during individual labor activity is indirectly of public nature. This means that the outcome, whether it be a product or a service, achieves public recognition only after it is actually performed. The specific form that this work takes always bears the signs of individual effort and is, basically, a form of craftsmanship. The state supports

the development of this type of activity by allowing and urging individuals to enter into contracts with state and cooperative firms and organizations. It assists interested citizens in forming cooperatives or voluntary societies. In this sense the law paves the way for the development of individual activity within the context of collective work based on the cooperative form of ownership.

Neither state nor cooperative firms and organizations have as yet fully satisfied citizen demand for goods and services. Overcoming these shortcomings will require time and resources. In many instances, however, imperfections in the economic system have caused a lack of flexibility in taking advantage of opportunities.

Between now and the year 2000 the USSR will commit investment resources and people to improving and increasing service availability. Research has shown, for instance, that the delivery of 1 million rubles worth of paid services costs more than to produce the same value of consumer goods. This implies that inexpensive ways need to be found to deliver more services more rapidly.

Calculations indicate that to saturate the market for services in the USSR the state would have to hire an additional 4 million employees, invest 5 billion rubles in capital equipment, and an additional 5 billion rubles in materials. This assumes that both demand and the current organizational structure remain intact.

These increasing demands for higher quality products and services can in many instances be satisfied through individual labor activity. The newspaper IZVESTIYA has calculated that the general public spends on the average less time by a factor of 1.5 in obtaining these now illegal services than would be spent in dealing with the state organized service network (for equivalent jobs) and that the quality of the service work obtained privately is frequently higher.

The passing of this law does not mean that individual labor activity did not exist previously or that the state is just now attempting to develop and support it on a daily basis. Such activities have existed from the first days of socialism, but the state has not been able to control them adequately. Suffice it to say that the number of citizens authorized to perform individual work activity currently exceeds 100,000 in urban areas alone.

Published data and estimates by experts at the USSR Ministry of the Interior suggest that individuals illegally performing services to private individuals earn 5-6 billion rubles annually that go unrecorded by any statistical or financial agency. There are estimated to be 17-20 million such individuals, and the fact that they perform such services does not necessarily mean that they are not also employed in an official capacity as well.

Of the total volume of services provided to residents of urban areas, the tradesman's guild performs half of all repairs to complex home appliances.

In rural areas, where services are poorly developed and unevenly located almost 80 percent of all services (sewing, shoe repair, home repairs, furniture repairs) are obtained illegally from private individuals.

The logic of the current economic system demanded the administrative suppression of illegally provided services. There were many directives issued, but none of them had much impact. This is because they did not conform to reality.

The illegal activities of private individuals in services and production also accounted for the uneven (deformed) final distribution of financial resources among the general public. For example, writing in IZVESTIYA, the sociologist V. Rogozin found that in one oblast of the USSR 3 percent of the depositors controlled 50 percent of all deposits by the general public.

There have never existed, in fact, precise rights and responsibilities for citizens engaging in individual labor activity. Most people perform these activities in their free time, have no documentation and pay no taxes. Some are not aware they are breaking the law, while others are consciously hiding their incomes. In some cases these activities generate an income with no work because the individual involved has a monopoly on the service being offered. Even though someone else, who might be an expert in the field, might come along in his free time and break the monopoly of the handyman, such experts might also choose not to do so in part because by so doing they might be lowering their professional standards. What has been lacking in such situations is a law to facilitate the implementation of social justice:

1. a law that will recognize an honest ruble earned through work on one's own time;
2. a law that will limit the sources of unearned incomes, wealth that is generated from intentions of private ownership. The law on individual labor activity thus supplements the law that has already been adopted concerning the struggle with unearned incomes. They are two sides of the same coin.

By legalizing individual labor activity this law permits the application of the abilities and experiences of retirees, students, housewives, the handicapped and employees who wish to moonlight.

The law as written covers 30 types of individual work activity. Local soviets have the authority, however, to permit other forms of activity that are appropriate to a specific oblast, okres, or republic. The law expressly forbids the manufacture of dangerous items or the speculative reworking of goods purchased in state stores.

Individual activities are under the control of local soviets, which have the authority to levy heavy fines or to forbid given activities when the law is violated. The pertinent offices of the financial sector and the Ministry of the Interior assist the local soviets in their inspection activities.

The law covering individual labor activity clearly defines the permissible ways for using individual ownership and individual work to meet the needs of the general public. It is based on the current level of development of the labor force and production relationships. It will assist society in gaining greater control over the process of accelerating socioeconomic development by involving more of the general public in the process.

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IMPORTANCE OF CENTRALISM IN ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING STRESSED

Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech No 4, 1987 p 3

[Article by Prof Eng Zdenek Mosna, doctor of science, Prague Economic College:
"Democratic Centralism in Management"]

[Text] The strategy of accelerating socioeconomic development through intensification and improved production efficiency requires a restructuring of the planned management system of the national economy. The basis of this restructuring is the consistent application and full development of the principles of democratic centralism as set forth in the recently published Principles for Restructuring the Economic System of the CSSR.

Democratic centralism as it applies to socialist economic management involves the organic integration of two principles, the central management of the national economy as a whole and the economic independence of the constituent elements of that economy. Both of these principles, in turn, assume that public ownership of the means of production exists at a level commensurate with the degree of nationalization of production.

The interrelationship between these two principles is unique in the sense that neither principle may be applied at the expense of the other. They may be implemented only as a unit. This interrelationship in turns defines the limits of the authority of each.

Neither centralism, nor organizational economic independence, may be considered absolutes. Centralism may never be used to undermine organizational economic independence, and the latter may not be used to weaken centralism. Should either principle gain predominance the very replacement of the publicly owned means of production would be threatened.

New Role for the Center

Under current conditions the consistent application of democratic centralism is urgent because of the need to increase production efficiency through intensification. Efficiency as the chief characteristic of production, intensification as the chief means for achieving efficiency, and democratic centralism are mutually inseparable concepts which are determining the course of the gradual restructuring of the planned management system of the national economy.

What is the nature of the new role for the central management sphere? This role involves a focusing of its activities on the resolution of general issues of the development of the economy in both its material and functional areas. More specifically, the role of the central management offices is to resolve the following interrelated tasks:

--Defining the principle objectives of the party's socioeconomic development policy as well as the ways, techniques and resources needed to accomplish the goals... The core of this economic strategic, which is subordinate to the main goal of socialist production, is a strategy of scientific and technical progress and the participation of our economy in the international division of labor, along with a derivative strategy of macrostructural changes and capital investment.

--Setting the pace and proportions of national economic development and assuring that development takes place in a balanced fashion. Determining the pace and proportions of future economic development is also subordinate to strategic objectives in the area of living standards, the environment, R&D progress, foreign economic relations, structural changes, etc. One important task of the center is to act as a regulator in cases when actual economic development appears to be deviating too far from the established pace and proportions.

--Improving the planned management system of the national economy, and primarily the economic system as the main resource for implementing socioeconomic objectives.

An important task of the center is the constant improvement of the economic system, i.e., the systems of organizational and economic relationships that determine the position, activities and mutual interactions of economic entities in the process of capital replacement. Any systematic improvements must conform fully to the economic laws of socialism as well as respond to the specific objectives and conditions of a given stage of social development.

If the tools of management such as prices, wages, profits, etc., are formed without accurate information, then decisions made by economic entities based on input from these areas will not reflect reality. This in turn has a negative impact on economic performance and the reputation of socialist ownership. The same is true if management mechanisms are designed with no regard for the specific needs and conditions of a given period of social development. The dialectic of the general and the specific places strict demands on the practice of formulating and improving the economic system.

Decisions made at all management levels, including the center, must be evaluated in terms both of the existing external environment and the existing economic system. This is one categorical demand placed on any restructuring of the economic system.

To assure that the economic system function as it should we need to make sure that decisions made by central offices conform to the following criteria:

1. that national economic development, both materially and functionally, be based on ongoing scientific analysis and planning;
2. that criteria for efficient economic growth be strictly adhered to, including criteria related to our economic participation in socialist economic integration and the international division of labor;
3. that they respect the principles of democratic centralism, balancing these considerations with the objective economic independence of the basic elements of the economy;
4. that decisions respect a unity of function, authority and accountability.

In fact, the economic center of society represents a complex system of offices among which must exist an effective distribution of activities and cooperation. This is why the 17th CPCZ Congress justly stated that the strategy of accelerated socioeconomic development places great demands on the federal government, republic governments, planning commissions, commissions for R&D and investment development, ministries and central agencies. The Congress at the same time defined the basic content of the activities of central agencies, and above all the federal government. The federal government, in its view, must concentrate more on strategic and conceptual issues of the development of a unified Czechoslovak economy, and on creating the requisite groundwork for the successful implementation of long term and 5-year plans, mainly by making needed changes in the planned management system of the economy.

Central industrial planning agencies play an important role in central economic planning. Each of these agencies "manages" a specific tool of central management; the state plan, finance, prices, wages, credit, and exchange rates. Because the basic mechanism of centralized management is the state plan, on the basis of which all other management mechanisms function, the central planning office is of particular importance of these industrial planning agencies. This office, in the words of V.I. Lenin, should become the true scientific and economic headquarters of the country. The central planning office is mainly responsible for formulating basic objectives of socioeconomic strategy, drafting 5-year state plans based on long range planning, and implementing national economic plan coordination with other CEMA member countries. In order to utilize more effectively the planning process state plans must begin to include projections of capital replacement goals in both physical and value terms, consistently to embody efficiency criteria, and to contain output targets that will allow firms to work in the most efficient manner.

The position and role of sectoral ministries must be more clearly specified. This must include their relationship to the government and its agencies on the one hand and to economic entities on the other hand. As part of centralized economic management, branch ministries must consistently represent public interests, through development strategies which implement the socioeconomic development plans of the state as they apply to a given sector. The sectoral ministries are fully responsible for meeting any and all targets related to their sector's role in the plan. Developing the economy as a unified national

economic complex with a focus on overall economic performance demands that branch ministries get away from a sectoral approach and begin to strengthen the role of interbranch ties in the central management system. On the other hand it is necessary that these ministries cut back on operational and detailed assistance that they currently provide to economic organizations.

Improving the quality of centralized national economic management while at the same time expanding the economic independence of organizations presumes that a new technique will be adopted for formulating the state 5-year plan and breaking it down for the enterprise management sphere.

Full Khozraschot Management

The more efficient utilization of socialist planning requires that the state plan anticipate the process of capital replacement in accordance with efficiency criteria. Achieving a balance between requirements and available resources while incurring minimal costs for resource formation will require an active role for efficiency standards, and above all standardized prices for determining the material proportions and tasks of the plan. A shift to materials and value based planning based on efficiency criteria will be unthinkable without greater interaction between material pricing, financial, credit, and exchange rate relationships.

Specific state plan outputs, which form the basis for the formulation of organizational economic plans, must provide a link between centralism and the economic independence of these organizations. This requirement is satisfied by an output structure which effectively combines, according to the specific conditions of each sector, economic standards that determine for economic organizations the relationship that must exist between resource formation and use, along with selected direct tasks related to state priorities. At the same time it is important that economic standards (state budget transfers, standards for forming organizational financial funds, etc.) be systematically related to the efficiency criteria for economic organizations. This will enable these firms to focus their activities to maximize the satisfaction of custom requirements at a minimal cost in labor.

Organizational economic independence is objectively defined by the characteristics of the replacement of socially owned resources given the existing level of nationalization of production.

Practical experiences in the building of socialism have shown that the effectiveness with which socialist property is replaced at the most basic levels of production depends directly on the extent to which these firms "pay their own way," i.e., act like socialist producers. This type of management means that an organization covers all its expenditures from the revenues generated by its sales, and that the state bears no responsibility for its obligations. Organizational economic independence is realized this way through khozraschot, a system that is incompatible with subsidies and redistribution, and balancing the incomes of well-managed and poorly managed firms.

Because the principle of compensation assumes the existence of relationships of equivalence, khozraschot combines within itself the principle of centralized economic management with the use of market-price relationships and the law of value. Denying that the law of value plays an active role in practical economic planning and management frequently leads to a situation in which the nonnational costs of one producer are recognized as the socially justified costs, which then deforms the allocation structure of production factors within the economy and undermines economic incentives for organizations to maximize labor conservation through R&D progress.

One important function of the center, then, is to assure that valuations are accurate, because without accurate estimations of value those firms managing according to khozraschot principles cannot make the best use of the advantages of this technique.

Principles of Socialist Self-Management

Shifting firms to this newly defined khozraschot system will have an impact only if the employees themselves begin to feel like real managers of public property. For this reason organizational measures must be taken along with economic changes that will hopefully turn work collectives into units carefully managing the public property entrusted to them.

Long experience has confirmed that the fact that the means of production belongs to everyone does not mean by a long shot that every employee feels a responsibility for managing this property well. This feeling comes only through direct participation by collectives in enterprise management decisions, and from a willingness of senior managers to give collectives the final decisions in certain cases, and to be responsible for those decisions.

The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee on the 27th CPSU Congress states the following: "In a socialist society, especially under current conditions, management cannot be the sole responsibility of a small group of professionals. We know from theory as well as long experience that a socialist order can develop successfully only when the people themselves take care of their own affairs, when millions of people participate in political life. This is true worker self-management in the leninist sense, and it forms the basis of Soviet power."

The 27th CPSU Congress formulated the principles for implementing socialist self-management in all areas of social life, including the economy. Based on experiences in implementing the Law on Work Collectives and Their Increased Role in the Management of Enterprises, Facilities and Organizations, passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1983, the Congress decided that there needed to be a step by step expansion in the range of problems for which decisions of work collectives will be the final decisions. This included expanding the principles of election to include certain other types of enterprise managers, increase the role of member meetings of blue collar workers and other employees, as well as increasing the accountability for implementing their decisions. In this context the issue was raised as to whether or not a council of work

collectives should be active at the enterprise level between member meetings. This council would be composed of representatives from management, party, union, and Komsomol organizations, team councils, blue collar workers and experts.

When implementing the principles of socialist self-management in the economy, just as in every other area of public life, it is necessary to be aware of the socio-political laws governing the development of socialist societies. This means that the leading force and main guarantor of socialist self-management can be only the communist party, which itself is the highest form of socio-political, self-managed organization. This further means that socialist self-management cannot evolve apart from state control, but only within the context of the state, with the understanding that the system will penetrate further and further into all aspects of the life of the state, thereby increasing the support for democratic centralism.

Socialist self-management, which derives from the public ownership of the means of production and is based on this form of ownership, thus also becomes an important factor in strengthening and expanding this form of ownership.

The motive force of socialism, in fact, lies in this joining of centralism and democracy, of central managerial will and the initiative of work collectives. Fully applying these principles to public practice is a necessary condition for the successful execution of the strategy of accelerating socioeconomic development, and if socialism is ever to demonstrate its advantages over capitalism by force of its example in economic affairs and all other areas of public life.

9276/12851
CSO: 2400/169a

COMPREHENSIVE EXPERIMENT IN CZECH CRYSTAL DISCUSSED

Ceske Budejovice JIHOCESKA PRAVDA in Czech 30 Jan 87 p 3

[Interview with Eng Jan Kadoun, director of Czech Crystal Glass Works in Chlum u Trebone: "Comprehensive Experiment in Czech Cristal Glass Works"]

[Text] Government Resolution No 321/1986 provides for the testing, beginning on 1 January of this year, of aspects of the projected restructuring of the economic system at selected organizations, the testing to take place under the Comprehensive Experiment in Increased Responsibility and Accountability of Economic Entities for Efficient Growth. The Experiment has been under way since 1 January at two economic production units [VHJ], Jablonec Costume Jewelry and Novy Bor Crystalex. There is now one firm in our kraj that will be implementing the Experiment, the Czech Crystal Glassworks at Chlum u Trebone. We therefore requested an interview with the director of this firm, Eng Jan Kadoun.

[Question] The Experiment affects all aspects of enterprise activity, planning, financial management, wage resource allocation, credit policy, pricing, etc. What will be the major differences in your case?

[Answer] Our enterprise management has analyzed our performance in recent years in such a way that the data will be easily convertible to the format of the Experiment and so that we will be able to institute all the requisite measures with little difficulty. The major difference for us will be that in the past we were evaluated on the basis of eight critical indicators of the state plan, while this year there will be only two such indicators, the so-called received revenue standard and the exports to socialist countries in all charges paid prices standard.

[Question] Could you be more specific?

[Answer] The second target, exports to socialist countries in all charges paid prices is clear to every one of us, and we feel that as long as we produce high quality products we will have no problem meeting this goal. Received revenues represent money that we have actually depicted. This is a more complicated matter, especially related to Skloexport. The greatest discrepancies occur in the relationship between internal khozraschot management and the state budget. Let me give you one example: in recent

years 75 percent of our profits have been transferred to the state budget, while under the experiment the figure will be 65 percent; also, previously 40 percent of our depreciation charges were transferred to the state budget, now all these charges will remain with the enterprise.

[Question] What other charges do you perceive as significant?

[Answer] I would describe it as expensive labor. As of the end of 1986 we were contributing 20 percent of an employee's salary to social security. Beginning this year the figure will be 40 percent. This means that an employee who earns Kcs 30,000 annually will end up costing the firm not only the wages of Kcs 30,000, but an additional Kcs 12,000 in transfers to social security. If we eliminate this employee's job, on the other hand, we can put back the full amount of his wages plus Kcs 6,000 of the transfer payment into our wages payable fund. Furthermore, no average earnings standards have been set. If an organization makes enough money to increase wages it can do so. Nor have any limits been set on the size of the labor force. The assumption is that firms participating in the Experiment will be eliminating rather than adding employees, because the savings from eliminating jobs can be redistributed among the remaining employees, and the smaller the workforce with which you meet your targets the larger the average wage you can afford to pay. The de facto limits that have restricted us in the past have been removed. This includes limits on investments, new construction starts, etc.

[Question] This means, then, that you have to gain the cooperation of your people for this restructuring, and change their current ways of thinking and operating...

[Answer] Our intention is to acquaint every employee in detail with the principles of the Experiment, as well as with the specific tasks the fulfillment of which can result in a positive performance record for the enterprise. The Experiment also became an important point of discussion at the annual member meeting of our basic party organization. We expect the communists to be the ones who will create the conditions in individual plants and worksites for every employee to gain a full knowledge of these new principles and commit themselves to them. Our managers are rewriting this important document for all of our locations in terms both of positive motivation, incentives, and export stimulation as well as making clear that penalties will be levied for poor performance. At the same time the right of Party control will be exercised more often. The committee of the CPCZ basic party organization has placed under party control the fulfillment of the export to socialist countries target, the capital construction plans for the Chlum facility, and overall technical development throughout the Czech Crystal Glassworks, national enterprise.

9276/9190
CSO: 2400/148

MINISTER DESCRIBES PROSPECTS FOR FOOD INDUSTRY

Warsaw PRZEMYSŁ SPOŻYWCZY in Polish No 2, Feb 87 pp 39-40

[Interview with Stanislaw Zieba, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Industry: "Interview With Dr Hab Stanislaw Zieba, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Industry"]

[Excerpts] [Question]: Mr Minister, how would you assess investments in the food and agriculture industry during the past five-year period? Have the sizes of these investments played a major role in reducing the disparity between the resources of agricultural raw materials and the industry's processing capacity?

[Answer]: The good results of agriculture and the resulting increase in agriculturally derived raw materials resources accompany increases in the production of the food and agriculture industry, but there are great tensions. The modest scale of investment in the food and agriculture industry has unfortunately continued for a long time, more than 10 years. This has had an influence leading to increased decapitalization of fixed assets and large losses of raw materials. In certain branches of this industry, investment began just 3 years ago. The value of investment outlays calculated in fixed prices was 20 percent higher in 1985 than in 1982. By focusing efforts on changes in the investment structure, we have achieved substantial progress in developing production capacity in the bakery, dairy, and fruit processing branches. Unfortunately, there have been growing gaps between the supply of raw materials and processing capacity, especially in cold storage, grain storage and processing, and the processing of rape, sugar beets, and potatoes.

During the past five-year period the country's economic conditions have not permitted adequate increases in investments to develop the base for the food and agriculture industry, but the elaboration of solutions aimed at improving the production situation of the food and agriculture industry was an undoubtedly contribution of the past five-year period that set out to provide benefits for the future, with interest. I include among these above all the government's adoption of a ministry program for the modernization and development of the food and agriculture industry for 1986-1990 and the introduction of special credit conditions for investment undertakings in selected branches of this industry.

[Question]: So the current five-year period should be better for the development of the food and agriculture industry's production capacity?

[Answer]: By government decision, a few of the total 22 branches of agricultural food processing were singled out as being particularly important in investment activity. This means that the most important modernization and development ventures in these branches will be included in extended financing, with state budget participation. But full inculcation of the principle of active credit and self-financing of the enterprises within the food and agriculture industry should be purposely made the basis for activating investments in that industry. The ways to get out of the developmental recession should be sought largely in improvements in solutions of the economic reform. The specific features of agriculture and the food and agriculture industry must find their due place in the economic reform. We are also counting on mixed capital investments. For example, the potato industry plant in Woskrzenice will be built through a joint effort of Poland and the USSR. The same principles will be used to build cold storage plants, margarine plants, and other plants.

[Question]: Which branches of industry will be granted special treatment?

[Answer]: The direction of operation adopted grants priority to the following branches of the food and agriculture industry: the dairy, grain and milling, bakery, oil and fats, sugar refining, potato, fruit and vegetable branches, as well as refrigeration, food storage, and packaging.

In connection with the accelerated development of crop production, we should, for example, double the current capacity for drying and storing grain and greatly increase rape processing and margarine production. During the current five-year period, by building new grain processing and storage plants, we will reduce grain transport, expand market supply, and improve the quality of grain and flour products. We must also resolve or at least mitigate the problem of the shortage of cold storage and also increase the supply of nutrients for children. There will continue to be intensive expansion of milk processing and breadstuff production capacity.

[Question]: How would you assess the execution of other ministries' responsibility following from the government program to develop the food economy? In which areas are the difficulties the greatest?

[Answer]: The progress we intend to achieve in agriculture during the next few years is determined in our situation by the resources directed to agriculture, mainly technical resources and those of chemical origin, but also investment outlays. After the demand for basic cultivation equipment is satisfied, agriculture suffers from a shortage of plant protection machinery and equipment, as well as services for livestock, especially cows. The level of application of mineral fertilizers and lime for the soil is also far from the demand, and we can even see an obvious slide backwards in supply over the past 4 years. Although we have achieved progress in plant protection in fighting disease, pests, and weeds attacking agricultural crops and orchard material, nonetheless, the level of pesticide consumption is less than half a kilogram of active substance per hectare of farmland, and this shows the great

distance between us and most European countries, which average 4-6 kilograms of active substance per hectare. In this area, as in the application of lime, there must be the greatest progress to achieve greatest crop increases in relative terms.

As these several examples show, agriculture has barriers to overcome similar to those of food processing. Inasmuch as in the food and agriculture industry the basic difficulties also apply to the supply of materials. One of the most important production barriers the industry faces today is the shortage of packaging.

This does not mean that we are inactive with regard to these difficulties and many others. Thus, actions in the realm of the development of the packaging industry in our country, owing to the gravity of the problem and the need to commit foreign-exchange funds, are bringing about improvement, but over a longer period of time, one that extends beyond the present five-year period. The rank of other problems and the scale of the difficulties in resolving them is great and must therefore all the more inspire intensive efforts.

[Question]: What sort of changes in branch organization, in your opinion, are providing for greater working effectiveness in the food and agriculture industry?

[Answer]: In keeping with the guidelines of the Tenth Party Congress, the system of management in the food and agriculture industry will be earmarked by the inculcation of the second stage of the economic reform, forcing improvement in the effective use of raw and other materials, an increase in labor productivity, and improvement in the quality of goods by making a direct connection between the enterprises' economic and financial results and the earnings of plant management.

I think that the organization of the branches will evolve only in a way justified by the enterprises' and society's interest in the direction of tying the plants' operations goal to the needs of market demand. This direction of evolution of branch management should favor the accumulation of funds and joint investment ventures of significance to the whole branch. This at the same time precludes the possibility of any sort of reorganization not implied by the enterprises' needs or not socially justified. Job audits and a review of structures will counteract the growth of economic administration.

[Question]: To what extent does the economic reform have an impact on the effectiveness of utilizing raw materials and energy in the food and agriculture industry?

[Answer]: Production progress in food and agriculture processing accompanies a gradual increase in the effectiveness with which the major production factors are managed. During the past 3 years, the level of consumption of raw materials in food processing declined by 5 percent, while labor productivity rose by 15 percent, and the productivity of fixed assets increased by 6.5 percent. The industry's enterprises undertook many efforts to reduce losses and waste of raw materials and other materials and to step up recycling efforts. New solutions are being introduced in the realm of technical

progress, inventions, and rationalization. To an ever greater extent, the relationship between employees' individual earnings and the effective use of raw materials and energy is being strengthened.

Overall, in 1983-1985 the food and agriculture industry enterprises saved a total of 32 billion zlotys, 19 billion of which came from saving raw materials and other materials and 2 billion of which came from saving fuel and energy. Despite the fact that there is still a great deal to do, the progress achieved shows that the enterprises of the food and agriculture industry appreciate the need for thrift and savings and understand the benefits to be gained from them.

10790
CSO: 2600/556

BANK OFFICIAL DESCRIBES POLES' SAVINGS PATTERNS

Bydgoszcz GAZETA POMORSKA in Polish 28 Feb-1 Mar 87 p 3

[[Interview with Marian Bartkowiak, director of the Deposits department at the main office of the Polish National Bank, by Anna Jablonska: "Savings Trends at the PKO [Polish Savings Bank]?" subtitled "Savings Deposits and Problems Both are Growing"]]

[Excerpt] [Question] Rumors about a currency revision are continually recurring. Waves of hoarding various goods can be observed in stores. Consumers want to get rid of their zlotys. How does all this affect savings accounts at the PKO?

[Answer] People increasingly understand that it is more profitable to keep money in the bank than in the proverbial stocking. Last year the public's savings deposits in the PKO increased by 28.5 percent and in cooperative banks by 23 percent. Savings deposits in banks at the end of December totaled 1 trillion 987 billion zlotys. Four-fifths of this amount was deposited at the PKO and the remainder, in cooperative banks.

[Question] It is being said that the rise in savings deposits is directly attributable to market problems. In other words, it is the so-called deferred demand that accounts for it.

[Answer] Undoubtedly this is a valid assumption, but only to some extent. After all, the growth in savings has been higher than the growth in money supply. But the public's interest in longterm forms of savings also has been growing. Of the increase of 351 billion zlotys in savings deposits last year only 98 billion or less than 28 percent was in the form of regular savings accounts, that is, the kind from which funds are most often withdrawn, precisely whenever the stores have something suitable to offer. Our analyses indicate, besides, that deposits in these regular savings accounts at the PKO revolve on the average over a period of about 280 days.

[Question] These regular savings accounts pay only 6 percent interest. Only 6 percent, considering that the scale of inflation is at least three times as high.

[Answer] Nowhere in the world is the interest paid on savings account fully commensurate with the rate of inflation. Besides, we apply differentiated rates of interest ranging from that 6 percent to 15 percent. The average interest rate is more than 9 percent.

[Question] This is exactly one-half of the inflation rate.

[Answer] And this surely is not a bad situation.

[Question] That depends on who says it. For example, holders of 5-year certificates of deposit or bonds, which pay the maximum interest rate, are quite differently situated from small savers who maintain regular savings accounts. In this connection, could you comment in more detail on the so-called extreme interest-rate span? Who are the maximum savers, and where?

[Answer] Unfortunately, we lack current data on the subject. The most recent data are 4 years old. Since then much has changed and thus there would be no sense in referring to them. We are as yet preparing, together with the Bank of the Food Industry, another "vivisection" of the nature of savings accounts maintained at our bank.

[Question] How do Polish savers compare with those in other countries?

[Answer] We lack as yet the most up-to-date statistics. But of a certainty our neighbors to the south and west [Czechoslovaks and East Germans] are more thrifty and save more in relation to their average monthly wages.

[Question] How many savings accounts are there?

[Answer] Including clearing-savings accounts, approximately 37 million. But it should be borne in mind that many of our citizens maintain several different forms of savings.

[Question] In what type of savings accounts is most of the money deposited?

[Answer] The highest total, 470 billion zlotys, is kept in regular savings accounts, followed by 1-year accounts, paying 10 percent interest, and 3-year accounts, paying 13 percent. Special accounts for purchase of dwellings contain altogether 162 billion zlotys. The aggregate amount of funds kept in long-term bonds, which pay the highest interest rate, is estimated at 97 billion zlotys, and in certificates of deposit, 20 billion zlotys less.

[Question] Recently the press, radio, and television have been disseminating frequently desperate and sometimes publicly tearful appeals by bank tellers for the return of mistakenly paid out funds. Is not this a perilous signal? It undermines the prestige of banks. Elderly people who remember how the prewar banks used to operate say that formerly such instances and mistakes had been unheard of. And even if they did happen and honest customers themselves brought back the overpayment, the tellers used to insist that no such mistake had been made. Their honor and fear of losing their jobs prevented them from admitting it.

[Answer] True, but at the time the position of the bank teller had been more prestigious.

[Question] I wish such a situation would prevail even now or perhaps in the immediate future, and that the PKO customer would not be made to feel like a petitioner.

1386
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COLUMNIST QUESTIONS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO ECONOMIC WOES

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 12, 21 Mar 87 p 12

[Article by (KTT): "From Top and From Bottom"]

[Excerpt] Recently I spent several hours in the company of economists who are, I suspect, persons of the highest repute whose opinions count and theories do not derive from staring at the ceiling. The conversation was more or less as follows: the market is the means of restoring the health of the economy and putting it on its feet; the market and a genuine interplay of market forces can begin to operate once we abandon the subsidy system; if we abandon the subsidy system, then prices are bound to rise markedly. And hence, in a nutshell, there can be no economic health unless prices rise. How simple, logical, and consistent.

How simple, logical, and consistent it is, and yet all of us, both I and those economists whom I had heard, feel impaled on the horns of a dilemma: in theory we are perfectly aware that there is probably no other way, but in practice, as ordinary citizens, each day we perceive that our earnings are a diminishing part of our expenditures, so that if this situation continues, one day this wondrous Polish miracle will end and we shall be reduced to going around with a beggar's tin cup in hand. To reverse Goethe's famous dictum, theory is green and blooming but the tree of life is gray and somewhat withered.

Well then, let us take another look at theory. Why should the market restore the economy's health?

Probably because the elemental market mechanisms, supply and demand, indicate most accurately what the society needs and what it needs less, and also the true worth of everything. And here at once two big and rusty holes can be perceived in the iron logic of theory.

The first concerns precisely that mechanism of supply and demand. Namely, as we know from our experiences with the free market, competition should be a practical result of that mechanism. If commodity X is in great demand, this does not mean merely that its price may be higher, because people will be buying it anyway; it also means that producers will rush to increase its output so as to increase its supply to the market. And thereupon, after some time, the price of that commodity will begin to decline. But there will appear

various kinds of commodity X -- some better, some worse, some more expensive and some less, some packaged more attractively, some advertised better, universally available. Then producers will begin to fight for buyers, rather than buyers for the product. Ultimately, some equilibrium point is reached between supply and demand, and this can be termed a healthy market.

It is indeed perplexing that at a time when we talk so much about the market we talk so little about competition, although a little reflection will help understand this paradox. For competition presupposes the possibility of maneuvers, the possibility of altering the nature of production at discrete factories and plants, flexibility in reactions to the market. Could a tin cup factory in this country arrive at the conclusion that, e.g., it would derive higher profits by making "Minis" [passenger cars] instead of tin cups, and proceed accordingly with the conversion? Given the [questionable] quality of these cars, such a conversion would hardly be a dramatic leap forward in quality. Is it possible for a suitable number of new companies -- cooperatives or privately owned, it does not matter -- to arise in order to fill the fields in which the demand is greatest?

I do not know the answer to this, but I know for certain that, so long as there are no answers to precisely questions of this kind, which deal with systemic solutions, our discussion of the market will remain rather abstract.

Sometime ago, probably in 1982, a regulation was introduced enabling farmers to sell their meat surpluses at free-market prices; at the time, we were assured that, although these prices are astronomical, it is precisely they that will stimulate supply, meaning that the prices themselves will decline. I know from personal observation that there was at the time no shortage of producers ready to invade this domain. And it may be that this idea would have borne fruit in the form of a greater supply of meat at present, had it not been for the fact that that free-market provision was revoked even before the first piglet engendered thanks to it had the time to grow to adult size. Nowadays the same underlying idea is again broached, but the public's enthusiasm seems smaller as it were. Have the fodder stockpiles been depleted, or has the public's confidence in the durability of these maneuvers been undermined?

The other rusty hole of theory seems to me to be the belief that the abolition of subsidies will result in the evolution of real and logical though high prices. Nowadays I continually read in the Press and hear on the radio the bass voices of various enterprise managers announcing that, "in following the reform," they are going to refuse subsidies and hike prices. These gentlemen prate unctuously, like genuine captains of industry and economic strategists proclaiming to us the "dura lex sed lex" [hard laws (of economics)]. But I hear in their voices an overtone of not economic logic but chaos and greed, because not one of them is capable of calculating the extent to which these price hikes are due to the abandonment of subsidies and the extent to which they offer a splendid opportunity to conceal mismanagement, waste, overemployment, and organizational inefficiency.

Recently I came into the possession of an extraordinary document, a copy of guidelines distributed "according to the specified list of users" to film

studios and concerning the principles for applying the economic reform in the motion picture industry. Whoever has not seen it will find it incredible, but the 34 pages of that report contain a roster of decrees and ordinances on the reform couched in dry legalese. Please, pay attention: these 34 pages do not discuss the principles of the reform but merely specify the government-issued and other documents that have to be read in order to understand what that reform is about. But the practical effect of all this is such that a Lodz film studio operating in accordance with all these regulations, whose titles alone take 34 pages to list, charges a filmmaking team a fee of 12,000 zlotys daily for leasing a pair of boots used in the shooting. This money alone would suffice for ordering a new custom-made pair of boots each day from Kielman, but then what would be that 34-pages long list of regulations for?

I used to be, perhaps injudiciously, one of those who believed that the upward movement of prices is not only a trend toward a market equilibrium but also a way of improving quality. Minister Krasinski had at one time explained this to us so convincingly, and with such charm, that it was difficult to disbelieve him. To me, illusions of this kind were conclusively dispelled by the privately owned car wash in Saska Kepa [Warsaw], that is, an establishment that is certainly not subsidized by anyone and operates on market principles. Namely, each month and sometimes sooner one or another piece of equipment has been disappearing from that car wash. Either the blower for drying cars breaks down, and never gets repaired again, or yet another brush stops working, or the water-spray machine emits a more feeble spray. In a word, the car wash is becoming less and less efficient, but the price for washing a car is regularly increased. There exists a direct relationship between the rising price and the declining quality of service; the worse their service, the more they charge for it. If such a situation can happen in a privately owned company, what about the socialized sector with its 34-page long list of laws and other regulations, which offer a ready-made field for maneuver, for finding whatever happens to be convenient?

Recently I read two interesting news stories, both about the Soviet Union. The first concerns an extensive article by Henry Kissinger who, following a recent visit to Moscow, declared that abolishing subsidies in certain fields of the Soviet economy is necessary because, as he had been told, the subsidy system led to such absurdities that it became worthwhile to buy subsidized children's clothing in order to use it as rags for cleaning and washing passenger cars, because the prices for that clothing happened to be fixed at the lowest possible level. However, Kissinger believes that abandoning these subsidies will not result in shortages or unavailability of children's clothing, but will prompt looking for perhaps more rational sources of polishing cloths and rags.

The other news story originates in the Polish press, which reports that in the USSR the government has decided to buy up all the old and no longer produced types of passenger cars, because it is not profitable to maintain factories manufacturing spare parts for these cars. Sellers of worn jalopies will have the right to purchase new cars outside the waiting lists. Has any establishment in this country ever produced or is producing as yet spare parts for the Warszawa or Mikrus passenger cars? Is anyone producing spare parts for household washing machines, now that Polish industry has discontinued making

them (surely out of a desire to relieve the lot of working women -- this decision was probably taken right after the celebration of March 8 [Woman's Day]?)

Something is standing between the logical and reasonable theory of economics and everyday life, something that causes it to look completely different from the top than from the bottom.

1386
CSO:2600/495

REORGANIZATION OF POLISH OCEAN LINES OUTLINED

Gdansk TECHNIKA I GOSPODARKA MORSKA in Polish No 1, Jan 87 pp 3-5

(Article by Dr Jan Szomburg, affiliated with the University of Gdansk:
"Organizational Changes in Polish Ocean Lines")

[Excerpts] The economic and financial results of enterprises and the level of management effectiveness they achieve depend not only on the material and human resources they have available but also on the way they are utilized, that is, on the quality of management. The level of management depends in turn to a great extent on the organizational structure, in terms of the effect of the structuring of elements and actions (functions, improvements, and responsibilities). Rational organizational structure does not of itself produce profitability, but it is a special sort of catalyst for it. The importance of organizational structure as a key though intermediate instrument in achieving economic goals has recently been appreciated by Polish Ocean Lines (PLO). Despite the reduction in tonnage, PLO is still one of the largest ship lines in the world. In the face of the difficulties the company has been having for several years with profitability, it has decided to take a truly drastic step by basically restructuring its previous organization.

The first step came as of 1 September 1986, and the second, on 1 January 1987. PLO therefore followed other well-known line shippers, such as Nedlloyd, Hapag-Lloyd, CMB, Incotrans, Sea-land, and Zim Navigation, who changed their organizational structure earlier, adapting it to the demands of container technology and a changing environment. It is worth noting that this basically difficult operation was instigated, planned, and implemented by the enterprise itself, with the active support of worker self-government bodies.

Circumstances and Assumptions Underlying the Reorganization

The general circumstance underlying the reorganization of PLO was the inadequacy of the previous organizational structure in terms of current drastically different conditions under which the enterprise was operating: technical and engineering, market, financial, economic, and legal systems conditions. This inadequacy in practice appeared in the form of dysfunction. The following factors in particular called for a general change in the organizational structure:

Application of new technology: containerization in the production sphere and computers in the administrative sphere,

Long-term worsening of the situation on the sale and supply market,

Tighter economic and financial conditions in connection with low profitability and the requirements of the economic reform,

A new legal systems situation related to the economic reform.

The assumptions adopted in planning the new structure were directly related to the circumstances mentioned above. The main assumption is adaptation to a consolidation strategy, which generalizes the demands the enterprises faces in terms of the conditions under which it now has to function. A more detailed list of these assumptions is as follows:

To insure greater cohesiveness (consistency) in operations among the enterprise's organizational units both in terms of the environment and internally,

To insure that the requirements of container and computer technology are met adequately, for example, through the creation of organizational conditions for rational use of container equipment throughout the entire enterprise,

To insure general improvement and cost reductions in management, for example, by additional regulation of the tasks, authority, and responsibilities of the various units and positions, flattening of the organizational structure, increasing management spread, reducing the number of organizational units, levels of management, and managerial positions; and increasing management discipline and control,

Increasing the role of the strategic concept function (in order to extend the projection time in decision-making and provide for more innovation),

More promarket stance of the organization, for example, by making the trade function more visible,

Increasing top management's executive powers in carrying out strategy and, in part, the tactics of the enterprise, that is, generally making it more controllable, for example, through the creation of conditions for effective operation under crisis conditions,

Shortening response time, increasing operating flexibility and effectiveness in the various operational units, called "profit centers," for example, through actual decentralization of authorization and responsibility at the operations level and by creating organizational conditions for improving the "visibility" of the economic consequences of decisions made,

Increasing the functional-task purity of the various organizational units.

New Organizational Structure

The general direction of the enterprise's reorganization can be called consolidation. Therefore, the segmented institutional (divisional) structure will be eliminated, and in its place there will be a compact functional-line structure, based on functional sections. The ships' trade exploitation units, previously distributed among four exploitative units, will be integrated into a single section of the Assistant to the Director-in-Chief for Trade and Exploitation Affairs, a section which will also handle shipping policy, container utilization, marketing, foreign cooperation, and stowage. The elimination of the operational (line) units is first of all aimed at neutralizing the special-interest approach sometimes noted in the units and at facilitating decision-making at the "intersection" of the interests of various operational units, for example, decisions on shifting tonnage from one line to another. This means better coordination of commercial operation of the ships throughout the enterprise. Second, there is the issue of bolstering PLO's position with respect to customers on both the sales and supply market. A uniform approach, among other things, will create prospects for gaining more advantageous conditions in contracts signed with them. Third is the greater integration of shipping policy (which up until now has been in the central office) with ship operations (which the facilities handled). Fourth, better coordination of the use of the containers themselves. An element which will surely favor the attainment of these goals will be the location of all services mentioned in a single place physically (in the past they have been located in five separate places), which will naturally improve the flow of information.

The situation of commercial exploitation is similar to that of technical exploitation. The technical exploitation service is to be consolidated into a section of the Assistant to the Director-in-Chief for Technical Affairs. The accounting and financial services of the units will be integrated into a section under the Assistant to the Director-in-Chief, for Accounting and Financial Affairs, the Chief Accountant.

A fourth functional section will be directed by the Assistant to the Director-in-Chief for Economic Affairs and Development. This section will include, among other things, the planning and analysis functions previously handled by separate specialized organizational units in operations units, and part of the tasks previously handled by the Center for Research and Development in Liner Shipping.

The fifth section is the section of the Assistant to the Director-in-Chief for Employee Affairs, which has also taken over the duties previously handled by the social unit, as well as administrative functions.

Alongside these five sections in the structure, there is also the section of the Director-in-Chief, who has taken over the service of the Chief Navigator, which shows the intention to improve contacts between the top level managing the whole enterprise and the top level of ship management, as well as the desire to increase shipping safety.

Alongside the functional sections, PLO's organizational structure (in the second stage) will also include one other section, the Section for Supply and Transport, the Maritime Culture and Information Center, and the Interplant

Investment Coordination Center. Overall, the number of separate elements in PLO's structure will clearly decline, from 16 to nine, and the organizational scheme has become far more transparent.

Among the more detailed solutions, it is worth mentioning those which concern a basic function in the enterprise, commercial utilization of ships. In the section of the Assistant for Commercial Exploitation, three line service groups were identified: the American and Australian Liner Services Group, the Group on Liner Services to Asia, the South Pacific, and the Mediterranean Sea, and the European and West Africa Liner Services Group. The division was based on the criterion of technology and geography. Further division into exploitative units is dual in nature: it is either based on a division into an acquisition section and an operations section (for example, as in the case of the North-American Liner Service) or the division is along traditional lines (this applies, for example, to the South-American Liner Service).

Thus, the role of profit centers will be played either by the services (in the first case mentioned above) or by the line sections (in the second case mentioned above). In both cases the task profile has been comprehensively structured. That is, it encompasses the control of costs and income both. Therefore, the individual specialized units have been eliminated in those functions which existed in the former exploitation sections.

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PLANS TO DEVELOP SMALL INDUSTRY DESCRIBED

Bucharest REVISTA ECONOMICA in Romanian No 13, 27 Mar 87 pp 13-14

[Unattributed article: "Opportunities for Intensively Developing Small-Scale Industry"]

[Text] The priority objectives of the program for the development of small-scale industry in the 1986-90 period are: increasing the contribution of such units to the consumer market, providing certain construction materials from small local exploitations, cooperation with the national industry, performing processing services for economic units and private consumers, and developing the manufacture of products for export.

The development of the small-scale industry is based on the guidelines issued by RCP Secretary General Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, who said that "We must strive to ensure that the small-scale industry contribute approximately 18-20 percent of the value of the overall industrial production of the country."

The ab... tioned program envisages that by 1990 the value of the production-commo... of the small-scale industry should reach 8,000 lei per capita in each . The measures taken in the course of 1986 by the networks of small-scale industry units of people's councils, the artisans' cooperative, the cooperative of commodities production, procurement, and marketing, agricultural production cooperatives, and the small-scale food and catering industry organized by the Ministry of Domestic Trade and the Ministry of Food Industry prompted intensified efforts to utilize local resources of recoverable and reusable materials derived from the technological processes of industrial and forestry enterprises; the production of minor household articles and agricultural and gardening tools, and of semiprocessed vegetables and fruit increased, as did the production of artisans', decorative, and woven articles (much of it done at home) for domestic use and for export.

In 1986 the value of the industrial production-commodities was 17 percent higher than in 1985 for the entire small-scale industry, and the following increases were recorded for the various branches: 31.5 percent in food and catering production; 22.6 percent in the production of agricultural production cooperatives; 20.4 percent in the production of CENTROCOOP [Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives]; 16.4 percent in the production of UCECOM [Central

Union of Artisan Cooperatives], and 14.8 percent in the production of people's councils.

The development of local small-scale industry plays an important role for securing local budget revenues. According to the value index of per capita small industry production (production-commodities), the counties can be classified in four groups:

Value of per capita production-commodities	No. of counties
3,000-4,000 lei	18 counties
4,001-5,000 lei	11 counties
5,001-6,000	8 counties
over 6,000 lei	4 counties

This classification shows that in 1986 over half of the counties achieved a production in excess of 4,000 lei per capita, thus ensuring the conditions for attaining the 8,000 lei per capita level set for 1990. The national average per capita production-commodities in the small industry sector was 4,875 lei, which was higher than the level planned for 1986. The best achievements were obtained in the Satu Mare County, which had a per capita small industry output of 6,500 lei.

Resources Close at Hand

By putting to economic uses important quantities of raw and other materials such as: brick clay, limestone, sorted quarry and ballast-pit minerals, pig iron parts (scrap iron), and important volumes of straw, reeds, twigs and corn husks for woven articles, forest fruit, scrap rubber and plastics, log and lumber end pieces, forest cuttings, and fabric and other remnants, the manufactured consumer goods delivered to the market stock were 111 percent higher than the plan provisions. The above raw and other materials were turned into minor household articles, agricultural and gardening tools, woven willow and reed articles, brooms, furniture, construction and carpentry materials, toys, textiles, and leather articles. To that we can add sugar products, soft drinks, and canned vegetable and fruit products made by the small food and agricultural industry.

The small industry units of the artisans' cooperative manufactured both made-to-order articles and serial productions (new and restored spare parts, textile wear, footwear, furniture, doors and windows, ceramic blocks, etc.). CENTROCOOP units increased their production of cotton and wool-type textiles, knitwear, rubber and synthetic footwear, lacquers and dyes, sugar and pastry products, and canned vegetables and fruit.

Another major area of activity of the small-scale industry is cooperation with national industry enterprises, and the timber processing and forestry industry. In 1986 such cooperation ventures expanded in the manufacture of parts, subassemblies, and metal articles for enterprises such as: Autobuzul, Bucharest; Tehnoton, Iasi; Clujeana, Cugir Mechanical Enterprise, and Infratirea, Oradea; Electroputere, Craiova; and the Constanta Shipyards.

One of the counties in which the small-scale industry has fully demonstrated its potential to promote regional development, is Bihor County. The Bihor county union of production, procurement, and marketing cooperatives incorporates many units that can serve as a model of small-scale industry in both urban and rural environments; the same can be said of the Bihor County Union of Artisans' Cooperatives.

For example, the production-service department of the production and procurement cooperative of the Valea lui Mihai commune is comprised of a casting workshop that produces bearing casings for conveyor belts for the mining industry, agricultural ground levellers, and grills for livestock facilities; a mechanical workshop that produces box pallets for storage facilities, lids for the oil filters of tractor engines, disks and flanges for railway car buffers, shoe trees, metal capsules for soft drinks, standing and bedside lamps, and brackets; a mechanical workshop producing a varied range of machinery and equipment bearing the trademark "Practic," such as: motor seeders for small-scale farming, a Yale key stamping machine for consumer service mechanical workshops, a household rotary vise, and boring machines of various sizes for mechanical workshops; a garment and knitwear workshop which specializes in the serial production of children and junior dresses, school uniforms, and various knitwear articles; a leather workshop which manufactures school bags, travel bags, and belts. In addition, the cooperative has a pastry laboratory, a soda and soft drink bottling facility, and a bakery. The customer service department also covers the entire envisaged list of services, i.e., 35 services. Many of the products manufactured at Valea lui Mihai are exported.

In the urban environment, the Production and Service Enterprise (IPP) of Oradea widely cooperates with the national industry in the manufacture of parts for the electronic and electrical engineering sector (Tehnoton, Iasi; Electroarges, Cucea de Arges; Electronica, Bucharest; and Baneasa Enterprise for Radio Parts and Semiconductors). IPP Oradea manufactures for those enterprises a number of parts that in the past used to be imported, such as: the RAG ambase, a part used for diodes, contacts, contact nails, and cable casings, which are in great demand for electronic circuit diagrams, and for which the enterprise itself provided the technologies and equipment. The annual value of the production of such items ranges in the millions of dollars, and contributes to the development of electronics related sectors. The enterprise also designed and put into production a new type of plastic zip fastener that in the past had to be imported. Ingenious solutions were also devised for other current economic requirements, such as the container now used to transport bottles in the commercial network, for the manufacture of which IPP Oradea itself built a spot welding machine.

Local Energy Resources

For the heating of the production bays and administrative offices, IPP Oradea drilled a geothermal water well in the vicinity of the plant, which now supplies 20 liters of water per second at a temperature of 70° Centigrade. Thermal energy is recovered from the geothermal water through heat exchangers that ensure about half of the energy required for heating, hot water, timber

drying in the carpentry workshop, and heating the electroplating baths in the metal plating workshop. Some 527 tons of fuel a year can be saved through the use of geothermal water.

Throughout the county, the consumer cooperative has promoted the utilization of other unconventional sources of energy, too. Thus, the tourist complex Piatra Craiului and the Sacadat public catering unit have two solar panel installations, and similar systems are being expanded at Valea lui Mihai, at the Odorhei self-service facility, the Oradea incubation unit, and the Biharia pastry bakery. The livestock farms of Girisu de Cris and Biharia have two biogas installations. A micropower plant with a potential of 5 kW is being installed on the Peta stream for the knitwear department of the Sintandrei cooperative, and a lumber saw will be activated by the Bulz waterfall at Valea Iadului. The achievements of the Bihor small-scale industry reflect a thorough understanding of the line of development pursued in this sector of activity, and a good adaptability to the conditions and requirements of the national economy and of the county.

Processing Equates Utilization

Another area of activity of small-scale industry are the local processing services of certain raw materials: furriers, carding, knitwear, dyers, children's articles, agricultural services, etc.

In this respect, the people's councils and agricultural production cooperatives have not fulfilled their plan tasks, particularly concerning the organization of repair shops for housing, furniture, and household articles; this shortfall is also due to the nonfulfillment of contracts for the delivery of spare parts. Some counties have not fulfilled their programs to diversify services, and the consumers are still insufficiently informed about the range of services available. Shortfalls have also been recorded in the manufacture of children's wear, school uniforms, household articles, winter coat substitutes, etc.

The following measures are required to further increase the contribution of small-scale industry to meeting consumer requirements for goods and services:

--more active support and guidance of industrial units by the central coordinating bodies: the Center for Production, Service, and Construction, UCECOM, CENTROCOOP, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, the Ministry of Food Industry, and the county people's councils, which bear specific responsibilities under Law No 2/1980 for coordinating regional activities of this type;

--overseeing the implementation of the programs established to diversify and update product ranges, improve the quality of the products manufactured by small industry units, and redesign various existing products;

--identify new local resources, more intensively utilize recoverable and reusable materials, and widely capitalize on the skills of the designers trained by our institutes of higher education;

- increase the volume of consumer goods for domestic consumption and export (developing and diversifying folkart and artisans' production in all the counties);
- better utilizing the existing production capacities, modernizing them, and running the installations and equipment at full capacity;
- developing and diversifying the range of food products by utilizing available raw materials, with a view to meeting consumer requirements and facilitating household work; this is to be carried out by the Ministry of Food Industry and the Ministry of Domestic Trade, as well as the small-scale producers of foodstuffs;
- a closer cooperation with the national industry and with plan coordinators, with a view to allocating raw and other materials in keeping with the approved consumption norms;
- small industrial units must initiate concrete actions to train and improve the skills of the working personnel in accordance with the activities envisaged in the approved programs;
- develop and diversify the range of services available, and improve their quality.

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USE OF NONCONVENTIONAL ENERGY FOR TOURISM

Bucharest REVISTA ECONOMICA in Romanian No 11, 13 Mar 87 pp 7-8

[Article by Gheorghe Barbu]

[Text] The particular characteristics of tourism as an economic sector mark the cooperation relations between it and the rest of the national economic complex. A primary such characteristic concerns the siting of tourist facilities, which can only follow the criteria of optimal use of the infrastructure in correlation with the optimal utilization of the actual tourist attractions: mineral springs, ski slopes, recreational and cultural tourist routes, etc. Consequently, tourist facilities often appear as relatively isolated from urban networks, including that of energy supply (electricity, thermal energy, natural gas, etc.).

The particular intensity of tourist activities in areas such as the Danube delta, spas, and mountain resorts requires that the specific economic activities capitalize on a broad range of energy resources, in keeping with the opportunities offered by current technologies, particularly on unlimited resources. Thus, the tourist sector can become increasingly less dependent on exhaustible energy resources.

Tourist activities designed to meet the requirements of tourists depend to a very large extent—as do all other activities, in fact—on the production of energy. Even if in the tourist sector, energy in its various forms does not hold a position similar to that in other branches (transportation, industry, etc.) regarding the primary element of cost, its role is no less important for the optimal performance of various specific services. In point of fact, energy constitutes an important element of tourist calculations, too, because its availability is one of the essential conditions for any service. The dependence of the tourist sector on the energy production can be divided into two groups: direct and indirect. The direct dependence concerns the fuel required for tourist transportation, cooking, and heating (during the cold months of the year) the accommodations, public catering units, treatment facilities, and year-round recreational facilities.

An important volume of the energy consumed in the tourist sector goes to tourist stopovers, mainly to accommodation and public catering units.

In view of the fact that the country's energy situation is tight and that certain uses must be cut, certain of the available resources must be used more intensively, and measures must be taken to preclude any thermal (in the case of heating) or lighting loss.

Solar Energy

Although substitute sources of energy are still at the initial stage of utilization—some of them requiring improvements in the production technology, and thus more time—tourism is one of the sectors that already can and does utilize such resources. The use of solar energy is one of the solutions that deserves further great attention.

International and domestic scientific research and technological development have highlighted the possibility of using solar energy especially for producing low heat, for cooling, and for producing mechanical energy for engines and pumps, and in the future for producing electrical energy. The efficient conversion of solar energy to low temperature heat and the manufacture and improvement of the technological equipment and systems for utilizing it for heating (household hot water and heating) is one of the main targets of research and development in the area of solar energy and its utilization in the tourist sector.

In Romania, the average annual value of the total radiation is approximately 1,340 kWh/square meter, and the average sunlight duration is about 2,000 hours/year. Since the sun is at its strongest between the months of May and September, the utilization of solar energy is best suited to seasonal tourist facilities such as inns, stopovers, hotels in the Black Sea and Danube Delta resorts, etc. Capturing devices for solar energy produce a yearly volume of power equal to about 40 kg of conventional fuel per square meter. Thus, the 1,140 square meters of solar panels experimentally installed in 1980 in the Saturn and Eforie Nord resorts have from the very beginning permitted annual savings of approximately 40 tons of conventional fuel. On the basis of those results, further solar panels were installed at many hotels in sea side resort towns for the purpose of supplying hot water.

In the 1986 season, alone the 14,000 square meters of solar panels installed in the resorts of Saturn, Venus, Cap Aurora, and Jupiter made it possible to save about 400 tons of conventional fuel. In the 1987 summer season many more solar panels will be in operation along the sea side than in the previous year, and thus fuel savings can be expected to be substantial and the investment costs to be recovered within a relatively short period of time. For example, according to plans, the solar water heating installation for the swimming pool of the Parc-Bucharest hotel will be amortized within about 7 years from fuel savings.

Expanding the utilization of solar panels in tourist facilities deserves further attention in view of the fact that in many areas with a large number of hours of sun light, conventional energy resources, which are increasingly difficult to provide, are being used. Simple solutions for the utilization of solar energy can be adopted for, among other things, heating indoors or outdoors pools in or near hotels, heating the shower water at treatment spas

or beaches, etc. In cases such as that the solar panels can yield an even higher productivity, since the water temperature is lower than that required for household purposes.

Wind Energy

Another form of energy that also offers important potential resources for tourist facilities is wind energy. The areas endowed with real possibilities in this respect are those in which the average wind velocity is no lower than 4 meters/second. Mountain regions have a great utile wind energy potential. Within the Carpathian circle the wind is an almost permanent meteorological phenomenon, sometimes reaching very great speed. The periods of atmospheric calm in the course of the year are the shortest in the country. Thus, according to the data furnished by four meteorological stations--Lacauti, Omu Peak, Tarcu, and Vladeasa—which are located at altitudes between 1,777-2,509 meters, the average annual frequency of calm weather ranges between 4.1 percent at Omu Peak and 8.5 percent at Tarcu. The periods of calm increase slightly during the warm season, i.e., between June-September, but would not affect the utilization of wind energy installations during that time of the year.

In the mountains, wind energy can be utilized for both electricity and for pumping potable water for tourist facilities located at a distance from towns, especially huts. Among the tourist huts located in areas with a great potential for this type of energy are those at Ciucas, Caraorman, and Babele (Prahova County), Curmatura and Piatra Mare (Brasov County), Dochia (Neamt County), Prejba and Turnuri (Sibiu County), etc.

Other areas with a high wind energy potential are the sea coast and the Danube Delta (which used to be known as the "Windmill Country"). The average annual wind velocity in those area exceeds 4 meters/second. However, in the area of the resorts the atmospheric calm is higher than in the mountains—11 percent at Mangalia and over 15 percent in Constanta—and prevails during the most intensive tourist period. The Danube Delta is, generally speaking, more windy in summer, while December and February are the calmer months; consequently, the conditions there are more favorable for wind energy utilization during the warm season, when tourism is higher, too.

The utilization of the wind as a source of energy depends, to a large extent, on the quality and productivity of the eolian installations. Our country already has noteworthy achievements along this line (for example, the eolian installations produced by IMA-Bucharest), especially when one considers that such installations come in varying capacities and thus are used for different purposes. In the tourist sector, aside from generating electrical energy, eolian installations add a decorative element to the scenery, making certain places even more attractive.

Geothermal Energy

In many spa resorts--such as Baile Felix, Baile Herculane, Calacea (Timis County), Baile Boghis (Salaj County), Sacele (Gorj County), and others--the presence of mineral geothermal springs offer possibilities for household

utilizations, something that is already done in some of the above resorts, like Baile Felix, Baile Boghis, etc. One of the problems that has to be dealt with in such resorts is to utilize the springs without impairing the treatment functions, which is the primary purpose of those resorts.

All of the abovementioned nonconventional energy resources present the added advantage that they do not affect the environment and do not pollute the air, something that is essential for preserving the attraction of the tourist resorts and points of interest.

"White coal"

One of the means that the tourist sector can use to secure electrical energy for isolated facilities (huts, inns, stopovers) and to supplement the energy requirements of spas and other resorts is the utilization of hydropower on a small scale. This type of solution deserves attention because the respective resource is not limited in time, is found in abundance in mountain areas (which are intensely favorable for tourism), and its utilization does not involve any environmental pollution.

A study done for the entire country by the Institute of Hydropower Studies and Planning (Inventory of the Hydropower Micropotential of the Socialist Republic of Romania, July 1982) shows that the hydropower micropotential that can be utilized is high, and that among the counties rich in such resources are many counties with a developed tourist industry, such as: Vilcea, Caras-Severin, Brasov, Sibiu, Gorj, Harghita, Hunedoara, Mures, Covasna, Suceava, and others. Regarding efficiency, we want to note that the hydropower micropotential can be tapped and exploited at relatively low cost (approximately 0.35 lei/kWh), which is half the minimum tariff for grid power.

The number of tourist localities and points of interest that can utilize the contribution of eventual hydropower microstations is very large. In the Vilcea County, for example, we find Caciulata (with a micropower station on the Caciulata stream), Baile Olanesti (with a micropower station on the Olanesti stream), Voineasa (with a relatively large number of microstations on the Lotru and on some of its tributaries), and so forth; in the Maramures County: Borsa, Sapinta commune, and others.

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YOUTH ATTITUDES ON EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES EXAMINED

Warsaw I.T.D. in Polish No 15, 12 Apr 87 pp 2-3

[Interview with Professor Maria Jarosz, sociologist, by Piotr Gadzinowski:
"Barriers: It Is More Difficult for Young People Now Than It Was Just After
the War"]

[Text] [Question]: Professor, are we still an open society, one that makes it
possible for young people of different backgrounds to get ahead?

[Answer]: The terms "open" and "closed" are always relative. In every
society, even in a static "closed" social structure, we find individuals who
managed to get through, but the society, when young people have relatively
great opportunities to change their social position and to obtain an
education, have the chance to enter the profession they wish, and can choose
where they live. The Polish society of the 1980's has a closed social
structure and basically does not provide such possibilities.

[Question]: That is a shocking statement! We have become accustomed to the
notion that our society is "a society of equal opportunity," "of social
advancement."

[Answer]: This is the way it was in essence. From 1945 to the end of the
1960's, tremendous class-strata shifts occurred in it. It is enough to look
at the post-war intelligentsia. Only a small percentage come from families of
the intelligentsia, but as the years pass, the social structure has frozen,
and there have been fewer and fewer opportunities to get ahead. This process
was not written up in the scientific literature or noted by journalists.

[Question]: Could it be that this "closing" of the social structure went
unnoticed?

[Answer]: This is a certain process, and insofar as one can mark exactly the
beginning of processes, of "opening up," the process of the stiffening of
social structures began back during the 1960's. I wrote about this in my book
"Nierownosci spoleczne" (Social Inequalities), published in 1984. You can see
this clearly, if only by noting access to higher education. A rather precise
indicator is the "college opportunity index." It measures the percentage of
elementary schools graduates from worker, peasant, and intelligentsia families

entering as college freshmen. In 1968-1969, one grammar school graduate out of every seven from a worker's family, one out of every nine from a peasant family, and one out of every three from a family of the intelligentsia entered college. In 1983-1984 the figures were one out of every 11 from a worker's family, one out of every 23 from a peasant family, and one out of every three from the intelligentsia. As you can see, there were no changes among the intelligentsia.

[Question]: Does this mean that we are heading for a situation in which a child from the intelligentsia will continue that tradition, one of a worker will be a worker, and one of a peasant will be a peasant? A situation in which social position is inherited?

[Answer]: To a great extent this is already what is happening today. The children of an unskilled worker may at most be a skilled worker or technician. Similarly, the child of a peasant may remain in the country or take a job as a blue-collar worker. Of course, there are always some possibilities for breaking out of this pattern, but they are declining.

[Question]: But what is bad about passing on position and profession to one's children? After all, does this not have a positive effect on the quality of the vocations, creating tradition and professional culture?

[Answer]: In our country you often see it written that it is a good thing for a child from the family of a physician or lawyer to maintain the professional tradition, but this is a terribly pragmatic point of view.

[Question]: Perhaps this is the model of the stabilized society that we are finally reaching? A certain social order?

[Answer]: I think it is a bad model. I know of no foundations to justify the statement that because this is what has happened, that means that it is a good thing and we should only rejoice. Neither economic results nor social indicators like citizens' social commitment incline us to such a view. We must also remember the basics: we are living in a specific system and society. Our system was supposed to insure equality, not only before the law but also equality of opportunity in achieving the desired level of education, acquiring a vocation, and realizing aspirations. In a recent book, "Bariery zyciowe mlodziezy" (Life's Barriers Facing Youth), I collected a great deal of data showing how unequal opportunities were when we compared those of workers' and peasants' children to those of children of the intelligentsia, or those of youngsters living in villages and small towns with those of youngsters in large cities.

[Question]: One often hears statements from young people who supposedly give up on education. They think that college studies delay their start in the job world and that the earnings of young members of the intelligentsia are lower than those of workers. In the media this attitude is called the "practical orientation."

[Answer]: This is a misunderstanding. It is based on the assumption that everyone has the possibility of unlimited choice, and chooses for himself:

either I will be a member of the intelligentsia or not. Besides that, blue-collar workers do not always earn more than the intelligentsia. It all depends on the profession and place of employment. In reality it is usually like this: A child from a worker's or peasant's family goes to a worse elementary school. There with his poor vocabulary and meager cultural background, his position is lost. It is in elementary school that his fate is determined. Even if he declares his desire to acquire a vocation quickly, this is not his own motivation but the pressure of the environment. He chooses a vocational school, because in practice he does not have an alternative.

[Question]: Are you calling for having everyone graduate from college?

[Answer]: Not everyone, but all the best, regardless of what sort of family they come from. Equal opportunity consists of the fact that education, attractive vocation, and high social standing can be achieved by children from all walks of life, not just the privileged ones, but this does not mean that the less capable, the less industrious, or the lazy will have equal opportunities, just that the place of birth should not determine one's fate or ascribe one to a certain social environment. It is also worth noting that social prestige and position do not depend solely on the type of work or the size of earnings. I recently conducted research among single mothers raising children alone. These were poor women who had gone no further than elementary school. In talking about their problems with the school and with the social welfare institutions to which they often did not go, because they did not know how to phrase their requests, they pointed out the abyss between them and the people who manage to talk to people in the bureaucracy, the people who know how to take care of something without bribes, without being afraid that they might offend the person of whom they are making the request. According to these women, women often living below the minimum standard, the division in society consists of the fact that there are simple people, on the one hand, and the intelligentsia getting along just fine, on the other. This is a division not so much between the rich and the poor as between the educated and the uneducated. After all, the most recent research shows that education still is highly noted, and the university professor, surprisingly enough, holds the highest rank in the social prestige hierarchy.

[Question]: In recent years that position has diminished.

[Answer]: It is very strong again, because education not only provides various opportunities. It is also an autoelite value. It often happens that a young person graduates from college and then for a time is involved with earning money, but the education attained creates greater possibilities for a higher standard of living, for a qualitatively better life.

[Question]: Education is not the only barrier in life. Often the possibilities for training or an attractive job fall through for lack of housing. The high costs of living felt acutely in young families militate against training and education. Some young people say that they were born "too late," that they would have had greater opportunities for advancement and a preferable social position earlier!

[Answer]: It is true that they are late. At present, it is more difficult for young people than it was after the war. This is an unpopular statement, because people usually say that young people are all mixed up now, but they have less chances for housing today than they had 20 years ago. The average wait for an apartment today is 10-15 years longer than it was then. Access to desirable jobs is also shrinking. Suffice it to look at the mean age of managers' jobs now and during the years right after the war. It is also worth noting an adverse phenomenon related to youth health risks. Young men now have a projected lifespan several years shorter than a man of the same age had in the 1960's. This is the result of the "civilized diseases." Deaths from cancer and circulatory diseases have increased. There has been a rise in respiratory diseases stemming, for example, from smoking and environmental pollution. There are countries in which the rise in these diseases has been halted, but in Poland they are still on the increase.

[Question]: The prospects are not very encouraging. What is left for young people? To be frustrated? To leave the country? To earn a lot quickly, because there are such possibilities?

[Answer]: These are solutions for only a small group. I think that the causes of the frustration are not only or mainly the difficult material circumstances so much as the differences between what they see and what they read. Let us recall the Gierek years. Then there was the slogan "A Pole can." People said that rich citizens were creating a rich country. If somebody did not get rich -- and you could become rich in various ways -- then he was a loser, an ordinary jerk. One should probably give up the notion of "equal opportunities for young people."

[Question]: But will this encourage young people to commit themselves? Will it bolster prosocial attitudes? At present it is not just the managers whose mean age is rising. So is that of statistical members of the PZPR and allied parties, deputies, council members, and self-government activists. This is a very bad thing!

[Answer]: There are various reasons, often historical ones, for the low level of activity among young people. At present young people are usually involved in what help them get along themselves, in what produces rapid results, or in something that is exceptionally attractive, with great social weight. For several years I have been conducting research on the activity level of self-government organizations in large plants. We have recently noted some increase in young people's interest in this activity, but only when it is genuine activity and not a facade for decisions made on top. What counts are real actions, not facade.

[Question]: But in the questionnaires, young people still put "successful family life" and "interesting work" in first place. On the other hand, last place goes to "social and political activity." We often see the phenomenon of "closing in" to the family circle, the group of friends, or reduced contacts with the community.

[Answer]: This is characteristic of our society. First the family circle, one's closest friends, and then right after that, the country.

[Question]: This is also a result of social frustrations. If young people could have a greater role in determining their fate, their future, there would not be such pathology. Since it is not possible to insure young people of housing, or of equal opportunities for education and desirable jobs, maybe it would be worthwhile to at least give them greater opportunities in decisionmaking, in leadership?

[Answer]: I would like such an experiment very much, and sociologists would also surely favor it too. Would young people really handle certain matters better? Of course, provided that the criterion for selecting staff was competence and not just year of birth. I hope that young people will become involved wherever there are conditions for real activity, for improving their fate. If young people are to be encouraged to become active and to take part in various social and political organizations just to improve the demographic statistics, to make it look as though something is going on, then there is no real sense in doing it.

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